

BROWNSON'S
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ART. I. — INTRODUCTION. — *The Boston Quarterly Review.* — *Greeting to Old Friends.* — *Design of the Work.* — *Change of Views.* — *Eclecticism.* — *Saint-Simonism.* — *German Philosophy.* — *Philosophy of Life.* — *Theology.* — *The Church.* — *Law of Continuity.* — *Ultraists.* — *Conservatism.* — *Constitutionalism.* — *Moral and Religious Appeals.*

AT the close of the volume for 1842, I was induced to merge the Boston Quarterly Review, which I had conducted for five years, in the Democratic Review, published at New-York, on condition of becoming a free and independent contributor to its pages for two years. But the character of my contributions having proved unacceptable to a portion of its ultra-democratic subscribers, and having, in consequence, occasioned its proprietors a serious pecuniary loss, the conductor has signified to me, that it would be desirable for my connexion with the Democratic Review to cease before the termination of the original agreement. This leaves me free to publish a new journal of my own, and renders it, in fact, necessary, if I would continue my communications with the public. I have no fault to find with the conductor of the Democratic Review, Mr. O'Sullivan, — a gentleman for whom I have a very

high esteem. His conduct, so far as I am concerned, has been honorable, and even generous; but my self-respect prohibits me from living on another's generosity, or by means of an engagement profitable only to myself. I am, moreover, not unhappy to terminate an arrangement, into which I reluctantly entered, and from which I never really augured a favorable issue, and to return home, and, as it were, meet my old friends around my own fireside, where we may talk over matters at our ease, and in our own familiar way.

I have never been at home in the Democratic Review; I have felt, all the while, that I was among strangers, speaking to a strange audience, who knew not my face, and recognized no familiar tones in my voice. We were not, as the Mesmerizers say, in communication. No magnetic chain of sympathy united us, and no household feeling could spring up between us. They looked upon me as a stranger, as an intruder, and seemed to be all the while wishing for my expulsion. Under such circumstances, I received as little pleasure as I gave. Joyfully, then, I return home, and, resuming my old familiar speech and dress, meet again the kind and constant friends, who have always stood by me, and cheered me on, from first to last.

Never had a periodical a better list of subscribers, than had the Boston Quarterly Review, during the whole term of its existence. They were few, but they were serious, honest, earnest, affectionate. I felt, and still feel, though the faces of most of them are unknown to me, that they were my warm personal friends. They might, or might not, always agree with me; but they were always patient and respectful listeners; always appeared to be willing to hear what, and all, I had to say. When a clamor was raised against me, which fetched its echoes from one end of the Union to the other, not one of them, to my knowledge, deserted me, or stopped his subscription, because he found me advocating offensive doctrines. Many of them have signified a wish, that I would speak to them

again through a journal of my own, from my own chair, not from that of another. Many of them, I trust, I shall meet again ; for the bond that unites us, I feel, is proof against time and distance, and against good fortune and evil. It is to them, to the little public that knows me, to whom my voice is familiar, and to whom familiarity has softened its natural harshness, that I chiefly address myself, in this Introduction ; and not to a stranger public, who know me not, or only know me by uncertain report. I come into the circle of my friends, to exchange kindly greetings, and to allow my heart to expand, and to overflow with the warm sentiments, which have, since I went abroad, been pent up, struggling in vain for utterance.

We meet again, then, dear friends, after a short separation, and, I trust, unchanged. You may have heard strange rumors of me, but I come back what I was. The heart may be sadder, and less buoyant ; but it beats still for the same great moral and social end, and retains all its old faith in God, in Christ, and human capacity. Believe none of the idle rumors which may have reached your ears. As you have known me, so will you always find me. You have known me too long, and too intimately, to give in to the false notion, that I am constantly changing my opinions. They who have not known me formerly, as ye knew me, and who gathered my views from isolated extracts from my writings, or from the views of my presumed associates, beginning now to understand really somewhat of my doctrines and purposes, may very well fancy that I have changed, because they do not, upon a better acquaintance, find me what they had figured me to themselves ; but you, who have read me from the first, were always able to find in my writings the germs, at least, of the doctrines and sentiments, which they now approve, and suppose I have but recently come to entertain.

Yes, I deny that I have *changed*, though I own that I seem to myself to have *advanced*. I am looking the same way, and have continued on in the same

direction; but I believe, that I am further along than I was. When I first began speaking to the public, I was young, inexperienced, ignorant, though perhaps not remarkably modest; my views were in the process of formation, rather than formed, and my mind, if not void, was at least in a chaotic state. I would fain hope, that years and constant study have, in some degree, reduced the primitive chaos to order, and ripened what was crude. My views have, in general, become more fully developed, and systematized; I seem to myself to understand myself better, to know better what I would effect, and what means I must use to effect it. The young dreamer, the visionary speculator, let me hope, has ripened into the sober, practical man. If this be to change, I doubtless have changed; but in this I have only changed, as all change, who are not incapable of profiting by experience. But in all else, I seem to myself to be what I was. I bring to this new periodical, the same love of independence, the same free thought and free speech, the same unreserved devotion to liberty, the same unquenchable desire for individual and social progress, and the same power to live or to die for it, that made me so many enemies, and so many friends, in the Boston Quarterly Review.

So much, I have felt that I might, without egotism, be permitted to say of myself, in returning to the field of my former labors, in a Review of my own, through which I may speak out, in my own tones, when and what I please. Of the plan of this journal, of its leading purposes, and the general doctrines it will support, I may speak more fully, and at greater length.

The name I have chosen, is not chosen from a selfish vanity, but because it is honest and appropriate, and tells the public the simple truth. This is *my* Review; I am its proprietor; its editor; intend to be its principal, if not its sole, writer, and to make it the organ of my own views of truth, on all the great or little topics, on which I shall judge it worth my while to discourse. It will be the journal of my own mind,

and, doubtless, reflect all its various and varying moods. It may support, and oppose, first one existing party, sect, or school, and then another. It will be bound by none, but be free to approve, or to criticize, one or all, just when and where its editor judges proper. I will be held responsible for nobody's opinions but my own, and nobody shall be held responsible for mine, unless he chooses to be. All parties, sects, and schools, must be free, so far as I am concerned, to accept what they like, and to reject what they dislike; to praise me when they please, and, when they please, to scold me to their heart's content.

This said, so that we may start fair, I will add, that this Review will have certain fixed principles and leading doctrines, which its readers may always expect to find recognized and supported in its pages. I do not start it with uncertain and fluctuating views, with doctrines, that will be taken up to-day, and abandoned to-morrow. I have my doctrines determined, and have prescribed to myself a course, from which no departure need be expected, or apprehended. In this respect, this journal will differ from the Boston Quarterly Review. When I commenced that Review, my views were still, to repeat myself, in the process of formation, rather than formed; and I aimed at exciting inquiry, rather than at positive instruction. The greater part of my essays were conceived and written with the view of promoting liberal inquiry and philosophical investigation; not with the view of teaching any regular system of doctrines, on any subject whatever. My great and leading design was, to awaken the public mind, and to prepare it for the reception of profounder and more kindling views of the Destiny of Man and Society, than those I found generally embraced by my countrymen. The community appeared to me to be asleep, overcome by a mental *vis inertiae*; and the first thing they needed was, to be aroused, by bold and startling appeals, to a sense of their danger, and stimulated to new and more vigorous efforts for their salvation, moral, intellectual, and social.

This first work, evidently, could be necessary only for a time ; as soon as the public were awakened, it would cease to be useful, and another work would need to be commenced, — that of POSITIVE INSTRUCTION. The sleeper awakened asks, "What shall I do?" This question the Boston Quarterly, during the last two years of its existence, it is true, to some extent, attempted to answer ; but timidly, and with many misgivings, for I was not yet quite sure of my public, and still less of myself. It was not till the last half year of its continuance, that I succeeded in working myself into the clear light of day, and became able, in my own estimate of myself, to pass finally, in my public communications, from the inquirer to the teacher. Then, only, could I feel, that the fetters, which had bound my soul, and against which I had struggled in vain for twenty-five years, were broken, and that I was free ; then, only, was it, that the scales seemed to fall from my eyes, and that I could see where I stood, and what must henceforth be my direction. The mist vanished, and I could see men in their due proportions and proper forms, — not merely "as trees walking." Then commenced with me a new intellectual epoch, which must, to some extent, give a new phase to my writings. This new phase will be represented in this journal, as it has been, in relation to some special subjects, in my contributions, the past year, to the Democratic Review.

When I commenced the Boston Quarterly Review, in 1838, I was still under the influence of the French Eclectic school of philosophy, founded by M. Cousin. That school found me in a state of transition from Naturalism to Supernaturalism, and, for a time, took fast hold of me, — completely subjecting me, and making me its slave, though not always its willing slave. It was long before I could master it, and recover the free action and development of my own mind. I think I have finally mastered it ; but I must not be understood as having rejected it. I am still a disciple of that school, though a free disciple, not a slave. What I

hold to be good in it, I have made my own ; and I feel myself able to accept its good, without being obliged to accept also its evil. I think I see its truth, and its error ; where and why it has succeeded ; where and why it has failed. I have obtained a clear, consistent, well-defined system of philosophy, satisfactory to my own mind ; but, in obtaining it, I have assimilated no small share of the teachings of that school, and I cannot but feel myself largely its debtor. It is, men may say what they will of it, *the* great metaphysical school of modern times, and its founder will take rank, in the history of philosophy, along with Abelard, Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, and Schelling.

In forming my own system of philosophy, I have also been greatly assisted by the Saint-Simonian school, in which I reckon, though differing, more or less, among themselves, Bazard and Enfantin, Leroux, Lerminier, and De La Mennais. As a metaphysician, the last mentioned of these may not deserve a very high rank, but he deserves honorable mention as a social and religious philosopher. Lerminier does not appear to have any very well defined system of his own ; he is more of an erudite, than of a philosopher ; yet his *Philosophie du Droit* contains many valuable and original suggestions, which no student of philosophy will do well to neglect. Leroux is, indisputably, a great man ; his, so far as I am able to judge, is the greatest name in contemporary French literature. His resources are immense ; his reading is various and extensive ; his views, if his judgments are sometimes hasty and unwarranted, are original and profound. Yet, as some of the German writers say of him, he is a philosopher, rather than a metaphysician, and more admirable for his broad and generous generalizations, than for the depth or acuteness of his analysis. His genius carries him to the study of theology, and one is half tempted to believe, that he aspires to the founding of a new religion. He appears to struggle hard, sometimes almost ludicrously, not to be a Christian, and he apologizes to his readers for venturing, now and then,

to speak well of Christianity ; but, though ranked, and apparently choosing to be ranked, by the Catholic clergy, among the adversaries of our religion, I much doubt, whether any writings will do more than his to recall the age to a living faith in Christianity, or to unfold the deep significance of the dogmas and symbols of the Church. I have profited much by them, and they rarely fail to bring me nearer the Church, even where they seem designed to remove me farther from it.

The German philosophers have afforded me very little satisfaction. It is true, that I have made no profound study of them ; but, so far as I know them, I claim no affinity with them. I feel, and own, the eminent analytic ability of Kant, but I am forced to regard his philosophy as fundamentally false and mischievous. His *Critic der reinen Vernunft*, if taken in any other light than that of a protest, under the most rigid forms of analysis, against all modern philosophy, is sure to mislead, and involve the reader in an inextricable maze of error. Hegel is no better, if so good. His system, originating in the earlier teachings of Schelling, is, under other forms, nothing but a reproduction of the old French Atheism ; and Schelling, rising from the tomb and breaking the silence of near forty years, has recently, at Berlin, entered his solemn protest against it, and pronounced it insufficient, and a failure ; but, as it would seem, without being able to substitute any thing solid, or new, in its place.

In my own philosophic studies, I have found it necessary to go back to Plato and Aristotle, and to follow the main current of philosophy, down through the Alexandrians, the Fathers of the Church, the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, and to resume its problems, very much where they were found by Bacon and Descartes. I am far from saying, that no advance has been made since the Scholastics ; I would by no means underrate, or speak lightly of, the labors of modern philosophers ; but I dare affirm, that all the labors of philosophers, from Bacon and Descartes down to Schel-

ling, Cousin, and Leroux, have resulted in amassing materials for philosophy, rather than in philosophy itself. These materials are various, rich, invaluable, but the philosophy which is to solve, for us, all the great problems of life, is yet to be constructed, and on a foundation laid by no modern philosopher. I am not so vain as to pretend, that I am able to construct this philosophy; but I do feel that I am able to contribute somewhat towards its construction; for I think I see very distinctly, not only what must be its final cause, but what is, and must be, its foundation and method. And to contribute my share towards its construction, at least to rally and stimulate the workmen, is among the chief motives for commencing this new periodical.

IN THEOLOGY, six years ago, I had worked my way up to a considerable distance from zero, where I found myself in 1829; but I still retained, unconsciously, some traces of former Naturalism and Pantheism. I believed, that I was a believer. But there were weighty problems, remaining unsolved, and which I was unable to solve; I had but a feeble glimpse of the mediatorial character of Christianity, of the Gospel as a divinely provided system of *means*, designed to be, to fallen man, the wisdom and the power of God, to keep the law, according to which he was originally created; I had no just appreciation of the real nature, rights, and offices of the Church, and no clear conception of the profound significance of her principal dogmas and sacraments; I could at best only stammer my faith, which, though sincere, through my want of distinct articulation, seemed to many, and not without some reason, as good as no faith at all. I may deceive myself, but I believe, that, if there are mysteries still remaining, as there are, and always will be, I have, finally, got rid of all naturalistic and pantheistic tendencies, and attained, at least, to the power of distinct utterance. I accept with my whole heart, without any prevarication, mystification, or men-

tal reservation, the Gospel of Jesus Christ, in the ordinary sense of the Christian world; and I hold the Church to be the depositary of the sacred Traditions, and the medium through which the Divine Life of Jesus, or the Holy Ghost proceeding forth from the Father *and the Son*, is transmitted from generation to generation, and communicated to the world, for the redemption and sanctification of sinners. I hold, that the Church is a divine institution, an inspired body, founded on the Rock of Ages, and that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it; that it is the ground and pillar of the truth; and the authoritative representative of the will of God on earth. Moreover, I hold, that the Gospel, deposited with the Church, contains the *principles* of all truth, and that the whole future of mankind, dating from its promulgation by Jesus and the Apostles, consists in developing these principles, and in reducing them to practice. Here, in the Gospel, is the foundation of the true Philosophy of Life, and the principle of the solution of every problem, theological, political, social, or ethical. In order to ascertain the truth, or to labor, freely and successfully, for its development and application, it can never, in my judgment, be necessary to go out of the Church, or to look beyond the Gospel.

But this statement, distinct and explicit as it is, requires, in the present state of the religious world, some farther developments, in order to escape misapprehension. The true THEORY of the Church is, I believe, that, through all the successive stages of its existence, it is Apostolic, retaining, always, and everywhere, the same authority over faith and discipline, which the Apostles themselves had; and that its mission is not merely to preserve the *memory* of a work done, *completed*, but to *continue*, and carry on to perfection, a work *commenced*. It has, indeed, received the *law*, from which it can in no wise depart, but a law which it is to develope and apply, by virtue of its own continuous inspiration, — received from the indwelling Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth, — to all new questions

that come up, and to all old questions, coming up in new forms, or under new relations. ITS MISSION IS THE CONTINUED EVOLUTION, AND REALIZATION IN LIFE, OF THE TRUTH CONTAINED IN THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHRISTIAN DISPENSATION, which continued evolution and realization constitute the continued progress of mankind.

Now, I am far from pretending, that the Church, in point of fact, has altogether overlooked this theory ; on the contrary, I believe that she has always asserted it, and, to some extent, acted on it, and it is by her authority that I dare undertake to maintain it ; but she seems to me to have asserted it with too much feebleness and timidity, and with numerous and almost suicidal concessions to the spirit which finally broke out in the Protestant schism. Instead of boldly asserting her high prerogatives as the Body of our Lord, and maintaining it to be her right, and her duty, to develope and apply the truth, according to the exigencies of time and place, she has left it to be believed, that the Gospel, instead of being given her merely in germ, to be subsequently developed and applied, was given her as a perfect code drawn out in all the minuteness of detail, and that her sole mission is, to preserve the original deposit unaltered, unenlarged, undiminished. I look upon this as a fundamental error, and one which has had, and cannot but have, the most disastrous consequences. The Church has failed to assert, at least to maintain, her absolute independence, which is essential to the successful accomplishment of her mission in carrying on the progress of the race. She has, on the one hand, yielded too much to the doctors, who would confine her to ancient tradition, and to primitive usage ; and, on the other, through weakness, timidity, or, perhaps, through the necessities of the times, too much to the civil authority, — suffering the civil ruler to invade her province, and, by his edicts, to restrain her free action and independent development.

I am well aware, that the reproach I here bring against the Church, is of an opposite character to that

which is brought by Protestant sects. I say nothing here of the alleged assumptions and invasions of the Bishop of Rome, whom I undertake neither to accuse nor to defend ; but, in speaking of the Church herself, I dare affirm, that her error, or the cause of her not having more completely succeeded, is not in the arrogance of her pretensions, but in the extreme modesty of her claims ; not in asserting, but in *not* asserting, her independence in regard to tradition, written or unwritten, and in face of the civil authority. So far as she has asserted this two-fold independence, she has done well, been faithful to her Lord ; so far as she has not asserted it successfully, or so far as she has temporized with, or succumbed to, either the temporal power, or antiquity, she has been wanting to her mission, and unfaithful to Him whose Spouse she is. The great evil in the Church has been, what I call, the *Protestant* spirit. Protestantism asserts the supremacy of the Written Word, not as the principle, but as a full and perfect code, needing, and admitting, no farther developments, and, therefore, tends to subject the Church to Antiquity ; it also asserts, in practice, if not absolutely in theory, the supremacy of the temporal power, and thus tends to subject the Church to the State, or to convert it into a mere function of the State. So far as it comprehends itself, it is a direct protest against the progress of the race, an attempt to keep the Church stationary in her action and influence, and is, therefore, anti-Christian. By taking away from the Church her legitimate control over faith and discipline, it denies to the Church all right to advance, and seeks to keep, or to carry, the Christian world back to the very point from which it started. Unquestionably, this was not the secret intention of the Protestant leaders, but it is what is implied in their principles, and is of itself, to all who believe in the glorious and kindling doctrine of progress, a full and utter condemnation of Protestantism. It shows also, that these leaders broke away from the Church unnecessarily, because they did not

fully comprehend her theory, and its absolute necessity as the condition of human progress.

But, if the Church herself neglected to assert, or but too feebly and timidly asserted, her independence, in face of the State, and especially of Antiquity, this was much more the case with the philosophers and free-inquirers in her bosom. These seem to have had no conception of her independence, of her right and ability, to accept all new views, or new applications, of truth; and so, whenever they attained to a new view, or discovered a new application, of truth, instead of seeking to bring it out, in harmony with the teachings of the Church, or showing how it was necessarily evolved from her admitted principles, and authorized by the analogies of faith, they brought it out independently, in opposition to her express dogmas, so that she must needs reject it, or prove suicidal. But in rejecting it she became, practically, the enemy of free thought and free speech, and, therefore, tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the war which has so long been waged between the Church on one side, and the philosophers and free-inquirers on the other, — a war not necessary in the nature of things, but caused by the failure of the Church to assert her own independence, and of these philosophers and free-inquirers to perceive that the successful assertion of this independence, would be the successful assertion of religious and philosophical freedom.

The evil, resulting from this misapprehension — shared in some degree by the Church herself — of the profound significance of the true Church theory, has been great and manifold; but it is not irremediable. Assert now, freely, fearlessly, and vigorously, the entire independence of the Church in face of Antiquity, so far as concerns the development and application of the principles of the Christian law, — which is all that any believer in Christianity can ask, — assume the truth and sufficiency of these principles, — which is what they, who believe in Christ at all, must assume, and do assume, — and all ground of hostility on either side is

effectually removed. There is ample provision for the largest liberty of thought and speech; and the authority of the Church remains standing, in all its plenitude and vigor. There is full scope for the boldest inquiries and the most unreserved utterance, provided only, that the inquirers take care, before giving utterance to their speculations, to examine them in their relation to the principles on which the Church is founded, and then to set them forth in their harmony with those principles, or as necessary evolutions from them, which they must be, if they are true, according to the assumptions we have already made. The only restraint there is or can be, in this case, is merely a restraint on hasty judgments and crude speculations, a restraint demanding no surrender or suppression of truth, but merely patience in forming, and modesty in uttering, one's own views; which would by no means be a mischievous restraint, but a salutary restraint, and one very much needed.

With this view of the case, I find myself able to submit to the authority of the Church, without surrendering one iota of my freedom as a man, or my independence as a philosopher; for, with this view, I see that submission to the Church is the condition of mental liberty. "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." But I have never been able to say this of the practical Church theory of any of our Protestant sects. Formerly, I knew not, that, under this relation, the Protestant communions differed from the Catholic, and I then felt, that, in order to maintain freedom of thought and freedom of speech, — which no consideration could induce me to surrender, for they are manifestly the indispensable conditions of human progress, — I must go against all existing Church organizations, and strike boldly for a New Church; but now, after a more thorough investigation of the Catholic Church than I had previously made, having ascertained that her real theory is, at bottom, contrary to what my Protestant education had led me to expect, favorable to freedom and progress, I find in the old Church, theo-

retically considered, all I had hoped from a new Church, and have, therefore, no longer any occasion to call for one ; which, were it necessary, as it is not, might, with merely human means, be somewhat difficult, not to say impossible, to obtain.

But my readers must not misinterpret me. There is no truth in the report, that I have joined, or am intending to join, the Roman Catholic Church. I am free to confess, that I accept the general theory of that Church, as the true theory of the Church of Christ ; but that theory itself prevents me, *in the present state of the religious world*, from seeking to unite myself to the Roman Catholic communion. In consequence of the error I have pointed out, and which the Roman Church has not as yet wholly corrected, she has but an imperfect claim, practically considered, to what, if I may so speak, is after all her own theory. She suffers her rights to lie in abeyance, is too Protestant, and not sufficiently Catholic, to be held exclusively as *the Church*. She does not fulfil the conditions of her own theory. Nor is this all. She can no longer claim to be the exclusive depositary of the Divine Life, which redeems and sanctifies. Even she herself would shrink from saying, that no one, out of her bosom, can possibly be saved. The great doctrine of Progress, owing to her neglect, has, in some measure, been wrested from her, and is now sustained by individuals not within her pale ; she has no longer an exclusive right to the theory of the Church which I have set forth ; and, therefore, notwithstanding her unquestionable apostolic descent, externally considered, her high antiquity, and general soundness in the faith, she must take her stand, very nearly, on the same level with other communions. In consequence of her failure to maintain her absolute independence, and to fulfil her office in the free development of the principles of the Gospel, and their application to practical life, the whole Christian world, regarded as a polity, has been thrown into a state of disorganization, and needs now to be reorganized. In the labor of reorganization, which is,

at the present moment, the great desideratum, all, who have seized the elements of Christian truth, whether in one communion or in another, or, technically speaking, in none, must be permitted to take part. If the Roman communion does what she may, and what she should, that is, assert the two-fold independence, of which I speak, she will become the nucleus of reorganization, and ultimately absorb all other communions into herself; but, they, who most distinctly assert, and most strenuously insist on, the true theory of the Church, will be this nucleus, and assimilate to themselves all existing churches; because the vital principle, the organic force, of the Church, is the *indwelling Life, or Spirit, of Christ*, not the mere fact that she is the depositary of *past* revelations and inspirations.

Now, I look forward to this reorganization of the Christian world, to a time, not far distant, when the Church will reassert, and effectually, her independence; become really one and Catholic; her spirit one; faith one; discipline one; and for this, without conferring with flesh and blood, I pray and labor, *from the very position where God in his Providence has placed me*. Let all others do the same, and gradually, but effectually, will spring up a unity of spirit, which will induce unity of faith, which, in turn, will induce unity of organization and discipline. This reorganization will, in some sort, no doubt, be a *new* organization, and will differ, in many important respects, as to forms, from the old; yet, strictly speaking, it will not be new, but the old transformed. Here, in brief, is my Catholicism, on which I shall have, in the progress of this work, much to say. To speak technically, I am neither Protestant nor Romanist. I belong neither to the Protestant world, nor to the Roman world. I look upon Protestantism as a blunder, and as having proved a decided failure; on the other hand, I look upon Roman Catholicism as substantially true, under the relation of theory, but upon the Roman Catholic Church, under the relation of practice, as having but imperfectly fulfilled

her mission. Theoretically considered, she forms the basis of reunion ; practically considered, she is herself more or less Protestant, and schismatic.

In laboring for the rehabilitation of the Church, and for the union of all men under one and the same religious organization, with one and the same religious faith and discipline, we must accept and obey the LAW OF CONTINUITY. The Present and the Future must be always regarded as intimately linked with, and evolved from, the Past. I, therefore, make it my law, to accept, always and everywhere, the Traditions of the race ; but, nevertheless, with a reserve in favor of progress. I accept them as a patrimony inherited, rich and precious indeed, but incomplete, and, therefore, to be corrected and enlarged, or, as we Americans say, *improved*, by the labor of each succeeding generation. The hostility many feel to tradition comes from the mistake of regarding it as already complete, and, therefore, as a law that must bind us, and as an inheritance which must supersede all necessity of any acquisitions of our own. While we accept tradition with all sincerity and reverence, we should carefully avoid this fatal mistake, which would be a bar to all farther progress. In accepting tradition, we must regard it as our duty to carry it on, by supplying its deficiencies, and enriching it by new discoveries. We must guard against the error of believing, that the canon of authentic tradition is closed, and that the human race must henceforth feed solely on its past inspirations. If the theory of the Church, I have set forth, be true, God has provided for a *continuous inspiration* ; not, indeed, an inspiration overriding the past inspirations, or superseding their necessity, — as innovators rashly and falsely pretend, — but an inspiration continuing the past, in one unbroken current, with an ever enlarging volume. Here is the ground of my dissent from the general principle of Protestantism, which condemns us to feed only on inspirations made in the past, and of which the canon is closed ; and here, also, is one reason why I cannot

unite myself to the Roman communion, which seems only half conscious, that, as the Church of Christ, she must be the medium of a continuous inspiration, not merely the keeper of these past inspirations. "He goes farther than we do," said a learned Catholic Doctor of one of my essays in the *Christian World*, "and claims Divine Inspiration for the Church, which we have not done." The Catholic Doctor was right; and, in reply, I must tell him, till his church can with truth claim to be the medium of a continuous inspiration, it cannot be said to fulfil the conditions of the Church of God.

This doctrine concerning Tradition and the Law of Continuity, while it associates me with all, who, at home or abroad, are enlisted in the great army of progress, separates me, of course, from the several classes of ULTRAISTS, with which our age and country abound. These Ultraists have, no doubt, kindly sentiments, and their ends and aims, regarded in themselves, may be good and commendable; but, by cutting themselves loose from the past of humanity, decrying all its past labors, and refusing to accept what is, as their point of departure for what should be, they are struck with impotence, and doomed to perpetual barrenness. They deprive themselves of ancestors, and must remain without posterity. Humanity disowns them, for they disown all that she has hitherto accomplished. They are foolishly attempting to build without materials, and their fabrics can be only castles in the air. Whatever respect the wise man may have for them as individuals, he can have no part or lot in their labors. For myself, I have learned to reverence the past; and I see nothing for me, nor for any one, to do, but to labor to carry onward the work humanity has commenced, and, thus far, not unsuccessfully prosecuted. Man was not a blunder, and his creation has not proved a failure. No radicalism in church, state, philosophy, or morals, but should be formally and solemnly eschewed. No efforts to create an entirely new order, instead of carrying

forward, to its perfection, the old, can be wisely, or safely, countenanced. Humanity is a mighty river, — to repeat a figure I have just used, — flowing on ever with a constantly increasing volume, in the same direction, from out of the infinite abyss, to its unknown ocean; and whatever would interrupt its on-flowing, or divert its course, is evil, and only evil.

This principle compels me to take the Conservative side in politics, the side which I have always taken, since the commencement of the *Boston Quarterly Review*, the thousand voices of the country, vociferating to the contrary, notwithstanding. I have never, at least, since my early youth, taken the Radical side, and placed myself in the attitude of a destructionist, and a revolutionist. I hold, and I believe I have always held, though I care little what I may have held, that here, in this country, at least, the existing order is to be preserved; and that no alteration is to be attempted. No amelioration even, not authorized by it, and capable of being evolved from it. Our fundamental institutions are to the statesman, what the Gospel is to the churchman, — the law which he is to develop and apply, but in no case to change, or to set aside. We may seek progress, but only progress under and through existing institutions. This is the law I prescribe to myself, and what I mean by CONSERVATISM.

I not only take the Conservative side, but I contend, that our institutions come under the denomination of a CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC, and not under that of a DEMOCRACY. The established political order in this country is not the democratic, and every attempt to apply the democratic theory, as the principle of its interpretation, is an attempt at revolution, and to be resisted. By a Democracy, I understand a political order, — if that may be called order, which is none, — in which the people, primarily, and without reference to any authority constituting them a body politic, are held to be the source of all the legitimate power in the

state. The people are above the Constitution, and, instead of being governed by it, are its creator. The constitution is, and can be, only a rule, which they lay down for themselves, and which it is optional with them, whether they will follow or not. It is, under the relation of government, as good as no government at all. In a Constitutional Republic the great body of the people may be citizens, and share in the administration of the government ; but they can administer the government only under the Constitution, and can hold and exercise power only by its authorization. The Constitution may be alterable, but only by its own authority, by virtue of its express provisions. This I hold to be the actual character of our political institutions ; and so holding, I must needs resist the attempt to convert them into a democracy, and seek to rally the sound and reflecting portion of the community to their support, as they are.

But, while contending earnestly for the *constitutional* theory, in opposition to the *democratic*, I contend, with equal earnestness, that the government, by whomsoever administered, should be administered for the good of the whole people, especially of the poorer and more numerous classes. It is here, in relation to the end for which government should be administered, that democracy has its legitimate, and only legitimate, place. So far as we understand, by democracy, the constitution and administration of the government for the interests of the great mass of the people, so as to break down all factitious distinctions of class or caste, and to maintain all, not theoretically only, but practically, *equal before the law*, I am, of course, a democrat ; any farther than this, or in any other sense than this, I am not, and never have been, a democrat. The great social end I have always aimed at, in all my publications, and to which my whole life is consecrated, is the moral, intellectual, and social amelioration of the less favored classes, on whom falls the principal part of the burdens of society, and who receive very few of its honors, or its advantages. To this end, I am called to labor by my

sympathies as a man, and by my faith as a Christian, not to say by my profession as a Christian minister. But laboring for this end is one thing, laboring to establish, or rather to realize, the political theory, which derives all power from the people, who are to be its subjects, and leaving them free to do whatever they choose, is another, and, unless I greatly deceive myself, a very different thing.

This political theory, I have never accepted, and never can accept, till I am convinced that government is no longer necessary. It is utterly incompatible with government itself. Yet I do not object to this theory, because I have no respect for the genuine voice of the people, when and where it makes itself heard. I am not conscious of any want of respect for the real voice of the people; and my general principles, without rendering me a slave to it, require me to pay it great deference, and to dissent from it only with great modesty, and when forced to do so by a higher voice than that of Humanity herself. The great mass of the people I am accustomed to regard as honest, and as desirous of making justice prevail in the state; and I have little fear, that, where they really judge, their judgments of what *is* justice, would not, for the most part, be sound and worthy of acceptance. But, even where universal suffrage obtains, the voice of the great mass of the people is rarely, if ever, heard. What passes for their voice is only the voice of the corrupt and intriguing few, who contrive to manage them, and to cheat or wheedle them out of their votes. A slight glance at practical politics will suffice to satisfy any ordinary observer, that this talk about the voice of the people is all moonshine, and that the excellence of the democratic theory consists in its affording the trafficking politicians a fine opportunity to *talk* in favor of liberty and equality, and thus to satisfy the people with the semblance, while withholding the reality. The confidence, which these politicians have in the people, is in the facility with which they may be gulled. Little confidence do they, in reality, place in the people. Would they

willingly trust the people? Would they willingly let the people into their secret caucuses, into their councils to contrive ways and means of plundering the simple and unsuspecting? Would the pure patriots, the democratic sages of Lindenwold and elsewhere, let the people know their various speculations and contrivances, by which they cheat, swindle, the laboring classes out of their hard earnings, to enrich themselves and their associates? No; there is nothing that these men more distrust than they do the people; for there is nothing from which they would have more to dread, than from the popular vengeance, which would overtake them, were the people really to know them.

When I find men, who are steeped in corruption, gorged with the "spoils" of the people, holding themselves up as the especial friends of the people, and loud in their advocacy of the democratic theory, and in their condemnation of all who question its soundness, I am irresistibly led to the belief, that there is something in the theory itself peculiarly favorable to the prosecution of their corrupt designs, and I want no better evidence to assure me of its utter hostility to the legitimate ends of government. What we want is not windy professions about liberty and equality, noisy rant and frothy declamations about democracy, but *substantial freedom*, however secured, for each individual to perform, without let or hinderance, his special function in the social body, whether it be the function of the head, of the hand, or of the foot. The real enemies of this substantial freedom, are your democratic politicians, who with their lips praise the people, and with their hands pick their pockets, or those who act as jackals to the dainty chiefs who are too exalted to plunder—except by proxy. For these and their masters democracy is, no doubt, a glorious doctrine; but the people of this country will, ere long, yet not till it is too late, I fear, find, that, in following the lead of these towards democracy, they recede from all wise and equitable government, and from all moral and social soundness. It is because democracy affords an ample field to these political

spoilsmen, that I chiefly distrust it, and demand the preservation of our constitutionalism, as some protection, against them, of the mass they flatter and plunder.

I have stated the great social end, for which we should labor, to be, the moral, intellectual, and physical amelioration of the poorer and more numerous classes. This is the end I have all along had in view, and to which all my labors have been directed, for the last twenty years. Whatever changes may have come over me in that time, or whatever modification my views have undergone, I have experienced no change in regard to the great end which every true man must labor to gain. That my views have from time to time been essentially modified, as to the means of gaining this end, it were worse than folly to pretend to deny. He who really has an object to gain, independent of his own reputation, will change his views often as to the means to be adopted; but changes of this kind imply no fickleness or want of stability; they imply merely an enlarging experience, or more practical wisdom. There is fickleness only where there is frequent change of purpose. In laboring ostensibly for this end, it would be easy to manage, to manœuvre, to gather a party, and make oneself a reputation; and I should feel humbled, indeed, if I felt that I wanted the ability to do so. But I have believed from my early youth, and I have been confirmed each day in my belief, that it is never lawful to attempt to gain even a good end by ignoble or unworthy means. I have never suffered myself to seek an honest end, by any but honest means. It requires — reference being had to the gullibility of the public — no extraordinary capacity to be able to devise, and successfully prosecute, a low, crooked, serpentine policy, which may raise oneself high in the estimate of one's contemporaries: but after all *cui bono*? A reputation, gained in this way, is too cheaply won to be worth a brave man's ambition, and is too foul a reproach to him who wins it, — to say nothing of its deteriorating moral influence on himself and others, — to satisfy any one

who feels that he is placed here only to be good, and to do good. The most rigid morality should govern us in the choice of means, as well as in the choice of ends.

Yet, in laboring to accomplish the end in question, the exercise of the highest wisdom, in the choice and application of means, is not only laudable, but obligatory. I have learned that we must work with such materials as we have. One method of accomplishing the end stated is, undoubtedly, to awaken the spirit of the laboring classes themselves, and to induce them to strike, boldly and resolutely, for their own elevation. But this method will not be found sufficient. Quickened the spirit of these classes, create a great social movement, and you have only invited ambitious, selfish, intriguing demagogues to mount upon the wave, and float into place and power. The cause of the people cannot be advanced in opposition to the more wealthy, intelligent, and influential classes. Any policy, that tends to create a horizontal division of society, will never result in any social amelioration. In all communities, there is a portion of the community, who, by their wealth, talents, education, manners, position, if not by their virtues, have a commanding influence. Against the combined resistance of these, no real practical reforms can be successfully attempted, unless by a more than human power. These must, to some extent, be co-workers with us. While we refuse to truckle to any class, or to compromise the cause of truth and justice, in order to win the coöperation of any one, while we meet all in a firm and independent spirit, and with a manly bearing, we must still so meet them as to command their aid, in working out our reforms, and in carrying our measures.

I am more disposed to appeal to the more favored classes themselves, than I am to the less favored ; for I rely more on the sense of duty and love of sacrifice, than I do on the sense of interest. It is easier to induce a man to sacrifice himself for another, than it is to induce a man to do what is really for his own interest. I look to the educated and more influential classes,

and I believe it to be the true policy of the Reformer, to enlist them on the side of the people. In the very bosom of what are called the aristocratic classes, notwithstanding all their pride, pretension, and folly, I can find warmer friends of the people, than I can in the ranks of the people themselves. There is, moreover, such a *solidarity* of interests, in every community, that what is really for the interest of one class in the long run, is for the interest of all, and may, with some little pains, be made to appear so to all. The worst enemies of genuine reform and progress, are rarely those who stand on the topmost round of the social ladder, but those nearer the foot struggling to reach the top. Your "people's friend," who, when poor, vaped about liberty and equality, and told you to beware of those who live in fine houses, on fashionable streets, is sure himself to live in one of those same fine houses, as soon as he can command the means. What he condemned was from the first the object of his ambition, and he condemned it, only because he was unable to reach it. I wish to see a greater degree of social equality, fewer factitious distinctions, and a more equitable distribution of the products of labor; but I hope to effect it, and will effect it, through the aid of the more influential classes themselves.

But, to secure this aid, we must resort to moral and religious influences. The first thing to be done is, to recall the age to a living Christian faith. We cannot proceed a single step, till we have got men to feel their moral accountability to a greater than man, and that nothing is gained, unless they gain the approbation of the Moral Governor of the Universe. There must be in men's hearts a faith which looks beyond time and sense, which looks only to what is true, beautiful, and good, and which joys in the most painful sacrifices. We must equalize wealth by raising the soul above the love of it, and help the poor by producing in them that state of the affections, that religious exaltation of the soul, which will lead them to count the wealth of this world as mere dross, or as dust in the bal-

ance, if they can but gain those durable riches, which will not take to themselves wings and fly away, if they can but lay up treasures, "where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, nor thieves break through and steal." Christianity has once brought men to count poverty, and want, and suffering in the cause of truth, justice, humanity, the greatest of all blessings, and in so doing changed the face of the world; and it can, and will, do so again. I dare avow, in the very face of this infidel age, in whose infidelity I once shared, my full and firm faith in the truth and power of Christianity to work out, for us, the highest social good here, as well as to secure us the blessedness of heaven hereafter. The attempt to reform the world, and to regain the long lost Eden, by human agencies, human philosophies, political economies, workhouses, and "cash payments," has been made, and failed, and always will fail, repeat we the experiment as often as we may. God leaves men, now and then, as it were, to themselves, to their own wisdom and strength, which are but weakness and folly; but He is jealous of His own honor, and His glory He will not give to another. Our own devices, our own schemes and systems, wrought out with infinite pains, may appear unto ourselves worthy of all praise; but the High and Holy One holds them in derision. The great moral power, that overcomes the world, is religious faith. At its touch, the great, the wealthy, the proud, become meek and childlike, and pour out their wealth like water, to help onward the good cause; genius, and talent, and learning, lose their arrogance and selfishness, and, bowing low at the foot of the cross, know only Christ and him crucified; regardless of honor or fame, they bring their rich gifts to the altar, and sacrifice all for the glory of God, and the redemption of men.

Here is my hope for the world. There is a higher Power than that of man; a mightier Reformer than human agency. It is God's will to work out for us a great and abiding social good, in the establishment of his kingdom on the earth; but He will do this, only

in his own way, by "that man whom He hath ordained," and by whom "He will judge the world in righteousness." The Gospel kingdom is the only possible medium of renovation and growth. But, blessed be God, it is all-sufficient, and all that we have to do is, to return under its dominion ; and its principles, entering our hearts, will make us mighty to the pulling down of the strong-holds of iniquity, and in overturning the thrones of oppression and blood.

Entertaining these views, the great object with me is, and must needs be, to reënlist men on the side of the Church, and to bring them once more under the dominion of the Gospel. We have been, for the last three centuries, Catholics no less than Protestants, trying to solve the social problem, without the aid of Divine Wisdom, or resort to the means Divine Grace has provided ; and God has confounded our speech, and brought our labor to nought. It is time to abandon our folly, and, ceasing from our insane efforts to ameliorate the condition of our fellow-men, by appeals to their selfishness, or by seeking in our social arrangements to neutralize the selfishness of one by the equal selfishness of another, to look to the Great Father of all for wisdom and strength, and to the moral efficacy of the mediatorial kingdom of his Son.

In the *Boston Quarterly Review*, I labored, mainly, to enlist the Church on the side of Reform, in the cause of the masses, as the condition of saving itself, and rescuing the age from infidelity ; in the present work, the formula is somewhat changed ; I accept the Church as the Body of our Lord, as the divinely appointed medium of individual and social regeneration and progress, and must, therefore, labor to enlist men on its side, under its banner, as the preliminary condition of Reform. In this, I shall have for enemies the worldly wise, the selfish, the unbelieving, and the indifferent, a formidable host, well marshalled and led on by the great Enemy of all righteousness. But I shall not be alone ; I shall be only one in the still mightier army of the Faithful, and shall be encouraged by the saints and

martyrs of all ages, whose prayers I dare invoke, and dare believe will be effectual with the Great Head of the Church, to whose service I have been consecrated, and to which I would consecrate myself anew, and without reserve. Weak and less than nothing as I am in myself, through Him strengthening me, I can do all things. In His name, which is above every name, I send forth this humble work, and with a firm reliance on Him, that he will not suffer me to send it forth in vain. Through Him it shall be a trumpet-voice, to rally the scattered friends of Truth, Justice, Liberty, Country, Humanity, under His banner, and unite them in one living and indissoluble body. It dares, in the face of an unbelieving world, to raise the standard of the Lord, to unfurl the banner of the Gospel, and to call upon all to unite for the glory of God, and the salvation of men. It calls, in the name of Christ the Crucified, of Christ the Risen, of Christ the Ever-present, of Christ the Almighty, the human race to a **RELIGIOUS FUTURE**. May God give energy and success to the call, and His be the praise and the glory.

With these remarks, I send this first number forth to the public, in the full conviction that the work will do somewhat to supply a want which all feel, and in the hope that it will meet a favorable reception from the justice and generosity of my countrymen, whose servant I am.

ART. II. — *Encyclopédie Nouvelle, ou Dictionnaire Philosophique, Scientifique, Littéraire, et Industrielle, offrant le Tableau des Connaissances humaines au XIX^e Siècle, par une Société des Savans et Littérateurs. Publié sous la Direction de MM. P. LEROUX et J. REYNAUD. Paris: Charles Gosselin. 1836. Tomes 1 et 2. 8vo. pp. 828 et 824.*

MORE than three-fourths of this new Encyclopedia, intended to be comprised within eight huge octavo volumes of close print and double columns, have already, we believe, been issued; though we have been able, as yet, to procure only the first and second volumes, and these quite recently. We shall, therefore, reserve all attempt to estimate its general, or particular, value, till the rest of the work is received. We can only say, now, that it ably represents the doctrines and aspirations of the new French School, at the head of which stands M. Leroux, and which continues, with essential modifications and improvements, the Saint-Simonian. Of the extent, power, or prospects of this school, in France, we have at present no very exact information; and we are unable to judge what is likely to be its ultimate influence on the French mind, and on French literature; but it has all the appearance of being a powerful and growing school, representing one of the most important philosophical and religious movements of modern times. We shall seize an early opportunity to speak of its general characteristics, excellences, and defects, and at considerable length. We limit ourselves, now, to the translation, from one of the volumes before us, of an article, for our own pages, by M. Leroux, on Berkeley and Idealism. The article is ably written, and, besides giving a tolerable synopsis of the philosophical views of the writer and his school, is decidedly one of the best criticisms on Berkeley's system, especially his "New Theory of Vision," that we recollect to have seen; and we are sure, that our

readers will thank us for giving it to them without abridgment.

“GEORGE BERKELEY, a celebrated English metaphysician, author of a psychological doctrine, commonly denominated Berkeley’s Idealism.

“We have several times, in this Dictionary, used the word Idealism, and shall have frequent occasion to use it again. We have gone so far as to say, *Christian Idealism*, and to speak of the *idealist* doctrine, which, according to us, has been the foundation of Christianity; we have reproached Protestantism, in general, with its want of *idealism*; we have characterized the decline of metaphysics in the eighteenth century, as an *anti-idealist* epoch; in fine, we have advanced the opinion, that Idealism is about to be reborn; that all the labors of our epoch tend to its rebirth, and that on this rebirth depend the future destinies and well-being of society. In thus expressing ourselves, we assuredly have not had in view, the several theories commonly termed Idealism; we have by no means intended to speak either of the doctrine of Berkeley, or that of Malebranche, either of the system of Kant, or that of Fichte, or even that of Schelling. A word of explanation, before proceeding to consider Berkeley’s theory, is, therefore, necessary; for we should only darken and confuse the minds of our readers, were we to use the same word to express doctrines so radically different.

“For us Idealism comes from *ideal*, not from *idea*, (*idée*,) and is the doctrine of the Ideal; while, in its ordinary acceptation, it is a mere theory of ideas. But what do we understand by the doctrine of the Ideal? An æsthetic doctrine? Have we in view some of those vague notions, of which such a display is sometimes made, when treating of the fine arts and their principles? No. It is not of this detail we would speak; but of a philosophy, which, if true, absorbs by good right all philosophy. We mean rather by *idealism*, what is ordinarily termed *spiritualism*; though this word, spiritualism, seems to us a little inexact, and not sufficiently expressive. Words are like those guide-posts, which point out the paths in a forest. The inscription is useful, only in case it is turned towards one of the forest paths. If the post lies on the ground, the traveller may, indeed, read the inscription, but his uncertainty remains. Such is the word Spiritualism. It throws no clear light; it indicates no direction.

“But it is the word in use, we shall be told. True, and it is precisely because it is the word exclusively used, and because

it is made not more expressive, that philosophy advances so little. What, in fact, does this word tell us? Simply, that they, who use it, distinguish two substances, spirit and matter. What light does this give us, if we stop here? This distinction is not the most fundamental of all; so far from it, certain of the Fathers of the Church, and among the most eminent too, have not made it, and yet they have been none the less idealists and Christians. Spiritualism is a recent word, coined in these last centuries, and has been in good use for only about a hundred years. According to us, it is a word which marks a decline, and was invented only after the sense of the deep things of philosophy had already been lost, and forgotten. When Christianity reigned, they, who believed in the Christian ontology, were not called *Spiritualists*, but Christians. In the beautiful times of Greek philosophy, there are Platonists, Pythagoreans, &c., but do we find that they ever dream of calling themselves *Spiritualists*? Nor do the Egyptians and Indians appear to have ever thought of obtaining from this distinction of spirit and matter, a name for their beliefs. What, then, is the bond, which, for those at all instructed, connects the school of Plato, that of Pythagoras, and certain beliefs of ancient Egypt and India, with Christianity?

“Christians, certainly, have no better claim to be spiritualists than had the Pagans. Tertullian, who asserts positively, that there is no soul, or spirit, without bodily appearance, is he more of a spiritualist, than Cicero, who decides nothing concerning the nature of the soul? Not here, then, is the differential shade, that separates Christianity from Paganism; nor here the similitude, which compels us to regard the several schools just named, as mutually related, and as having, within given limits, one and the same philosophy.

“Is there, then, in the history of philosophy, a philosophy of the Ideal? People will one day be astonished, that this question could ever have been asked; but we must propose the question, for this doctrine has no longer a name, at least, a name that expresses it truly; and because every day professors and philosophical writers use the term idealism to express quite a different thing, and appear to know no other idealism, than that of Berkeley, or that of Kant. It appears to us so important to recognize a doctrine of the Ideal, to have a philosophy of the Ideal, that we would willingly say, that Idealism, in this sense, is the very name of philosophy, or religion, itself. Philosophy, or religion, is the science of life; and we know no other explanation of life, that is to say, of ontology, than the Doctrine of the Spirit incarnating itself, of the Word

becoming flesh; or, in other words, the Ideal actualizing itself.

“When we come to treat of this subject, in its place, in this Dictionary, we shall easily prove, we think, that all reflections lead to this ontological theory; and that we may thus come directly, without needing to pass through history, or to be referred as learners to what our fathers have believed, to this ancient solution, which was that of the East, of Pythagoras, of Plato, and of Christianity. The simplest attention, I repeat, will of itself enable us to find again the profound mysteries of the ancient religions. But, if we are able to seize the essence of the doctrine of the Ideal by an *à priori*, how much more deeply shall we be struck with its importance, when we contemplate it in the light of history!

“The doctrine of the Ideal is the unbroken chain of Tradition. There are epochs in which it has been so vividly comprehended, so unanimously accepted, that it has taken the authority of religion, has, in fact, become religion. Transported from the East and Egypt into Greece, it has formed the philosophy of Pythagoras, and the philosophy of Plato. What, in fact, is the culminating point of the Platonic philosophy, but those archetypal ideas, which every artist, which the Great Artist, God, has objectively before him, yet subjectively in him, and by means of which he performs his work? More lately, invading the world from many sources at once, sovereign in Egypt; sovereign in Greek philosophy, this doctrine has appeared to the wise to unite all traditions; and with their consent it has formed Christianity. It is this doctrine which is concealed in all its mysteries; or rather, in our view, all the mysteries of Christianity are revelations of it. Concentrated in the fundamental doctrine of the Trinity, it is explained, and applied, in Baptism and the Eucharist. It is the very centre, the focus, the soul, of Christianity.

“It is this doctrine, again, which the greatest geniuses of the Middle Ages sought, with a steady eye, in the midst of the darkness of their epoch. All the great theologians, in these so despised centuries, preserve, in various degrees, the sense of this doctrine, which had inspired the Fathers of the Church, who had collected its elements, some from Plato, some from the schools of Egypt, others from Judaism, to unite and fuse them into a new formula under the name of Christianity. After the Middle Ages theology declined. The Church preferred to impose upon the mind the mere shell, so to speak, of her mysteries, rather than to instil the substance into the understanding. Then faith was commanded instead of being pro-

duced; and reason, proscribed, turned away from religion, from ontology.

"Here we have philosophy separated from theology; the priests on one side, the philosophers on the other; the one teaching to believe without comprehending, the others abandoning the peculiar province of faith, and pursuing their researches elsewhere. The doctrine of Idealism is obscured and effaced. Philosophers confine themselves to the investigation of phenomena, without concerning themselves with the generation, the succession, the genesis of these phenomena, and end in contemplating, not life, but death.

"When Locke came, when Berkeley came, the philosophical problem was proposed in this form, namely; What is the origin of our knowledge, and what is its certainty? Locke, whatever may have been his actual intention, or whatever the conclusions which have been drawn from him, answered this problem, by sensation, by body, by Matter; Berkeley answered, by Mind, by *idea*, and maintained that we have no other direct and certain notion of reality exterior to the Me, than *idea*; but which *idea* is all the knowledge we need. How shall this answer of Berkeley's be called? It was called *Idealism*. There was already, it is true, the word Spiritualism, opposed to Materialism, which might have been taken, but it was a general term, which presupposed both spirit and matter, two substances, and, therefore, not the proper term to express a doctrine, which excluded all notion of matter. So they created the term Idealism. This word, since applied to the theories of Kant, Fichte, &c., is not properly formed. To have been regular, it should have been, not *Idealism*, but *Ideism*. The question, however, then turning only on the origin and certainty of our knowledge, nobody was shocked at expressing a purely psychological theory, relating solely to the source and validity of our ideas, by a term which seems derived, not from *Idea*, but from *Ideal*, or *Ideality*.

"I repeat, that we should say *Ideism*, as we say Deism, Pantheism, &c. In saying *Idealism*, the root of which is, evidently, *Ideal*, we lead those, who are not well versed in the history of philosophy, into error; give them a confused notion, derived at once from what they know of the doctrines of Berkeley, Kant, and certain other psychologists, and from the induction, which they cannot avoid making, by virtue of the very laws of language, from the resemblance of this name to that which would be logically formed from *Ideal*, or *Ideality*.

"But the evil would not be great, if it stopped here. But, unhappily, we have a much graver reproach to make to this

word, employed in this sense. It usurps a place that does not belong to it; so that, if we continue to employ it in this sense, we have no word to express the most important of ontological theories, or, to speak more accurately, the great and only ontological theory. Does it comport with the progress of philosophy, to have no term by which to express the sublimest of all philosophies, that which, transmitted from age to age, from the Oriental world even to us, has appeared to be philosophy itself, the greatest and almost the only philosophy, to the finest geniuses of the world, to Pythagoras, to Plato, and to the Fathers of the Church?

"All who have studied the history of the progress, and the aberration, of the human mind, know the importance which words have sometimes had; and we do not hesitate to say, that the vicious use of this term, *Idealism*, constitutes one of the most serious obstacles to the progress of philosophy; for this false acceptation tends to divert attention from the doctrine of the Ideal, and to confound it with a theory which has no relation with it; and prevents, therefore, the student from perceiving the luminous summit to which philosophy aspires, in order to rejoin religion, and unite all traditions in one alone."

We pass over here, without remark, M. Leroux's theory of the origin of Christianity, for to treat that subject properly would carry us quite too far for our present purpose; we can only say now, that we have introduced this criticism on the use of the word *Idealism*, because we believe it to be just, and much needed. We had ourselves made, briefly, a similar criticism, in the *Democratic Review*, before meeting with this. *Idealism*, unquestionably, comes from *Ideal*; but what is the Ideal? That which relates to, or merely participates in the nature of, *ideas*? So one might at first sight be led to conclude. But this is not the fact. The Ideal is, philosophically considered, the *generic*, the origin and ground of ideas. The Greek word *idea* answers to the Latin *species*, or *forma*; and the Ideal, taken strictly, is the *formative* principle, that which forms the species, or specific idea. The doctrine of the Ideal, then, must be more ultimate, and altogether profounder, than the doctrine of Ideas; as the doctrine of the creator must be more ultimate, and profounder, than the doctrine of the creature. The doctrine of the

Ideal carries us back, and up, to the Original and Ground of all things or particular existences ; the doctrine of Ideas, or *Ideism*, carries us back, and up, only to particular existences, to individual beings themselves. Here is seen the great distance which philosophy has fallen from its original sublimity, and how low and superficial it has finally become. Its highest doctrines relate now only to particular beings, individual existences, leaving entirely out of view the Highest Being, Being of beings, Essence of essences, the object of the researches and contemplation of the older philosophers. But what is the philosophy which leaves out of view the infinite God, the primitive Essence, Unity, and Creator of all particular beings, or creatures, and which stops short with the creatures themselves? It is, disguise the matter as we will, atheism, and nothing but atheism. Is it wonderful, then, that our youth, who are taught this philosophy in our schools, and in nearly all modern literature, should find it so exceedingly difficult to obtain a firm and living faith in the Gospel?

But we are too favorable to modern philosophy. It has not only fallen from the Ideal, but it has fallen from even particular existences, and has come to amuse itself with the mere *notions* which the mind has of them. This is seen in the modern use of the word *Idea*. In the older philosophical language, the term *Idea* designated the thing itself, or rather the essence, the essential peculiarity of the particular being in question. It was the presence of the *formative* principle, or, as we prefer to say, *creative* principle, the Ideal in the Real. "The reality of the body," say Democritus and Leucippus, "is not in its external surface." The essence of any particular being, we may add, is not in its outward appearance, but in its vital or formative principle, in what some of our transcendental friends term the *spirit*, though without the necessary exactness of language. This essential, formative, or creative, principle, which must be in every particular existence, whether of the sensible world, or the intelli-

gible, and which is that which *makes* it be, and be what it is, is what the older and profounder philosophy meant by the word *idea*. *Idea* was, therefore, a term which belonged to a philosophy that dealt with ontology, — to speak after the Latins, with *essential forms*, the essences of things; and which sought, from the essences of things, to rise to the Primitive Essence, the Essence of essences, — to rise to God, as Plato poetically expresses it, borne on the wings of ideas. Here the term had a profound significance, which led those, who used it, to deal immediately with things, with realities. But the moment we come down to modern philosophy, especially to the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, all this profound significance disappears, and, instead of Ideas, regarded as the essences of things, we have Ideas which are merely our mental affections, taken as the object of the mind's own action; and, therefore, instead of a philosophy studying the essences of things, we have a fruitless psychology studying merely the soul's own phenomena. Even *Ideism* becomes now a term, etymologically interpreted, too expressive, for it obviously bears the same relation to Idealism that *Idea* does to *Ideal*. Strictly speaking, our philosophy has fallen as much below *Ideism*, as *Ideism* is below *Idealism*. *Idealism* rises to the Primitive Essence, for the *Ideal* is the *Creative Logos*, or Word, one with God; *Ideism* rises to the essences of individual things, or creatures; but modern philosophy, which is nothing but the veriest psychology, aspires only to the mere *phenomena* of the creature. Is it possible to fall lower, or to approach nearer to the infinite — Inane? But we return to Leroux, and Berkeley.

“We feel how very obscure what we have just advanced must appear to our readers. Unhappily, we can only vaguely indicate here our thoughts on a subject, which it will be the object of all our metaphysical articles to demonstrate, and make clear. Yet it was necessary to trace a line of demarcation between the two senses of the word *Idealism*. We have done it. We come now to Berkeley, and his system, which we must be permitted to call *ideism* or immaterialism, so as to escape the confusion of which we have complained.

"Towards the year 1680, William Molineux, author of a treatise on Dioptrics, and founder of the Society of Dublin, proposed an interesting psychological problem: 'Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere; suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man made to see; *query*, whether by his sight before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell, which is the globe, which the cube.' Molineux answers, 'Not. For though he has obtained experience of how a globe, how a cube, affects his touch, yet he has not yet attained the experience, that that which affects his touch so and so, must affect his sight so and so; or that the protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.'

"Locke published this problem of Molineux in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, (B. II. c. ix.), and gave it the same answer. 'I agree,' he says, 'with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this problem; and am of opinion, that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say, which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them.' This answer, adopted by Locke, moreover, conformed, perfectly, to his general principle of *sensation* and *experience*. The soul, in the beginning, as he held, being a mere *tabula rasa*, void of all character and without any ideas whatever, to suppose it possessed of a natural power to refer to the spherical figure the tactile sensations of the sphere, and to the cubic figure those of the cube, would have been to return to those innate ideas, to those marvellous instincts, or those essential faculties of the soul, which he had combated throughout his book, by striving to substitute for them the mere combination of sensations.

"Berkeley, born in 1684, was instructed in Locke's *Essay*, which had a very great influence on him; and afterwards, on bringing out his own views, so far was he from rejecting its principles, which he regarded as sound, he honestly believed, that he was merely following, correcting, and developing them. But, endowed with a very religious disposition, he deduced from them consequences very different from the sensualist metaphysics which others deduced from them about the same time, both in England and in France. The problem of Molineux above all engaged his attention, and became the source of all his ulterior intellectual labor. He adopted the

solution of Molineux and Locke; but he returned to it so often, and studied it so profoundly, that it suggested to him, still in his youth, a system for explaining, in a new manner, the phenomena of vision. As we shall soon see, this explication reduces all the cognitions, which sight gives us of the external world, to a certain number of colored sensations, having only a conventional value. Sure of having Locke to back him, he abandoned himself with confidence to this view; generalized it for the other senses, and made it the foundation of the whole edifice which Locke had constructed, and presented as the model of the human understanding; and he came, thus, very rapidly, and with full confidence, to the theory which bears his name, and whose peculiarity, as every body knows, is the denial of the reality of matter and of the external world. The origin of the system is evident; it is the doctrine of Locke pushed to its last consequences. Locke had reduced intelligence to sensation. But how can sensations, added, combined, multiplied, produce understanding, — give, I say, not man merely, but animal? What are sensations, collected, as in a reservoir, in a being deprived of every kind of intellectual power, and having, therefore, no other faculty than that of receiving them, and, to a certain degree, of retaining them? We must go farther than Locke; we must explain how something results from these sensations which pass over the sensitive being, as the breath of air over the surface of the waters. If the mystery of this being, which we call man, or animal, is not at all in himself, if there is in him only the single faculty of feeling, we must look elsewhere for this mystery. It is, then, in God. The veritable being, then, is God, and only God. What we take to be beings are only mirrors, which reflect at each instant, and all passively, the Divine emanations. By annihilating the *being* in man, or animal, we are forced to refer all causes to God; and man, or animal, being in no sense a cause, God is the only cause. Man, or animal, being only a purely sensitive being, what, I demand, are all the sensations perceived by this being? I see in him, indeed, different senses, — sight, touch, taste, smelling, hearing; but how pass from one order of sensations to another? What relation, for example, between a tactile sensation, and a sensation of sight? How pass from the world, which touch reveals, to the world which sight discovers? Is there in man and animal a mysterious harmony, which joins together these two worlds, and creates, naturally, a relation and connexion between the sensations of the one, and the sensations of the other? No, says Locke; there are only sensations. Then, says Berkeley, all

these orders of sensations are only conventional signs, and the words of a language which God at each moment speaks to us.

“Berkeley had had Locke for his master ; he had Hume for his disciple. Struck with the solidity of his argumentation, Hume received in some sort, from his hand and that of Locke, the seminal principle of that radical and universal skepticism which he professed in his writings ; so that since then, the psychologists have had a hard time of it, carried away as they have been, on the one side, by Berkeley into a sort of mysticism very similar to the doctrine of *Maya* among the Hindoos, according to which, the external world not existing, our life is only a long sleep, and all our thoughts are dreams which depend immediately on the Divine action ; or, on the other side, by Hume into the abyss of general and absolute doubt, which embraces at once the Divinity, our own intelligence, moral truth, the physical world, — all, in one word, save our actual sensations and momentary ideas. To tell how our psychologists have sought to escape from the consequences which Berkeley and Hume obtained from Locke’s doctrine, — how, for instance, the Scottish school, with Reid at its head, has made its efforts to stop the leaks in Locke’s vessel submerged by his own disciples, and how the German school, with Kant for leader, has only responded to the provocation of Berkeley and Hume, by attempting to save something, were it only some notions of time and space, from the universal shipwreck of human knowledge, — would be to make the history of what is called modern philosophy, although, in our judgment, the modest name of psychology would be the much more appropriate name for its researches. We undertake not to trace this history in the present article ; it will find, naturally, its place elsewhere in our Dictionary ; we restrict ourselves here to the exposition, in their sequence, of the views of Berkeley.”

Some of our readers will, doubtless, demur to the view here presented of Locke’s philosophy. We have, as we have often confessed elsewhere, a very great reverence for the author of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Of all modern psychologists, he is the one we most respect, and follow with the greatest confidence. As a man, he is worthy of all esteem ; as a friend to freedom, religious and political, and as a sufferer in its cause, he deserves our gratitude. As a

psychologist, he stands infinitely above the recent brood, who, at home or abroad, talk of consciousness as a *faculty* of the soul, as an interior light by which the soul may look into its own eyes, and see and observe itself in itself, as M. Jouffroy very innocently maintains. He knew no other way of studying the *Me*, than in its phenomena; and these phenomena he has studied, collected, and classed, as well as, if not better than, any of his successors. So far, we commend him, and follow him. But *Locke has never concerned himself with the great problems of philosophy*; has scarcely suspected them; and, if he has, now and then, incidentally made a distant allusion to some of them, it is to lower and obscure them, not to enlighten and solve them. He found philosophy rapidly sinking to mere psychology, and he hastened and completed its fall. So far as he did this, or contributed to the decline already commenced, his influence has been disastrous; and the authority he has acquired, which determines the direction of nearly all our philosophical studies, is, so far as submitted to, an unmitigated evil, fatal to all development and growth of genuine philosophy.

Morally considered, Locke is at the head of the school of enlightened self-interest, a school that seeks, in the political order, to secure well-being by what it calls freedom, but which is nothing but *free competition*, (which we have described in a subsequent article on Demagoguism,) and in private life, by prudent considerations, and a wise estimate of probable results. It is calm, tolerant; the sworn enemy of all eccentricity, of all enthusiasm, all deep and powerful sentiments. It makes wise, shrewd, practical men of the world. It educates few Sisters of Charity; founds few hospitals of pity, or mercy; suffers itself to have little sympathy with distress, sorrow, or affliction; but it restrains the populace, builds workhouses, and improves its dungeons and penitentiaries, &c., as the cheapest and most prudent way of disposing of its suffering, or its dangerous, population. In religion, it is rationalistic, professes to be reasonable, and to be governed by good

sense. It eschews all that is profound, or mysterious, all that demands long meditations, or excites deep and ardent feelings. It goes decorously to church, pays a moderate sum to the well dressed, well bred, pleasant spoken clergyman, who, it is understood, is to be only moderately in earnest, and to discourse, in well turned periods, and in a calm and regularly modulated voice, on the moral virtues and the duties of private life, on the importance of public decorum and a respectful observance of the outward forms of piety and devotion. As to that deep and living faith which overcomes the world, as to that profound love, that overwhelming sense of duty, that awful power of sacrifice, which will take captive, and make one brave all dangers, endure all evils, and submit to all tortures in the service of God or of men, — why, it is prudent to leave such deep, strong, and uncontrollable matters in the depths of the soul, unquickened, for they might carry us too far, disturb the settled order and decorum of society. What is impassioned may become tumultuous. Then is not the world already overcome? Has not modern science mastered it, annihilated time and space? Have we not political economies, free competition, a well regulated police, churches, schools, workhouses, and penitentiaries? What need, then, of a stir? What need of strong and ardent passions? God is the author of order, not of confusion, and would be served in a quiet, peaceable, decorous manner, and not with a heated, tumultuous, or fanatical worship, a worship that would lead us to look upon those who practise it as mad, or as filled with new wine.

But it was not precisely of this we intended to speak; but of the charge which makes Locke answer the question of the origin of human knowledge, by SENSATION alone. This charge is denied by the modern adherents of Locke; but, as it seems to us, rashly, and without sufficient grounds. Locke may have meant to assign an additional source of knowledge, in what he calls REFLECTION; he may even, in the course of his work, advance many notions not reconcilable with the

origin of all our knowledge in sensation alone ; but his clear, systematic, so to speak, official, doctrine, fully sustains the charge brought against him. Here is his own account of the matter.

“ Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, and without any *ideas* ; how comes it to be furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety ? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge ? To this I answer, in one word, *experience* ; in *that* all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about *external sensible objects*, or about the *internal operations of our minds*, perceived and reflected upon by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of *thinking*. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the *ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do spring.”

Let us analyze this passage. First, is recognized observation, and, implicitly, an observer ; secondly, two classes of objects of observation ; 1. external sensible objects ; 2. the operations of our minds. Here all objects of knowledge are excluded, but these two, — external sensible objects, and our own mental phenomena. This is clear. But what is this which observes, which experiences ? This is, unquestionably, the *me*. Well, what are the powers and capacities of this *me* ? What is it prior to actual experience, before having made any observation ? It is a *blank sheet*, void of all characters, and without any ideas. It has, then, the simple capacity of receiving characters, for this is the sole capacity of the *blank sheet* ; that is to say, it has the simple and sole capacity of receiving sensations. Did Locke mean all this ? We know not ; but he says all this.

But no, say his disciples ; Locke admits another faculty in the *me*, namely, the faculty of Reflection. Very good ; this is somewhat ; but let us see what it is, and to how much it amounts. Admit that it is a source of ideas ; still, of *what* ideas ? *Merely of the operations of our own minds*. It is, according to

Locke's own definition of it, nothing more or less than the mind's own apprehension of its own operations, and, therefore, simply CONSCIOUSNESS. "Though it be not sense," says he, "as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense*." Here, then, the *me* is reduced to the simple capacity of receiving sensations of external objects, and to the capacity of recognizing the fact that it receives them. The most rigid analysis, as well as the most liberal construction, can make no more out of Locke's doctrine; and all else that he recognizes in the *me*, and in the understanding, is of subsequent growth, and derived from experience.

Now, so far as regards the power of the *me*, and its properties, the distinction here set up, between sensation and reflection resolved into consciousness, is untenable. We quote here, with approbation, an able and zealous defender of Locke, among ourselves. M. Cousin had accused Locke of confounding reflection with consciousness. The defender of Locke admits the accusation, but denies that it is one, and contends that consciousness and reflection are identical. In this, of course, we do not agree with him; but to what he proceeds to say, we heartily respond. "We deny that there is any such thing as immediate and active consciousness *distinct from the mental act*. A cognition and the consciousness of that cognition are one and the same thing. A single perception is simple and indivisible; it cannot be analyzed into a fact and the consciousness of that fact; for the event itself being an act of knowing, it does not exist, if it be not known to exist. In one act of perception there is but one object, — the thing perceived; while the hypothesis of a distinct and independent consciousness requires two, — the thing perceived, and the object of consciousness, which is the perception itself." *

* Bowen's Essays: Boston, 1842; p. 131. The essay we quote was originally published in the North American Review, of which respectable and influential periodical, the author is, we believe, at

Admitting this, and for which we may quote the high authority of Leibnitz, who makes apperception only an intenser degree of perception, we shall hardly be able to maintain a valid distinction between sensation and the consciousness thereof. The sensation is a simple perception, and is a simple fact, distinguishable not at all from an apperception, or fact of consciousness, — unless it be in degree. The fact of consciousness contains no element not in the feeblest sensation which comes and goes without being noted. Admit, then, as we have shown from Locke himself to be the fact, and as his defender contends, that Locke recognizes in the *me*, prior to experience, only the capacity to receive sensations of external objects, and to be conscious of them, it will follow, as the perception and the consciousness of it are one and the same thing, that Locke does, as alleged, answer the question of the origin of our knowledge solely by sensation, and recognizes in the *me* itself, unacquired, no power or faculty, but the simple capacity of receiving sensations.

But, taking Reflection in a more liberal sense, in which Locke also takes it, as the power of retaining and reasoning upon a sensation, it will not help the matter; for this can give us only secondary ideas, wrought out of the original sensations. Reflection can only sum up, divide, and compare these original sensations, without adding any thing to them of its own, which, in the last analysis, reduces us to the simple sensations, where we were before. We contend, therefore, that the charge against Locke is well founded. The only relief from the charge, possible to Locke, had been to recognize a knowing faculty in the *me*, capa-

present the editor. Having alluded to these Essays, we may add, in passing, that they are written with considerable ability, and are quite creditable to the author. Considering the little that is written amongst us on philosophical subjects, they deserve a favorable reception by the public; though, were it not for the general dearth of philosophical writings, we are bound to say, that they would hardly take a very high rank.

ble of detecting, in the sensation, a non-sensible element; that is to say, as component part of the sensation, the perception, not merely of the mind's own operations on that sensation, but of an object, not sensible, actually perceived. We ourselves contend, as earnestly as Locke, that there is no cognition but through the medium of a sensation of an external object; but in every cognition the *me* takes cognizance of that which transcends the outward, sensible object. There is no sensation which is not integrally cognition, owing to the fact, that the *me* is essentially cognitive, as well as sensitive. This is the fact Locke and his school have overlooked, and which has vitiated all their labors even as mere psychologists. But we are lingering too long on speculations of our own; we hasten back to the exposition of Berkeley's New Theory of Vision.

“The Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, Berkeley's first [second] published work, appeared in 1708 [1709?], twenty-eight [twenty-four?] years after the work of Locke. The author was only twenty-four [twenty-five?] years of age. What is the value of this Theory of Vision? Is it solid; or is it only an absurd romance? The question is yet to be decided. Aristotle had said in relation to sight and hearing, (*Ethique à Nicomaque*, liv. 11, c. 1.) ‘It is not by virtue of seeing or of hearing, that we acquire these senses; instead of acquiring them by use, we use them because we have them.’ The opinion of Berkeley is exactly the reverse of this. According to the disciple of Locke, not merely all the ideas we acquire by sight are the result of a real education and of a series of experiments, but we owe them all directly to another sense, — to the sense of touch. We perceive distances, magnitudes, and situations, only because we have hands to touch, and feet by which we move, and not because nature has given us eyes. If we had not the sense of touch, we should be incapable of seeing. Resuming the example proposed by Molineux, Berkeley stoutly maintains, that if a man born blind should come to receive his sight, he would not be able by that to form any notion of distances, but objects the most remote would appear to him as if placed on his eye. Figures would escape him not less than distances. Place before him a cube and a sphere, which he has learned to know by touch, far

from being able to distinguish immediately which is the cube, which the sphere, he could not comprehend what relation his new sensations would have with those previously experienced. Moreover, these objects would not appear to him distinct one from the other; for, according to Berkeley, the sight is, by itself, utterly incapable of suggesting to us any idea of extension. The man born blind, suddenly made able to see, having thus by sight no notion of extension, would not isolate, by his mind, the cube from the sphere; for the same reason he would not even distinguish them from the table, or from the room in which he should be placed. All would be limited for him to a sensation of colors, a general sensation, and without distinction of parts, which would come to cover his soul, so to speak, as a garment immediately applied to the sensitive surface. It would be, in this regard, another touch, but of a nature wholly different from ordinary touch, and so essentially different, that, between the objects of the sense of touch and those of sight, no secret harmony could advertise the patient, that there is any connexion or relation.

“How, then, is a relation established between the sensations furnished by sight, and those furnished by touch? In other words, how does sight enable us to know and distinguish objects? Berkeley, in his *Treatise*, refers all notions of extension, and consequently of figure, distance, and, in general, distinction of objects, to the sense of touch. It is in touching with our hands, and in moving, either our whole body, or its different parts, that we form to ourselves ideas of extension; afterwards, we refer to these ideas the sensations of color which we receive from sight. But this relation is purely arbitrary, inasmuch as no necessary connexion exists, for us, between these colors and those ideas of extension. Sight, once again, suggesting to us by itself no notion of figure, magnitude, or distance, all the colored appearances we receive are only concomitant signs with the ideas which touch gives us. Touch, then, according to Berkeley, is not merely, as has since been said, the educator of sight, and in general the monitor of the other senses, but the only source of all our perceptions of external things. Touch has a special privilege, which neither sight nor hearing shares, in any manner, with it. Sight and hearing have a different purpose; these two senses send us only a species of signs incapable of furnishing us, by themselves, with any other idea than the sensations of color and of sound; but, these sensations being different according to the nature and position of objects, we refer them by habit, that is, by experience, to our sensations, and to our ideas of touch.

“ This manner of conceiving the uses of sight and hearing, evidently, makes of the results of these two senses only a sort of conventional language; since between the figures which these senses give us, and the nature of the perceptions which we can have, of the form, the magnitude, and the situation of things of the external world, there is no relation, no real and necessary connexion, at least, none which we feel to be necessary. Here is the conclusion of Berkeley, his favorite idea, that which continually recurs under his pen, in this *Treatise* of his youth, as in all his other works, that which we find has inspired his whole system on the non-reality of the exterior world.

“ It is impossible to carry farther, or develope more rigidly, the idea of the fragmentation of being, which Locke had introduced. Here, indeed, is the severest and most logical analysis which can be made, in starting from Locke’s inspiration and following his principles. If, in fact, the being we call animal is nothing but a subject of different sensations, if there are in this being no secret chords which establish, between the different orders of his sensations, mysterious, but hitherto unfathomed, and perhaps unfathomable, relations, then the sensations of sight, of hearing, of touch, of taste, of smell, must be examined apart, and as things as entirely distinct as if they pertained to different beings. An axiom of this sort, borrowed from the method of Locke, is Berkeley’s point of departure. Now, in considering sight thus apart, it was natural to make much of a discovery, which had made a great noise in the seventeenth century, namely, the representation of external objects at the bottom, or retina, of the eye. It was imagined, and still is, that we see by a plane surface, precisely as we perceive the sensations of touch on the rigid parts of our bodies. This granted, how can it be imagined, that a colored and plane sensation can give us ideas of extension? Such a sensation must always want, at least, depth; and, moreover, wanting also mobility to run over and measure the plane picture represented on the retina, it follows, necessarily, that sight must appear to be unable to suggest to us any idea of extension. The being, thus affected in a manner purely passive by a representation painted on his retina, would resemble a picture, incapable of measuring itself as to its surface, and, for a still stronger reason, of divining, that, under its surface, there are *horizons* of many leagues in depth. In assuming Locke’s method and the pretended vision on the retina, as our point of departure, we must necessarily arrive where Berkeley has arrived, and deny sight, in order, so to speak, the better to explain seeing.

“But Berkeley, in his explanation, remained, at least, faithful to his own analytic method; he showed himself a good logician, and pushed his reasoning to its last consequences. This reasoning leads him to believe, that we have by sight no idea of the magnitude, distance, or situation of objects, but merely a sort of colored *apparition*, as a painted canvass, without there being suggested to the mind any idea of the distinction between the parts of this canvass, or rather between its different colors. He concludes, and very justly, that, if, as is unquestionably the fact, we form ideas on the occasion of sight, it is because that to the most intimate notions we have formed of body by touch, we adapt the concomitant colors which we receive by sight, precisely as we give to objects names which have no necessary or exact relation with them. All this is logical and reasonable. But what say the metaphysicians who have come since, and adopted Berkeley's ideas, while mutilating them in the absurdest manner? Here, among others, is a curious example of the confusion, which, after him, has been introduced on this subject. Vision on the retina is subject to one mighty difficulty. Objects, as is known, are painted on the bottom of the eye *inverted*, the upper part of a given object being painted on the lower part of the eye, and the lower part of the object on the upper part of the eye, and so also as to right and left. This being so, whence is it, that we see objects in their natural position? Before Berkeley, they explained this, by conceiving a blind man holding in his hands two sticks that cross each other, and with them touching the extremities of an object. The lower hand of this man would feel the upper part of the object, and the upper hand the lower part. This explication of the erect appearance of the image, is wholly incompatible with Berkeley's reasonings. He, therefore, carefully refutes it. He shows, evidently, that we have no cognition of the intersection of the radius pencils, nor of the impulse of these pencils in right lines. He cannot conceive, he says, how the soul should judge of the situation of an object by things which it does not perceive, or how it can perceive them without knowing it. ‘Add to this,’ he continues, ‘that the explaining the manner of vision by the example of cross sticks, and hunting for the object along the axes of the radius pencils, doth suppose the proper objects of sight to be perceived at a distance from us, contrary to what hath been demonstrated.’ The argument is solid and irrefragable. It is absolutely necessary to reject altogether Berkeley's hypothesis, or to renounce the cross sticks.

“There remains, then, if we accept this hypothesis, the

difficulty of the erect appearance of objects. This, however, is not a difficulty for him, who, I repeat it, does not admit that sight can of itself give us any idea of extension. Naturally, then, according to him, we see objects neither erect nor inverted; we see merely colors, without their suggesting to us any notion of situation, size, or distance. But what follows? The school of Locke, the sensualist school in France and England, while admitting Berkeley's analysis, was unable to resolve to admit the obvious induction from the inversion of objects on the retina. It did not comprehend the subtilty of Berkeley's metaphysics; it tended to materialism; it would see sensation everywhere, and could not resolve not to find in sensation all that it sought; it wished to be able to point to all things with the finger, and to stereotype, so to speak, the sublimest intelligence in a piece of matter. It saw objects inverted on the retina; then it concluded, that we naturally see objects inverted. In this respect it did not comprehend the subtile Berkeley, who ceases never to repeat, that we do not see objects at all, that we have only a general sensation of color. But Berkeley adding, afterwards, that we form all our ideas of extension by touch, the materialist school hastened to adopt this part of his argument. It united, therefore, things fundamentally contradictory and irreconcilable. It believed, that, primitively, we see objects inverted, and yet that *sight is incapable of giving us any idea of extension*,—two propositions logically contradictory. Then it proceeded to explain the erect appearance of images by the hypothesis of Berkeley. It is thus that is formed, by a monstrous amalgam, the absurdest opinion of which science has ever afforded an example. It was believed, repeated, taught, as a truth proved, and beyond question, that naturally we are incapable of seeing; that, if we see, it is by favor of the sense of touch and of locomotion; that, primitively, we see bodies as if they were placed on our retina; that we see them inverted, the top at the bottom, the bottom at the top, the right at the left, and the left at the right; that we habituate ourselves, afterwards, to give to bodies their erect appearance; and that in this work the touch is our guide and our educator. Then was proclaimed louder than ever, *sensation and experience*. This was all as it should be. The sensation, which of all our sensations appears the most material, that of touch, had it not just obtained a brilliant triumph? So was understood, and still is understood, Berkeley's New Theory of Vision!

“Here is a strange paradox, which the eighteenth century accepts with so much favor, and which appears to complete so

happily the doctrine of Locke, that it becomes its indispensable crown. Condillac, at first, repulsed this hypothesis. He maintained, in his *Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances humaines*, that the eye appreciates, *naturally*, figures, magnitudes, situations, and distances. But he retracted afterwards, in his *Traité des Sensations*, and adopted the hypothesis of the education of the eye by the touch. He so fully adopts it, that he even attempts to appropriate it to himself; for this celebrated *Treatise on Sensations* is, at bottom, only an impudent plagiarism from the work of Berkeley, whose name, I believe, is not even once cited. As to Voltaire, the curious and eager importer of the discoveries of our neighbours, he was among the first to admit these singular novelties; and in his *Philosophie de Newton*, he asserts the truth of the English theory, with the same zeal he had displayed for Attraction. 'It is absolutely necessary to conclude,' says he in this work (Chapter VII.), 'that distance, magnitude, situations, are not, strictly speaking, visible things; that is, they are not proper and immediate objects of sight. The proper and immediate object of sight is nothing but *colored light*; all else we perceive only in the long run, and by experience. We learn to see, precisely as we learn to read; the difference is merely that the art of seeing is the easier to learn, and that nature is equally in all men the teacher. The sudden judgments, very nearly uniform, which all minds, at a certain age, form respecting distances, magnitudes, situations, lead us to suppose that we have only to open our eyes, in order to see precisely as we do see. But this is a mistake. *The aid of other senses is necessary*. If we had only the sense of sight, we should have no means of knowing extension in length, breadth, or depth; and a pure spirit could never know them, unless God revealed them to him.'

"It must be confessed, that this eighteenth century, so admirable in many respects, has shown on this point, as on several others, a singular simplicity in the midst of its incredulity. Here is a man who adopts an opinion the most opposed to the common and universal sentiment of mankind, with a faith which may, under other relations, well recall to mind epochs the most credulous.

"But what! has not the theory you reject been demonstrated by a celebrated and undeniable experiment? Do you forget the blind boy of Cheselden? Has not that experiment, in 1729, established, point by point, all the predictions of Berkeley, twenty years after the publication of his Essay? Is not this one of the best known, most striking, and oftenest cited facts in the history of science and philosophy?

“ We shall speak elsewhere (in the article on VISION) of this celebrated experiment ; it will suffice us to say here, that the account given of it has been almost always altered to make it quadrate with the demands of the theory ; that the original narration in the *Philosophical Transactions* is very little conclusive, and full of absurdities and contradictions ; and that, when carefully examined, it makes rather against Berkeley, than in his favor. The boy operated on for a cataract did by no means see objects inverted. Moreover, he distinguished them so well, says the account, one from another, that he preferred those of a uniform and regular figure. All that the account proves is, merely that vision in the diseased person was very difficult to be established, as was to be supposed in pathological cases of this kind. Has it not often been remarked in persons who have a long time been deprived of the sight of one eye, that the nerve corresponding to that eye is affected with atrophy ? What completes the demonstration of the little reliance to be placed on the inductions from this experiment, is the manner in which it terminated. The blind boy had been operated upon, at first, only in the case of one eye ; at the end of a year, the cataract was taken from the other eye. During this year he had educated sight by touch ; that is, according to the hypothesis, he had been able to apply the notions of extension, suggested by touch, to the colored sensations which were given him by the eye which had been operated on. He should then have immediately seen, in the full sense of the term, with his second eye, as soon as it was uncovered. But, however, it was not so, and he was obliged, they say, to recommence a new education, as in the case of the first : that is, in our view, the pathological state demanded in the case of this eye, as in that of the first, a certain time for its cure.

“ It is on such an experiment, which no other operation for the cataract, among innumerable cases, has confirmed, and which, on the contrary, other accounts of similar operations constantly belie, that is still to-day affirmed, and taught, Berkeley's Theory of Vision, grossly perverted by the other disciples of Locke ! But, instead of the blind boy of Cheselden, have we not around us all this multitude of beings which come each day to the light, and can we not experiment on them, with some little assurance, whether, in point of fact, sight is a natural faculty, or whether it is merely the result of touch and experience ? The examination of the smallest animal might, one would suppose, suffice to prevent us from being betrayed into this wild aberration, into which science has devi-

ated with so much assurance for more than this hundred years.

"My friend, the late Dr. Bertrand, in a thesis directed against the doctrine still taught in the schools,* has shown how all nature protests, by all that she offers to our view, against this strange assertion, that sight is, as to notions of extension, only a blind sense, and that it is touch which teaches us to see. Do we see young animals rushing at hazard against obstacles? Is it *experience*, that teaches the chicken to make the movement necessary to pick up with its beak the grain that must feed it, and which its eye sees without previous education? The young quail, just hatched, and still encumbered with the remains of its shell, pursues the insect which it must make its prey. The child sees, at a period when it has as yet touched nothing; it has no need to run its fingers over all the parts of the face of its nurse to recognize her and smile. Birds are of all animals those which appear to enjoy the most perfect vision; and yet they are precisely those least fitted to learn to see, for they cannot be said, properly speaking, to have an organ of touch. Is it locomotion, that gives them the ideas of figure, distance, and situation? But do we not see that young birds, when for the first time they come out of their nests, go and alight, without hesitation, on the branches of the neighbouring trees, which they do not take for colors? If their flight is infirm, it is not because their sight is at fault, but because their wings are weak. Their eyes serve very well to direct their first motions; but how could they have learned to see, while remaining, without moving, in the narrow space of their nests?"

We have very little to say, ourselves, on this Theory of Vision, or on this slight, but sufficient, refutation of it by M. Leroux. The singular absurdity into which our scientific professors fall, in admitting, with Berkeley, that naturally we do not see objects at all, and yet contending that we see objects naturally inverted, and learn subsequently, by experience, to give them this erect appearance, — an absurdity repeated, we believe, in all our schools, — we commend to the very careful attention of those who boast of sensation and experiment, and talk of the *exact* sciences. The present

* *Examination de l'opinion généralement admise sur la manière dont nous recevons par la vue la connaissance des corps.*

editor of the North American Review, formerly a teacher of philosophy and metaphysics in Cambridge University, in the volume of Essays already referred to, says: "If metaphysicians were challenged to produce one broad, definite, and fruitful fact in their science, which had been *discovered* since the time of Bacon, and so established as to admit of neither *cavil* nor *doubt*, we know of no better way whereby they could silence the questioner, than by a reference to Berkeley's New Theory of Vision." * He proceeds to develop the theory, and to accept it, in a manner as unqualified as could be asked by its most ardent friends. We believe that it is universally accepted among us. But those who read these remarks by M. Leroux, as well as they who study the Theory itself, must see that we cannot accept this theory, without accepting Berkeley's whole doctrine on the non-reality of the external world. Either we must give up the reality of all existence exterior to the *me*, and recognize only the *me* and its affections, or we must give up this Theory of Vision. This Theory knocks the philosophy of sensation in the head, and destroys all certainty, save in the case of momentary consciousness. We demand that this be attended to. If they will teach our youth this Theory, we insist that they shall teach it in all its bearings, and in all its legitimate consequences. We protest against the feebleness, not to say dishonesty, of teaching premises, from the consequences of which we shrink. Our youth should be dealt by honestly and fairly, and allowed to be logical and consistent. The moral chastity of their natures should not be destroyed by their being compelled to submit to contradictions, and to swallow absurdities. The immorality occasioned by teaching premises, the legitimate conclusions of which must be denied, in order not to revolt common sense, it is not easy to estimate. If your premises lead you to conclusions contrary to the universal sense of mankind, do not deny your conclusions, but reëxam-

* Bowen's Essays, ubi supra, p. 274.

ine and correct your premises. All the world has believed that we see because we have eyes, and because we have the power or faculty of vision; and not that we have the power to see, because we have the sense of touch, and see only because we have *learned* to see. But to return.

“ We have lingered long on this question of sight, because it is in itself a subject of the greatest importance, and because it is sad to see a false theory taught in scientific treatises, and in our schools; and furthermore, because nothing can better make us perceive the genesis of Berkeley’s metaphysical system, or of what is called his *Idealism*. This idealism, which he opposes, as a preservative, to the materialism proceeding from the school of Locke, and which he presents as a shield to religion against *atheists*, *skeptics*, and *wits*, is itself merely a deduction from Locke’s doctrine on sensation. What, in point of fact, according to Locke, is intelligence? A collection or assemblage of sensations; nothing else. Now what can we concede to sensation in regard to the reality of the external world?

“ We know the external world only by sensation. Sensation is merely a mode of the mind’s own existence, a modification of ourselves, a *passion* of our soul. It does not exist by itself; it exists only in us; or rather, it is we alone who exist and who are affected. Philosophers have never doubted the non-reality of what they call the *secondary qualities* of bodies. They admit without difficulty, that heat or cold, hardness or softness, sweetness or bitterness, red or blue, &c., exist only in the mind; but they generally regard, as really existing, extension, figure, solidity, weight, motion, rest, what they call the *primary qualities* of bodies. The ideas of Berkeley on sight, formed after Locke, must needs carry him much farther. In fact, if you comprehend the exposition which we have just made of the Theory of Vision, you will see that sight reveals to us only colors, that is, merely sensible qualities, which exist only in us. Moreover, properly speaking, we see not the same objects that we feel by touch. There is no relation between our sensations of touch and our sensations of sight, any more than there is between objects and the conventional names we give them.

“ If Berkeley thought this of sight, for a still stronger reason, he must have thought it of hearing, taste, and smell. Touch itself, charged with sustaining the whole edifice of the notions abstracted from the other senses, must in time undergo the

same fate that they have undergone, and Berkeley could not escape from despoiling it, by the very artifice which he had used in dis inheriting the others, of all certainty. A given body, then, appears to him nothing but an assemblage or congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas collected by our different senses; ideas which our mind unites in one and the same body, that is to say, to which it gives a name, for it has observed that they accompany one another. But a body did not appear to him to be a being distinct from these sensations.

“After having broken the *subject* into fragments, the doctrine of Locke must needs end in doing the same to the *object*. After having destroyed the unity of being in the *me*, it must needs destroy the external world. This is what Berkeley has done, with a profound sagacity, and a resoluteness truly wonderful. His terrible analysis of sight finishes the work of taking away all certainty in relation to the *primary qualities* of body, which philosophers had distinguished from mere sensation. Evidently then, *primary qualities* must go with the *secondary qualities*. All, in passing under the level of sensation, must share the condition of sensation, that is to say, be reduced to a modification of the mind, to a mere *appearance*.

“What a strange spectacle in the history of philosophy! Descartes taking spiritualism for his point of departure, tries with all his might to demonstrate the existence of the material world; and Berkeley, a disciple of Locke, and assuredly the ablest of the metaphysicians of sensation, does all in his power to save the spiritual world, and to annihilate the idea of matter! It is thus that Berkeley meets Malebranche in the system of *Vision in God*, that we see all things in God. The one starts from Descartes, with *cogito, ergo sum*, the other from Locke with sensation; both end in an analogous doctrine.

“But we must say that this doctrine is much more studied, much profounder in Malebranche, than in Berkeley. Malebranche is the great interpreter of the text of St. Paul, understood in this sense: *In Deo vivimus, et movemur, et sumus*. As to Berkeley, what is properly his, what establishes his place and his rank in the history of modern philosophy, is, above all, his having conducted the doctrine of sensation to this terrible abyss. The system itself of immaterialism, or of pure spiritualism, negation made up of all substances destitute of thought, is very little developed in his works. He is rather occupied in overthrowing matter and materialism, than in building up spiritualism.

“But having come after Locke, and so evidently from his school that it could not have been developed without him,

Berkeley has had a twofold influence, very remarkable. On the one hand, his sagacity has furnished materialism with its most boasted discoveries. It is from him, in his analysis of vision, that Condillac, a spirit void of invention, has drawn his books; it is he who has inspired the famous axiom of Helvetius, that *without our hands we should be yet browsing in the forest*; and it is from him, in fine, that Hume professes to have borrowed all the arguments of his skepticism. But more lately, it is he, also, who has made the partisans of Locke beat a retreat. The offspring of Berkeley and Hume, what is called the Scottish school, is startled at the obscure labyrinth into which these two powerful reasoners had carried it away; it loses somewhat of its faith in sensation; it asks if Locke has not been too hasty, if he has not forgotten something; it seeks with nicest eye through what broken stitches has entered the deluge of doubt which invades every thing. Then comes Reid, and, in his train, that little flock of reasoners, who compose the school, from him down to Dugald Stewart, — minds for the most part so feeble, and with so little penetration, that one is really embarrassed to call them philosophers. They attempt by a thousand little means, by all sorts of shifts and artifices, to escape skepticism; they live by contradictions; they are of the school of Locke, and are not of it; they hold his doctrine to be the master-piece of philosophy; he is for them the father of veritable logic and metaphysics, and yet they make against him a reaction, which they strive to render fundamental. But, while they toil and struggle without much effect, Kant, solitary and alone, resumes the problem of philosophy where Berkeley and Hume had left it. Philosophy changes its soil, and returns to visit the country of Leibnitz. By the side of the original effort of Kant, the attempts of the Scottish school appear but the quaking of pigmies. It is, then, to Berkeley, that we must refer, in a great measure, the efforts the psychologists have been obliged to make, even down to our own times, to ascertain what is necessary to be held in regard to the origin and certainty of human knowledge."

ART. III. — *Tracts for the Times.* By Members of the University of Oxford. New York : Charles Henry. 1839. Second Edition. 3 vols. 8vo.

WE have not introduced these Tracts, which have created so much excitement, and concerning which so much has been said and written during the last few years, for the purpose of going into a critical examination of their literary, or their theological, merits ; nor, indeed, for the purpose of entering far into the question of the claims of the Anglican Church to Catholicity, which they open up ; but because they happen to furnish us with a convenient text for some rather desultory remarks, on the very important religious movement, of which they are one of the pregnant signs.

So far as they broach the claims of the Church of England to be *the* catholic, or *a* catholic, church, we, probably, should not altogether agree with their learned and pious authors. Regarded as a question of outward organization and canonical communion, the claims of the Church of England to catholicity, on her own admitted principles, do not appear to us to stand on any better footing than those of the other Protestant communions. She holds, and rightfully, that the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church is supreme, under God, in all matters of faith and discipline. It is true, she adds, it is not lawful for the church to ordain any thing contrary to, or besides, God's word written, to be believed for necessity of salvation ; but this does in no wise impair her authority ; because she is the keeper and interpreter of the word written, as well as of the word spoken ; because it is she herself, by virtue of her authoritative interpretations of the word, that prescribes, and interprets, the limitations and extent of her own powers ; and because she alone has the right to judge of their infraction, and also of the mode and measure of redress. She cannot suffer the individual member, or any number of individual members, as such, to judge her acts, or to plead the Sacred Text against her decis-

ions ; for this would be to authorize Dissent, and Individualism, against which she protests.

Now it is undeniable, that from the sixth to the sixteenth century, to say the least, the Church of England had *no separate, independent existence*. It was an integral portion, canonically considered, of the catholic church, the acknowledged head and centre of which were at Rome. This catholic church, one and indivisible, including all national or local churches in communion with it, was, during the period we have named, supreme, and therefore competent to legislate on all matters of faith, discipline, and church organization, for *all* its members. Whatever modifications in regard to faith or discipline, or to the constitution and administration, the distribution or concentration of power, she chose to introduce, she was competent to introduce ; and they must override all ancient usages inconsistent with them, and be as obligatory upon all the members as if they had existed from the beginning. Grant, if you will, that in some cases the modifications, or by whatever name you choose to call them, which were actually introduced, were injudicious, contrary to the principles of the gospel, oppressive even, — although this is hardly admissible by a good churchman, — redress could rightfully be sought only in and through the orderly and official action of the church herself, that is, in and through the body ; not in and through the members, acting on their own responsibility.

We must not forget the *unity* of the church. There is no reserve to be made in favor of *national churches*, as if the church existing in a given nation were an independent church, subsisting by itself, and holding communion with the church existing in other nations, not as the necessary condition of its own vitality, but as a mere act of Christian and ministerial courtesy ; for this would be to deny both the unity and the catholicity of the church. It were a real rending of Christ's seamless garment. The church of Christ knows no geographical boundaries, no national limitations, no national distinctions. The member of Christ's church here in Boston

is a member of it in every part of the world, and in communion with the whole body, wherever it is. If not, it is idle to talk of unity and catholicity. Assuming these principles, which the Church of England does, and must, assume, as the foundation of her own claims to catholicity, we confess that we see not how she can justify herself in separating, as she did, in the sixteenth century, and setting up a particular communion, without going the whole length of Dissent, and abandoning entirely her own principles. On the ground, then, that it is necessary to have maintained, from the first, the unity of the Lord's Body unbroken, we think she not only fails to prove herself to be *the* catholic church, but to be, in the catholic sense, even a church at all.

But we do not wish to pursue the discussion. The question in this form is, to us, one of only secondary importance. We own that the Church of England has never been able to convince us, on the ground she assumes, of the validity of her claims; but shall we, therefore, seek to unchurch her? God forbid! There is, and can be, but *one* catholic church. If she is that church, all not in communion with her are unchurched; and all, who are not members of her communion, are out of the pale of the church; therefore out of Christ; therefore, again, out of the way of salvation. Shall we say all this? Shall we say, that all the members of the Roman Catholic Church, of the Greek Church, the Arminian Church, the Lutheran, the Presbyterian, the Congregational, the Methodist, the Baptist, are out of the way of salvation, and can be saved only by becoming members of the Church of England? It were a terrible responsibility to say so, and we are not aware that our Anglican brethren do say so. On the other hand, shall we say, that all, who have lived and died in the Church of England, since the time of Henry and Cranmer, have lived and died out of Christ? We dare not say so.

The fact is, those of us who believe in, and seek, the unity of the Lord's Body, must be careful how we begin by laying down principles which unchurch all

but our own particular communion, or which would exclude from the church of Christ, in the sense necessary for salvation, and which is a higher sense, too, than that of mere outward communion, any particular body of professing Christians, which maintains the Christian principles and spirit in the lives of its members. The great question of *the Church* should be looked at from a higher and a broader point of view than that of particular communions. The outward form of our Lord's Body has been broken into fragments; but it was an IMMORTAL body, and each particular fragment, however small, or however far the adversary may have cast it abroad in the earth, is still quick with its original life, and cannot die. Instead, then, of contending, that this or that particular fragment is the whole body, and contains all the life, the real friends of the unity and catholicity of the church, imitating, as Milton says, the careful search of Isis after the scattered fragments of the torn body of the good Osiris, should seek them in every place of opportunity, and bring them *all* together, to be moulded anew into one homogeneous and lovely form of perfection.

Entertaining these views, we confess that we read with pain that portion of these Tracts which is directed against the Church of Rome, and also that portion which attacks Dissenters. What we have just said of the claims of the Church of England, though we have a very great respect for that communion, may well show, in the unpleasant feelings it may awaken in the breasts of its members, how very impolitic it would be, to say nothing more, for any particular communion to set up to be *the* church catholic, and, therefore, to unchurch all the rest. Each communion unchurched is provoked to bring forward its own claims; and, instead of peace and unity, we have strife and division; each crying out, "Ye are heretics and schismatics; the Temple of the Lord is with us; we are *the* church; and only they who worship with us can be saved." We are all called, whatever the name we may bear, whatever our rank or influence in the Christian world, to a higher

and a more Christian work. We are all called to labor for REUNION, for the restoration of the unity of the church: unity of polity, of faith, and of discipline. But we must, if we will labor with success, take our stand on an eminence which overlooks all these sectarian divisions and causes of strife and bitterness, and seek to unite men in the very unity of the Christian Life, the deep, the eternal, the creative principle of Christian unity, which is Christ himself. In other words, we must rise to a full comprehension of that HIGHER UNITY, which is the principle and cause of the unity of polity, of faith, and of discipline; and, whilst we are engaged in doing this, our first and most pressing work, all these secondary and minor questions, touching the claims of particular communions, should be laid on the table. Perhaps they will never need to be called up.

The truth is, the church — we speak generally — has lost the clear sense of the profound significance of her own organization, doctrines, sacraments, and symbols. In the present state of things, unity of polity becomes a mere *forced* unity, the unity of aggregation, not of a living body. The effort, therefore, at this moment, should not be to effect outward unity and canonical communion, but to recover the significance of the church itself. Christianity, as a divine scheme of mediatorial grace, has become to the great majority of the Christian world an enigma, of which few, if any, retain the key. The great mass of church-goers, nay, of church-teachers, have no conception of the profound significance of the church. They, therefore, lose all respect for it as a divine institution, and come to regard it mainly in the light of an auxiliary to the police, as a useful institution for keeping the lower classes in order, and for preventing men from cutting one another's throats. What is the church? What mean her dogmas, her sacraments, her symbols? Who among us is able to answer? or who among us, attempting to answer, but babbles some profane nonsense, or repeats words whose sense escapes him? Here, it strikes us, is a great

and primary question to be answered, THE QUESTION OF THE CHURCH ITSELF; and just in proportion as we succeed in answering this, we may be assured that the true centre of church unity will disclose itself, and the principle, which is to reunite, even outwardly, the torn body of our Lord, will begin to operate.

And here we find the redeeming principle, and the great and exceeding value, of these Oxford Tracts. From below the horizon, if we have eyes, we may see, like the sun emerging from the ocean, rising into full view, the great and permanent question of the church itself, of the real catholic church. These Oxford Divines have felt the workings of the great and universal problem itself; they have begun to feel, that the church, as manifest to the world, nay, as existing in the minds of the great mass of churchmen, priests as well as laity, is not precisely *the* church, — is, in fact, far, very far below the true church of God; they have begun to catch some glorious glimpses of UNITY and CATHOLICITY, and to feel somewhat of the divine life these impart and must impart; and they have come forward, as the humble, but earnest, advocates of unity and catholicity, — to recall the church to a sense of her rights, her prerogatives, as the church of God, as the necessary condition of fully discharging her high mission in the salvation of the world, here and hereafter. What if they have seen and done all this with the eyes and the hearts of Church-of-England men, and have sought to narrow the question down, as far as possible, to the alleged “insular prejudices” of their own nation? Let us leave all this, — which is lamentable enough, to all not of their communion, and which proves them to be but men, — let us leave all this by the way, and not suffer it to disturb our prejudices, or to bias our judgments. There is good enough in these Oxford Divines, and the sort of good, too, not over-abundant in modern times, to entitle them to our gratitude and respect, and to make us thank God for their labors, were their Church-of-Englandism a thousand-fold more prominent and offensive than it really is.

We do not look upon the movements of these Oxford divines as indicative, on their part, of a wish to return to Rome, as their enemies allege ; they are far enough from being Romanists ; they are, undeniably, genuine Church-of-England men ; but they are possessed by a sentiment which will be found too big and too expansive for the Church of England, and which will absorb it, in the long run, in the true catholic church. Their movements indicate to us a presentiment of something superior to what the church, in point of fact, in their days, really is ; and a growing desire, an intense longing, to see the catholic church, restored to her unity, her freedom, and her authority, prepared to resume and carry on the great work in which she was engaged in the Middle Ages, and which was, to a considerable extent, interrupted by the rise of Protestantism. In this point of view, these Tractarians broach a higher than a Roman or an Anglican question, a question which concerns all Christendom, in fact, all humanity ; and in the discussion of which all Christendom must take part. It is a great question ; an agitating question ; a powerful question ; a terrible question ; which will not pass over the world without changing its face. Let no one be deceived. This question is no ephemeral question, to be put at rest by a newspaper paragraph, or even by an elaborate article in our more aristocratic Reviews. It has its roots deep in the very heart of our age ; and is nourished by all our wants, hopes, aspirations, and tendencies. We repeat, that it is not a question which concerns merely this or that particular communion ; it concerns not merely Oxford divines and Church-of-England men ; it concerns not merely the Protestant Episcopal Church of this country, in which it has broken out ; it reaches the whole Christian world, and all communions, Papal, Patriarchal, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Congregational, Trinitarian, Unitarian, Arminian, Calvinistic, all alike are concerned in it ; for it is the great question of the Christian church itself, in that high and profound sense, in which it transcends, and embraces, all particular

communions. It asks the significance of this great moral Fact, before which we stand, and before which the more advanced nations of the earth have stood, or have bowed down with awe and submission, for eighteen hundred years. What means this Fact? Is it a phantom, an illusion? or is it a reality? Has it a being? If so, what is it? What is it here for? What are its rights, prerogatives, duties, means?

Now, we say, here is the question of questions for our age. We have, for the last three hundred years, been losing sight of the main question; we have been concerning ourselves with collateral points, with mere details, proposing petty amendment to amendment, till the original question has been buried under the mass, and left out of the debate. These Oxford Divines, without precisely understanding the original question, without having exactly made up their minds how to vote on it, yet firmly persuaded of *the fact* of such original question, have come forward and moved it; not with a view of stifling the debate, but to recall it to the main question. The main question is now coming fairly up before the great Christian parliament; and, if the speakers will only keep to the point, the debate will not only be full of interest, but of instruction, and tend to the profit of the whole Christian world.

These Oxford Divines represent a great movement, already commenced throughout Christendom, towards unity and catholicity. But have they seized, and have they presented, the true ground of unity and catholicity? Do they give us evidence, that they have gone to the bottom of the question, and seized the elemental principle of Christian unity and universality? We think not. They do not seem to us to have detached the question from its accidents, and to have considered it in itself, independently of its special applications to this or that communion. They do not seem to us to have grasped the key to this great moral Fact, and to have become able to see, independently of the mere authority of tradition, its profound, universal, and eternal necessity. They have bowed to the Tradition; but the

reason of the Tradition? but the *reason* of the historical phenomenon? This seems still concealed from their view, and almost unsuspected. They have, then, themselves, seen the main question only by faith. It lies further back than they have gone, deeper than their plummets seem to have sounded. We take up Dr. Pusey's Sermon on the Eucharist; we find him recognizing a fact there, and laboring to prove, that, in the best days of even the Church of England, it was very generally believed, that there was a fact there; but what this fact is, his sermon does not tell us. He calls it the *Real Presence*, that is to say, a fact, and not the symbol of a fact; but this does not tell me what the fact is. We take up the Dissertation on Baptism, in the volumes before us; we find here, again, that Baptism is very properly declared to be a *fact*, not the mere symbol of a fact, or rather, as with the majority of modern Protestants, of a no-fact; but what *is* this fact? No answer. We are left in the dark. So of all the other matters touched upon. We find, and are most happy to find, that everywhere it is affirmed that there is fact, reality; but what the fact, what the reality is, we are nowhere told. These divines, therefore, are chiefly commendable for calling our attention to the fact, that the church really means something, rather than for having told us what it means.

The method of these divines is also defective. It is the historical method. They seek to instruct us, as to the significance of the fact in question, by piling quotation upon quotation. But, Reverend Doctors, this will not answer; for the sense of these quotations has escaped us. We know all very well what are the *words* the Fathers have used, but what have the Fathers *meant* by their words? We gain nothing by being told what they have said, for the question is not as to what the Fathers have said, but what the Fathers have meant. We all know the canons, the rubrics, the creeds, and the catechisms, in which the church has embodied her sense of her own significance; but what do these mean? what has the church meant by them?

Why do you light tapers upon the altar? Why do you turn to the east in prayer? Why do you kneel when you come to the word Jesus? We know the church commands us to believe in the Trinity; but what is the profound significance of this doctrine? What is the *fact* which lies under it? The church gives herself out as the medium of our union with Christ, through whom we have access to the Father. But what does this mean? The church insists on apostolic succession, and canonical appointment. Go to the bottom of this and tell us what it means? The age, Oxford Divines, has grown weary of idolatry; it is weary of mere images, symbols, representations; and demands to be made acquainted with the true God, the Infinite I-AM, not with the I-APPEAR. As yet, ye have done nothing but to erect an altar to the UNKNOWN GOD. But this ye have done, God be thanked! ye have declared your firm faith, that God is, and that in all holy things there is a reality, the NUMEN as well as the shrine.

The great evil is, that we have, as before said, lost the profound sense of the Christian mysteries, of the church and its dogmas, sacraments, and discipline. Quotations, then, from the accredited fathers of the church, cannot avail us; because these quotations are, as it were, part and parcel of the church, and their sense escapes us, as does hers. It is necessary, then, to go farther, to look deeper, and, by profound meditations on the very nature of things, and of God's providential dealings with humanity, to find the lost key to the mysteries of Christianity. We are now as the Jews, who had lost the true pronounciation of the sacred Tetragram; and prophecy, and inspiration, and the power to work miracles abandon us, and leave us to our merely human resources. We must find again the sacred NAME, and its right pronounciation; and then, but not till then, shall we be able to know Him whom we now ignorantly worship. In other words, it is in the study of the *philosophy* of the church, and not in its mere outward history, that we are to find the key to its mysteries, and to become acquainted with their significance, with the FACTS they cover, that is to say, with the

Christian ontology itself. Our Oxford divines seem to us to have neglected the philosophy of the church, and therefore to have failed to show us the real principle of unity and catholicity. We find them reproducing the phenomena of the church, but not its ontology; and yet it is its ontology, that is the principle of its phenomena.

We find no fault with the Oxford divines for reviving obsolete customs, and for studying to restore the liturgy of the church to its former completeness; although, were we of the Church of England, acknowledging episcopal authority, we should hold it to be as improper for a private presbyter to revive an obsolete custom, on his private authority, as it would be for him to introduce a new one, the rubric to the contrary notwithstanding. What has fallen, by general consent, into desuetude, though still standing in the rubrics and canons, is virtually repealed, and can properly be revived only by the supreme legislative authority. But this is no affair of ours. We make no doubt that many things have been cast off, that it will be well to resume. But do our Oxford divines ask, if these practices, which they are seeking to revive, have, or can have, the same significance for worshippers to-day, that they had formerly, when they were faithfully observed, and evidently attended with the best results? To revive, or to create, as it were, "with malice aforethought," can it ever do good? Bring us back the sense of these old practices; that we need; but that sense may, perhaps, now and hereafter, be better expressed in other, and even very different, forms. The great question, the main question, is not the restoration of the ancient forms of church discipline, but the restoration of the original sense of the church, and of the church herself to her true place in the economy of Providence, as the condition of more effectually discharging her high functions. This is the question, the real question for the age; and, after all, it is the real question with these Oxford divines, and they should, therefore, have proposed it clearly, distinctly, unencumbered by any minor

questions about details, however important these minor questions may become, when the main question itself is disposed of.

We repeat, the church question is not a question of details, of particular communions, of dogmas, nor of constitutions. It is not, whether we shall adopt this or that symbol of faith; whether we shall accept, and observe, this or that form of social or private worship; whether we shall contend for the Papal, the Episcopal, the Presbyterian, or the Congregational method of constituting the church; it is not, where the authority of the church shall be lodged, nor how its administration shall be provided for; all of which may become questions, and grave questions too; but, What is the church itself? what its office? and what its authority, however constituted, or however named? This, we believe, is the first and main question to be disposed of by our own age.

Touching the constitution and discipline of the church, we say, in passing, the church is herself supreme. *No precise model of the one, or minute details of the other, are given in the New Testament.* It was, evidently, the design of the Founder of the church, to leave the constitution and discipline of the church to be shaped according to the exigencies of time and place; and the sacredness of this or that form of the one or the other must be supported, not by texts of Scripture, but *by the inherent authority of the church herself to adopt such forms, from time to time, as in her wisdom she judges proper.* If we deny to the church this authority, we make her an empty name, an institution without reality, a mere appearance, an optic illusion, about which no wise or sober man will concern himself for a moment. The question, then, comes up, Has the church this authority? If so, whence does she derive it? And this leads us back to what we have called the church question itself, and requires us to comprehend the whole scheme of God's Mediatorial Grace.

It is by no means our intention, in the present article, to try our hand at answering this question of the

church. That we have some thoughts on the subject, we should be sorry to be compelled to deny ; nay, that we have attained to some proximate solution of the problem, caught, at least, a transient glimpse of the profound significance of the Mighty Moral Fact before which we and all Christendom stand in awe, we firmly believe ; but our present purpose has been merely to state the question, and to offer some few practical observations on the movements commenced, and commencing, by our age, which indicate a desire to return to unity and catholicity, that is to say, to the church of God.

How the fact, that the sense of the church, of its dogmas and ritual, has been lost, can be reconciled with this other fact, for which we strenuously contend, namely, that the Spirit of Truth, which leadeth into all truth, is ever present in the church, its organic principle, its vital force, we shall attempt on another occasion to explain. It suffices us, for the present, to assume the broad, obvious, undeniable fact, that this sense *has* been lost. We may find evidence of this anywhere throughout all Christendom, at any time since the disappearance of the great names of the Middle Ages. Perhaps no single cause has contributed more to this result, than the philosophical movement commenced, in the twelfth century, by the layman, Abélard, — the real father of what we call, by courtesy, Modern Philosophy. Abélard was the first to work that mighty change in philosophy, by which it leaves the ontological question, that is to say, theology, the eternal verities of things, and comes to concern itself solely with phenomena. He has placed in the Christian world the system of philosophy known as CONCEPTUALISM. Anselm and others had asserted the reality of ideas, making them, as we have elsewhere explained, the *essential forms*, or the essences of things. William de Champeaux, following, did the same, only taking care to distinguish between ideas, or genera, properly so called, and mere mental abstractions, and thus gave to Realism a systematic form. Roscelin, founder of the

Nominalist school, denied all reality to ideas, to genera and species, to the essential *forms* of things, and called them empty words, as Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley have since done. Between these two schools appears Peter Abélard, a brilliant genius, rendered famous by the love of the noble Eloïsa, but of whom, morally considered, the only good thing we have to say is, that this noble and true-hearted woman loved him, and never ceased to love him, — between these two schools, came, we say, Peter Abélard, and denied the reality of ideas, against the Realists; and that ideas are mere empty words, against the Nominalists; by asserting them to be *conceptions* of the mind. Here was philosophy, at once, placed on the point of leaving the study of the deep significance of things, to take up the study of our own mental phenomena, and, therefore, of having for its subject henceforth, not ontology, but psychology, and for its problem, not, What is? but, What do we conceive, or think, we know? This philosophy of Abélard, this Conceptualism, nobly withstood by William de Champeaux, St. Bernard, and the orthodox clergy of the time, nevertheless virtually prevailed, and it has penetrated to the foundation in the system of St. Thomas, which is even yet the approved philosophy of the church. Now, the least reflection will suffice to show, that Conceptualism leads directly to the study of the phenomena of our own souls, our internal affections, and therefore to the neglect of the objective and eternal verities of things. The neglect of these objective and eternal verities, in which lies the profound significance of the church, its dogmas, and ritual, could not fail to obscure, and finally to obliterate from the minds of even the best instructed, that sense itself. After the prevalence of this philosophy, this Conceptualism, the last word of which we have seen in the *Critic der reinen Vernunft*, no great theologian appeared. Theology, in fact, ceased to be studied; attention was soon almost wholly engrossed with ancient heathen literature, and philosophy, properly so called, was pretty much forgotten. The theological works, which

appeared, were mere excerpts from older works, or attempts to dilute and adapt the older and profounder works to the modern delicate tastes and weak stomachs.

The church, regarded as an institution, a visible organization, taken generally, became, in consequence of this and other causes coinciding and coöperating, a mere rind, or external husk or shell, from which the inner substance, the *meat*, was lost, or, at least, in which no substance, or meat, was seen, or suspected to exist. This is strikingly true, when we come down to the last century. We take the Church of England ; it has become a mere auxiliary of the police, or a provision for gentlemen's younger sons. The qualification for a bishopric was, proverbially, to have edited a Greek play. Its doctrines, practically considered, dwindled down to a meagre rationalism, and an eminent prelate was able to declare Christianity to be only "a republication of the law of nature." The sacraments no longer signify any thing, and the whole ritual has become an empty form, which the fox-hunting parson thinks *quite too long*. The morals, the devotion, the inner spiritual state of the communicants, we have described in the foregoing article, when speaking of the moral and religious tendency of the school of Locke. In the German Church, matters are no better. There is more learning, more mental activity, more diligent study ; but no profounder thoughts, no nearer approach to the original sense of Christianity. The tendency to rationalism is still stronger ; rationalism is systematized and avowed ; Christianity is stripped of all its mysteries ; all that cannot find entrance through the narrow aperture of a rationalist's mind, whether in history, in doctrine, or in discipline, is pared off, and this is called rendering Christianity *intelligible, comprehending* Christianity !

In Catholic countries, things go no better, if so well. His Holiness is a respectable old gentleman who resides at Rome ; mild and amiable in his manners ; learned, polite ; corresponds with the philosophers ; writes a

very agreeable letter to Voltaire, and can find it in his heart to reprove the arch-infidel for nothing but the false quantity of one of his verses. The more active of the educated classes are, openly or secretly, hostile to the church, and its dignitaries smile upon, and even fraternize with, the *philosophes*. Bergier and others, who defend it, do so in an apologetic tone, and on infidel principles. Theology becomes a branch of physics, and God is demonstrated by the telescope and scalpel, at least, till a Laland exclaims, "*Je n'ai jamais vu Dieu au bout des mes lunettes.*" Then a portion gave up God, and the remainder held their peace. In our own country, the outward form varies, but the spirit is the same. No theology, no profound philosophy, at best only passable psychology with a Jonathan Edwards; the church is not recognized, hardly even in name; to speak of its unity and catholicity is a scandal, and to intimate that Baptism and the Eucharist mean somewhat, are not signs without significance, is to confess one's intimate relations with the Scarlet Lady of Babylon. So completely has all sense of the profound things of the church escaped us, that we define it, "a voluntary association of believers for religious purposes"; look upon the Eucharist as merely commemorative of departed worth; and perceive no shocking absurdity in hearing it asserted by the most numerous denomination amongst us, that the only proper subjects of Baptism are they who have already been regenerated! No wonder, then, that the great mass marvel why the church is here; are puzzled to make out what business it has to be here at all; look upon it as an old and useless ruin, respectable, perhaps, in the eyes of a few antiquaries, but serving only to harbour bats, owls, ravens, and other birds of ill omen; and to encumber the site which could be advantageously occupied by a cotton-mill, or a neat two-story dwelling-house, painted white, and ornamented with green Venetian blinds, or at best by a lyceum, a school-house, an anatomical or a chymical laboratory.

Now against this state of things, throughout all

Christendom, a reaction has commenced. The adversary, who, if possible, would deceive the very elect, has gone the length of his chain, and can no further; Michael descends again to chain the old serpent, the Dragon, that drew after him a third part of the stars of heaven; the man of sin is arrested; the sacred central fire, which was smothered, and which seemed for a time to the superficial to be extinguished, but which never ceased for a moment to burn in the heart of the church, is growing intenser, and begins to expand, and send its vital warmth towards the extremities, which for so long a time have been so cold and lifeless; churchmen begin to feel that they have wasted their substance in riotous living, that they have been feeding on husks, and are well-nigh starved; and, blessed be God! the memory of the long forgotten *home* returns, and they remember that in their Father's House there is bread enough and to spare, and they say to themselves, "We will arise and return to our Father's house." They remember that they have a Father, which for a long time they had forgotten. They feel that they need not be the lone, starving wanderers in a far country, fatherless, and desolate, which they have been. There is yet a *HOME* for them. The tendency is now everywhere to return, and find again this long deserted home. This is a glorious tendency, full of significance, and of hope. It is this tendency, which is represented by the Oxford divines; this is the significance of *PUSEYISM*. This is the significance of what a shallow Radicalism calls retrograde movements, now to be seen throughout the Christian world, in every communion, from the Roman down to our own Unitarian; and this is wherefore we hail these movements with hope, with joy, and with thanksgiving.

But it is precisely here, that we begin to feel a serious embarrassment. We would return home; where is this home? Of these numerous buildings I see, which is my Father's dwelling? The tendency, we have said, is to unity and catholicity, and that, not merely in a

refined metaphysical sense, but in the sense of outward form and institution, as well as of inward spirit and feeling. The tendency is no longer to Quakerism, the only respectable tendency the religious mind has felt since the disruption of the church in the sixteenth century. Men cannot feed on air, or live in utter nakedness. They demand unity and catholicity of faith, polity, and discipline. Then, amid all these rival institutions, these fragmentary churches so-called, into which the body of our Lord has been broken, which is the true Catholic Apostolic Church? This is the question, and it is one, disguise it as we will, which cannot but embarrass, for a time, the sincere and earnest inquirer. Here I am, I have run through nearly the whole circle of the sects, in pursuit of a home, seeking rest and finding none. The tendency of the age, the Christian *Welt-geist*, has, at length, taken fast hold of me; I have come to believe in the one Holy Catholic Apostolic Church, and to see and feel the need of a *one* temple, and a single altar, to which all the tribes of Israel may repair. But where shall I go? With which of the numerous communions shall I seek fellowship, as the condition of being in the true church, and, therefore, in the way of salvation? The Roman communion? and, by so doing, declare it to be my solemn belief, that salvation is absolutely unattainable in the Greek Church, the Arminian Church, the Anglican Church, the Lutheran Church, the Presbyterian Church, the Congregational Church, the Baptist Church, the Methodist Church? No. I cannot do this. Say, then, the Anglican, or any one of the others, and the same question follows. If I can be saved without joining one of these communions, then no good reason can be assigned, why I should seek to join any one of them; if I can be saved in any one of them, then is there no just ground for preferring one to another. But, in joining any one, I do say, if I know what I do, that I not only prefer one to all the rest, but that I hold that it, of all, is the only one in which salvation is possible, and that out of that there is no salvation for me. I cannot, therefore, seek fellowship with one,

as a serious, honest, and intelligent man, without, in my own belief, unchurching all the rest. This I shrink, as it seems to me, every intelligent and fair-minded man must shrink, from doing. Where, then, can I go ? Literally, I can go **NOWHERE**.

Now, here is, if we mistake not, a very serious and embarrassing question, a preliminary question, which must be met and disposed of, before we can proceed a single step. We have, since we came to believe in the unity and catholicity of the church, thought much and anxiously on this question ; and, without wishing in the least to disguise its difficulty from ourselves or from others, we will, with all modesty, deference, and humility, give, briefly, the best answer we have been able to obtain.

We begin by assuming, that no solution of the problem, which really unchurches any existing communion, will answer the purpose. The moment such a solution is proffered, each communion which is unchurched is provoked, as we have said, to bring forward its rival pretensions ; and each claiming to be a church, and, therefore, to be independent in respect to all others, there is no common umpire to whom the dispute may be referred, and whose decision will be recognized by all as binding upon all. The Bible is not this umpire, because the Bible is all in the meaning which the living interpreter gives it, and each communion interprets it differently from the others. The Episcopalian, the Presbyterian, the Congregationalist, each appeals alike to the Bible ; but has the Bible as yet settled their rival pretensions ? Individual reason, or private judgment, will not answer ; because each man's private judgment is in no small degree the product of the peculiar traditions of his own special communion ; and because it is never the same in the case of any two individuals. The whole history of Christendom, since the time of Luther, demonstrates the utter impracticability of attaining to unanimity by means of individual reason. Moreover, the individual reason is authoritative only for the individual. To make it the umpire, would be to set up the reason of

one as the standard, and to require all the rest to conform to it, which would be the grossest tyranny conceivable. My individual judgment is the equivalent of my neighbour's; to require me to submit mine to his, or him to submit his to mine, would be an outrage, which every true man, at all conscious of his rights, dignity, and duty, would, if need should be, resist even unto death. There is, then, as we have said, no common umpire, to whose decision, recognized by all as binding, the rival claims of these conflicting communions can be brought and settled. We are forced, then, by the very necessity of the case, by the actual condition of Christendom, to begin by so far recognizing the claims of all, as to bring the special claims of no one into discussion, — unless some one, indeed, insists on unchurching all but itself; and even then we must suffer ourselves to do it, only so far as is necessary to rebuke it for its arrogance and exclusive spirit.

Perhaps our meaning would be best expressed by saying, that we should begin *by waiving all discussion of the claims of rival communions*. This discussion is really unnecessary, and cannot fail to be mischievous. Let us begin, then, by assuming, that the Lord's body has been broken into fragments, but that each of these fragments is, in a degree, a living fragment, and capable of imparting more or less of Christian life. No one of these fragments must assume to be the *whole* unbroken body of the Lord. This premised, let there be no discussion as to who broke the body, or as to which fragment, upon the whole, retains the most of the original body, or to which we should do best to assimilate; but, let the question be, How shall all these fragments be brought together, and reunited in one unbroken body, so that the whole Christian world may be really one?

Here, then, is our answer: Do you ask, *which* is the true church? that is, *which* is the Lord's body? We answer, No one; that is, no one is it, all and entire. Do you then retort, and say, that the church has failed, and that we assume the true church to be no longer extant,

save in a refined and metaphysical sense, thereby falsifying the promise of our Saviour, that he would build his church upon a rock, and the gates of hell should not prevail against it? We deny your charge. We say, the true church, the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church, does still exist, and has never for one moment ceased to exist, *but exists at the present moment in a fragmentary state.* This existence, in a fragmentary or broken state, is very different from not existing at all. It is the church still, but the church no longer in its full glory and power, which in fact is implied in our very inquiry; for, if it were, it would at once be recognized. We prefer representing the church as a body broken, rather than as a vine, and the several communions as branches; for these branches must all through the main trunk intercommune, and receive their nourishment from the root; or else they would be dead branches, abiding not in the vine. If these separate churches are branches, we ask, where is the trunk? that is to say, where is the central church, which receives the sap from Christ, the Root, and circulates it through the branches, thus giving life and growth to the whole plant? We do not understand this notion of branch churches, without a main trunk. To us the church is the *body* of our Lord, bearing to him a relation analogous to that borne by our bodies to the vital force, or organic principle, which creates and preserves them living *organisms*. Now we can easily conceive of the body being broken, and yet without the parts being torn so far asunder as to have absolutely no intercommunion; and this is to us an exact representation of the present condition of the church. It is the torn and bleeding, but not yet dead, body of our Lord.

So much for the church as it is. Now, the real problem is not, to which of these parts I must assimilate; therefore, the preliminary question, With *which* communion shall I seek fellowship? disposes, as it were, of itself, and ceases to be a question at all. It is only by taking a false view of the Christian world as it is, that it ever comes up to trouble us. The question disturbs

us, because we begin by assuming, that some *one* of these communions must be *the* true Catholic Apostolic Communion, and that the rest are no Christian communions at all ; instead of assuming, in the outset, as we should, that all are but so many fragments of one and the same Catholic Apostolic Communion. In any one of these communions, you are in the church, and, therefore, have no occasion to ask, Where shall I go ? STAY WHERE YOU ARE.

The true question for the inquirer, is not, *Which* is the true church ? but, What can be done to bring all the fragments together, heal the broken body of Christ, and clothe it again with his seamless robe ? And, after all, this question is not so difficult as some might suppose. Assuming, that all the professedly Christian communions extant, save one, must be unchurched, the matter is indeed difficult ; for then you can reach unity only through proselyting, only by converting all the members of these unchurched communions to your own ; which, beginning as you do by setting up your own as *the* church, the only church, and the whole church, is utterly impracticable, as the experiment of the last three centuries abundantly demonstrates. But, on the ground we assume, it becomes comparatively easy. We have but to observe the process of nature in healing a wounded body, in order to ascertain, at once, the law which is to govern our efforts. Nature carries on her curative process by throwing off the bruised flesh, and forming new flesh, simultaneously, and by one and the same operation, by virtue of the *vital principle*, which is in the broken body, and equally, though it may be in unequal degrees, in the several parts. The restoration of unity, and the absorption of all particular communions, must go on simultaneously, and be effected by virtue of the *living principle* still in the broken body of our Lord, and in all the fragments into which it has been broken.

Now, is there in all these fragments this one vital force, this organic principle, by virtue of which the

whole body may be healed, unity recovered, and division absorbed? We contend, that there is, and that just in proportion as we address ourselves to this vital force, we shall be successful in healing all these divisions, which we now deplore in the church. Beneath all this diversity, which strikes us, on the surface, there is, though but partially operative, the fundamental principle of unity. It is to this principle, that we must look; for unity can be effected only by appealing to a principle common to all. Unity by conversion of one communion to another, much more of all communions to one, is out of the question. The union must come, if it come at all, by means of efforts possible to each communion, while continuing to be a particular communion. That is, the work to be done for the recovery of the unity and catholicity of the church, as a body as well as a spirit, must be a work, possible to the Roman Catholic, without his becoming a Protestant; to the Protestant, without his becoming a Roman Catholic; to the Anglican, without his becoming a Presbyterian, or a Congregationalist; and to the Presbyterian, or the Congregationalist, without his becoming an Anglican.

Now, what is this principle? It is, answers one, the spirit of Christ, that is to say, LOVE. Love is the grand principle of union, and, just so far as all possess it, they do really become one, one with one another, one with Christ, and, through him, one with the Father. Nothing more true; but this overlooks a very important fact, and assumes the presence of love as the principle of the unity of the church; whereas it is the unity and catholicity of the church, which we need, as the condition of producing love in the hearts of its members. This answer makes the unity and catholicity of the church the end; whereas love is the end, and unity and catholicity are the means. With this multiplicity of jarring and hostile communions, whence the love necessary to unite them? If, with these jarring and hostile communions, you can obtain the love, what do you want the unity and catholicity for? Here is the fallacy of most of the grounds of Christian union, proposed, in our

day, by our church reformers. These all forget the mediatorial character of the church, and fall into the superstition of regarding it as an end; they all forget, moreover, the helplessness into which the sinner falls through sin, the destruction of his moral power, which is the inevitable consequence of sin, and, therefore, that he cannot, of himself, without divine assistance, rise to the possession of the Christian spirit, or to the practice of the Christian virtues; and, furthermore, that it is only as the medium of this divine assistance, that the church question assumes the least gravity.

What, then, is this principle common to all, and to which we may appeal? It is not a special dogma, a special form of church government; but the real belief, still retained by all, though in a sense more or less feeble, of the unity and catholicity of the church. Now, we say, that, however much these particular communions may differ in all else, every one does, in reality, though it be unconsciously, hold, that the vital principle of the church must needs be one; that the church is really the living body of our Lord, the depositary, and authoritative interpreter, of his word, whether the written word or the spoken word. Here, then, is the foundation on which we must build; here, in this common belief, as to what the church really is, what are its rights, prerogatives, and duties, is the principle, through the workings of which we must recover unity and catholicity. Here our readers may see why we have dwelt so emphatically on the importance of moving the main question of the church itself. It is simply and solely because this question will disclose both the necessity, and the ground, of unity and catholicity. This question can be moved in the bosom of any one of the communions extant, freely discussed, and the true answer proclaimed, without the least infraction of its order, or subjecting ourselves to its discipline; and moved, too, and the true answer insisted upon, without, as would be the case with any other question, bringing one communion into conflict with another.

The matter now grows plain. We are to seek unity

and catholicity, by moving what we have called the church question. We are to grasp the true theory of the church, which, at bottom, is asserted, as we have said, by every communion, and to hold it up, in the bosom of the very communion in which we are, as the Oxford divines have done, and are doing, in the bosom of the Anglican communion; and this will prove effectual. It may be done in every communion, because every communion, without knowing it, does hold it as one of its elements. It may, then, be brought into operation in every communion in an orderly manner; not, we own, without ultimately destroying that communion *as a particular and independent communion*; but this is the very end we seek; for what do we seek, in seeking unity and catholicity, but the absorption of all particular communions in the one Catholic Communion? There are, moreover, in all communions, at this very moment, individuals who are oppressed with a sense of the present torn and bleeding state of the Lord's body, and who sigh and yearn to heal its bruises, and restore it to its pristine health and vigor. Let these, then, where they are, turn their attention to the paramount question of the church, revive the true theory of the church, and preach it. We say, the true theory of the church, not the method of outward organization, where authority shall be vested, or how its administration shall be provided for; but the true theory of what the church is, what are its powers, its rights, and its duties. Settle this, and it is already pretty well settled, thus far, in their minds, and then preach it. Let every one who has come to believe in, and to long for, the great principles of unity and catholicity, preach them from his own stand-point; the Congregationalist from his congregational pulpit, the Presbyterian from his presbyterian pulpit, the Anglican from his episcopal chair, the Roman Catholic from his old cathedral; and let it be done here in Boston, in New-York, in Baltimore, in Oxford, at Berlin, at Paris, and at Rome; and instantly it will be seen, that throughout all Christendom, in the bosom of the most exclusive and hostile

communions, there is a real unity of faith as to what the church, as a body, really is, and as to what are its mission and its authority.

When so much shall be done, all is done ; for this very theory of the church, then becoming predominant, recognizes, in the church herself, the inherent right, by virtue of the indwelling Christ, to settle, authoritatively, all the other questions which may or can come up. All that would then be requisite would be to call, as would then be practicable, a new council, to adjust the bases of renewed communion, outward polity, and discipline. Let this new council, which would be a sort of ecclesiastical Congress, be composed of delegates from *all* Christian communities extant, which believe in the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church, and are willing to submit to its authority, and abide its decisions, fairly and formally promulgated. We see no serious difficulties in the way of doing this. We are much mistaken, if the movement, that must lead to it, is not already commenced. The few, who would not submit to the canons promulgated by this new œcumenical council, would be rightfully regarded as heretics and schismatics, for they would have no excuse for not hearing the voice of the church. Moreover, they would be morally powerless against the church, healed of its divisions, and reinvigorated, and they would soon be absorbed.

This result obtained, the church no longer obliged, as in the first three centuries, and in these last three, to struggle for her very existence, would resume her work of social amelioration, — interrupted by the rise of Protestantism, and delayed by the obstacles thrown in its way by infidelity and the supremacy of the temporal authority, — and devote new and unsuspected energies to the moral, intellectual, and physical elevation of the poorer and more numerous classes. Then the kingdom of God will come, and really, and confessedly, dwell with men ; then will be in very deed fulfilled this Scripture, “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor, he hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted, to preach

deliverance to the captives, the recovering of sight to the blind, and to set at liberty them that are bound."

Is this an idle dream? O, no! God has promised it, and all Christendom is crying out for it. The angel, with his roll, flies through the midst of the heavens, preaching the everlasting gospel, and men are everywhere falling into their ranks. The great question comes up, Catholicism or Individualism; which becomes, again, Church or No-Church; which, in the last analysis, is, Religion or Infidelity. Disguise the matter as we will, we must all rally, at the one or the other of these battle-cries. Can there be a question, to which the great mass of the Christian world will respond? Protestantism, in all it has peculiar to itself, in all that distinguishes it from genuine Catholicism, no longer responds to the religious, or even the social, wants of the soul. It is weighed in the balance, and found wanting. Through all our souls, have we, who have been educated under its influence, felt its utter insufficiency. We have sought to supply its defects in Mysticism with the Quaker, in Rationalism with the modern Lutheran, in Naturalism with the old English and French Deists, in Pantheism with modern philosophers, in Socialism with Owen and Fourier; but all in vain. Let loose, like Noah's dove from the ark, ere the waters had abated, we have found no resting-place for the soles of our feet; and, weary with our endless flight over the wild and weltering chaos, produced by the deluge of rationalism and infidelity, we return, and beat against the windows of the ark, impatient till the patriarch reaches forth his hand and takes us in. Struck with the perpetual miracle of the church, some among us bow down and worship; others find their way back through history and tradition; others, again, like ourselves, find, when least expecting it, their philosophy reproducing, and the wants of the soul, suffering from the ravages of sin, redemanding, unity and catholicity. In one way, or another, thank God, we shall all finally get back, and the new will become old, and the old will become new. There will be one fold and one shepherd; one

faith, one baptism, one heart, and one mind ; and it will be as the second coming of the Lord, to reign with men, and to make the salvation of God appear unto the ends of the earth, when all flesh shall behold his glory, and rejoice together. Even so, Lord Jesus, come quickly, and let the whole earth say, Amen.

ART. IV. — DEMAGOGUISM. *Party Machinery. Mr. Van Buren and the Presidency. Civic Virtue.*

IT is universally conceded, that republics, especially democracies, can subsist only by means of the virtue and intelligence of the people ; but it does not appear to have been very generally considered, that democracies, or popular forms of government, which, through suffrage and eligibility, admit the great mass of the population to a share in the administration, have a strong tendency to counteract the very virtues on which their permanence and utility depend.

Our political history, we think, demonstrates this latter position, beyond the reach of cavil or doubt, to all who have accustomed themselves to look a little below the surface of things. Here, in this matter, the boasted maxim of political economy, that demand creates a supply, does not hold good. Looking at what we were in the beginning, and at what we now are, it may well be doubted, whether another country in Christendom has so rapidly declined as we have, in the stern and rigid virtues, in the high-toned and manly principles of conduct, essential to the stability and wise administration of popular government.

We commenced our national existence with many peculiar advantages, and advantages wholly independent of our peculiar political institutions. We began our labors on a virgin soil, in a new country, of vast extent, great internal resources, and remote from the vicious and corrupting examples of the Old World. We were, for the

most part, an agricultural people, sparse, not crowded into towns and cities, with plenty of new and fertile lands, easy to be obtained, and yielding a rich and immediate reward to the cultivator. Our wants were few, our manners and tastes were simple, and life with us was uniform and little exposed to vicious temptations. Government had little to do, for all moved on harmoniously, as it were, of itself. It must have been a bad government, indeed, that could, at once, have corrupted us, and hindered our growth and prosperity. So were we in the outset; but so are we no longer. Our population has become comparatively dense; our new lands are exhausted, or have receded so far in the distance as to be no longer of easy access, or attainable at all by the inhabitants of the older States, who have not some little capital in advance. We have become a populous and a wealthy country, a great manufacturing and trading people, as well as a great agricultural people; we are separating, more and more, capital and labor, and have the beginnings of a constantly increasing *operative* class, unknown to our fathers, doomed always to be dependent on employment by the class who represent the capital of the country, for the means of subsistence, and therefore to die of hunger and nakedness, when employment fails them; we are brought, by improvements in steam navigation, alongside of the Old World, into immediate contact with its vicious and corrupt civilization; we are no longer isolated, no longer a simple, primitive people; our old manners have passed, or are rapidly passing, away; our increasing wealth brings in with it luxury, poverty, and distress, as well as refinement, and a more general culture.

Here is what we have become. It is now, under these altered circumstances both of the country and the people, that the virtues of our institutions are put to the test. These institutions have as yet had no severe trial. The peculiar advantages of our position are sufficient to account for all the superiority, under a moral and social point of view, we have hitherto exhibited. But, if, with these advantages, our institutions have suffered

us so to deteriorate, will they suffice to restore us to our former elevation? Nay, if, with these advantages, we have, under these institutions, fallen nearly to a level with the Old World, and shown a rapid decline in the stern and rigid virtues, the high-toned and manly qualities we are accustomed to boast in our ancestors, unparalleled in other Christian nations, not excepting even England, to what can we attribute so lamentable a fact, but to our peculiar institutions themselves? The result, to which we have come, is attributable to no slight or accidental cause, but to a deep-seated and constantly operating cause, and this cause can be found nowhere, but in our peculiar form of government.

In speaking of the decline we have experienced in the stern, rigid, high-toned virtues of our population, we are far from implying, or wishing to imply, that we have fallen below even the more advanced nations of the Old World; and, in assuming, that our political institutions, taken independently of the accidental advantages of our position, have not produced such unmixed good as our noisy politicians pretend, we are equally far from implying, or wishing to imply, that we are not even yet in a moral and social condition much superior to that of any other people. What we mean to assert is, that, under a moral and social point of view, we have not maintained our former relative superiority. We are still in advance of the Old World; but by no means so far in advance as we were in the outset; and, considering the many obstacles the several nations of the Old World have had to encounter, and the much we have had in our peculiar position in our favor, we have, relatively speaking, fallen behind them, and show a deterioration, of which they set us no example. France, Germany, England, even Spain, have, during the period of our national existence, made no inconsiderable efforts at national regeneration, and each and all of them have, we believe, commenced the upward movement, while we alone have actually deteriorated.

Assuming this to be a fact, there must be, in the nature of our peculiar institutions, some inherent and

permanent cause of this deterioration. And this we solemnly believe to be the case. In this world, good and evil grow together, and often spring from the same root. The matter of vice and virtue, as Milton has remarked, is not unfrequently the same. As you recede from one evil, you strike upon another ; and as you secure a new advantage, you expose yourself to a new danger. This has been our experience as a people. We have escaped many, perhaps the heaviest, of the political evils of the Old World ; but, in return, have exposed ourselves to evils, from which the Old World is comparatively free. These evils, to which we have exposed ourselves, are by no means so great, or so difficult to guard against, or to counteract, as to induce us, for a moment, to balance our institutions with those of any other people ; or to ask ourselves, if we have done wisely in adopting, or shall do wisely in sustaining them. With all the evils to which they expose us, they are the best, at least, for us, that the world has ever seen, or that we can even conceive of. All we insist on is, that they do expose us to evils, which demand our sleepless vigilance, and all our wisdom and energy, to counteract. They will not, as it were, go of themselves, of themselves create all the virtue essential to their wise and just administration.

A delusion had seized the world about the time of our national birth, that all the evils, the human race suffers, are owing to bad government ; and that a wisely constituted government will, as it were, of itself cure them. Hence, we fell into the mistake of feeling, that our institutions would take care of themselves, and work out for us, without any special agency of our own, that higher social good towards which our minds and hearts were turned. But bad government itself must have a cause, and can have no cause but the ignorance, the vice, the selfishness, and the indolence, of the people ; and the best of institutions will produce only mischievous results, if not wisely and virtuously administered ; and wisdom and virtue, in our case, to secure the right sort of administration, must not only be

generally diffused among the people, but be brought to bear directly on the administration itself.

Another delusion, at the same epoch, seized the more advanced nations of Christendom ; namely, that the people could *make* the constitution, and that nothing was wanting to secure its successful practical working, but to intrust it to the care of the people. The desideratum of the time was to get rid of bad governments, of tyrannical and oppressive rulers. It was felt, that the people, if admitted into the government, would have so deep an interest in good government, that they would never submit to bad government, or suffer the government to become bad ; and that their own interest would lead them to resist all tyrannical and oppressive magistrates, and to invest none with power who would not exercise it for the common good. All this was plausible, and taking ; but it obviously placed the dependence for good government, not on the virtue of the people, on their sense of duty, and power of sacrifice ; but on their *sense of interest*. Their own sense of their own interest would lead them to institute good government, and to insist on wise and equitable administration. But, in throwing a people back upon their sense of their own interest, leaving them, nay, teaching them, to be governed by their own views of their own interest, do we not, necessarily, destroy the very virtues essential to the maintenance of wise and good government ? do we not set up interest as the ruling motive ? And, when interest becomes the ruling motive of a people, will not each individual struggle, not to administer the government for the good of all, but to make it a machine for promoting his own private ends ?

The principle of the political order sought to be introduced, and on which the statesmen and politicians relied for securing the practical benefits to be expected from government, was to pit the selfishness of one against the equal selfishness of another ; or, as we may express it, UNIVERSAL COMPETITION. The principle of competition is selfishness. Leave, then, free scope to the selfishness of all, and the selfishness of each will

neutralize the selfishness of each, and we shall have for result, — Eternal Justice, wise and equitable government, shedding its blessings, like the dews of heaven, upon all, without distinction of rank or condition! Truly, this were putting vice to a noble use, and proposing a transmutation of the base metals into the precious, far surpassing that dreamed of by the old alchemists, in their insane pursuit of the philosopher's stone. But the success of the theory would not have given the result anticipated. From absolute negation how obtain an affirmative? Assuming the absolute equality of all, and that, in all cases, the selfishness of one will exactly balance the selfishness of another, the result will be zero, that is to say, absolutely nothing. But assuming the *inequality* of the social elements, and that the selfishness of one is not, in all cases, the exact measure of the selfishness of another, then they in whom selfishness is the strongest will gain the preponderance, and, having the power, must, being governed only by selfishness, wield the government for their own private ends. And this is precisely what has happened, and which a little reflection might have enabled any one to have foretold. The attempt to obtain wise and equitable government by means of universal competition, then, must always fail. But this is not the worst. It, being a direct appeal to selfishness, promotes the growth of selfishness, and, therefore, increases the very evil from which government is primarily needed to protect us.

Nor is this all. Alongside of this principle of universal competition, lay that of RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PEOPLE. Responsibility of the civil magistrate to the people was, no doubt, asserted with a good motive, for the purpose of establishing the right of the people to divest the agents of authority of all power, in case they abused it; and also as a restraint on these agents themselves, who, knowing that if they abused their trusts the people could dismiss them, would be induced, by all their love of power and place, to use their power for the common good. Here, again, the same attempt to convert the base metals into the precious, to make

selfishness produce the effects of the loftiest virtue. But the old alchemists did not discover the philosopher's stone. We have not yet discovered any method by which lead can be converted into silver or gold. Selfishness is selfishness, and will be selfish, say and do what we will. And, therefore, instead of taking care not to abuse its trusts, so as not to lose place or power, it only set its wits at work to secure the confidence of the people, by professing the greatest respect for their virtue and intelligence, and a willingness at all times to bow to their will, and to do all their bidding. Selfishness became a courtier, and sought to gain its ends by flattering the sovereign people, and by *seeming* to have no interest but theirs. It would not tyrannize and oppress with the strong hand, by bidding defiance to popular power; but it would do it by sly cunning, by subtle arts, and plunder the people, and enrich itself, by their own consent, at least with their own hands. If it pleased the people, and gained their confidence, it was enough; no matter by what means.

The result, therefore, of making all officers of government, and all aspirants to office, feel their responsibility to the people, has been simply to encourage DEMAGOGUISM, and to cover the land with swarms of greedy and unprincipled demagogues. To gain place, or power, I must please the people; and the readiest way of pleasing the people, the only way practicable to selfishness, is to flatter them, to defer to them, to adopt their opinions, to take the law from them, and never to resist them, or seek to change their course, let it lead where it may. Selfishness, then, becomes a TIME-SERVER; seeks not for truth and justice, but for what is popular; asks not, What is right? but simply, What will the people say? It has no opinions of its own. It runs athwart no popular prejudice; treads on none of the people's corns; is non-committal on all points on which the public mind has not declared itself; and is tolerant to all incipient errors, for they may become popular to-morrow. It is prudent, sleek, decorous. It has no rough edges, no angular points, and thrusts its

elbow into no man's ribs. Its face has a settled smile ; and its voice is soft, gentle, insinuating. It is calm, dispassionate, mild, deliberate. It is free from rage, from hurry, and "bides its time." If it fails to-day, it will succeed to-morrow. "The sober second thought of the people" will set all right, and place it at the top of the ladder. Hence, all manly devotion to the truth, all earnestness in the defence of the right, all firm resistance to popular error and delusion, all bold and vigorous efforts to advance the people, and carry on individual and social progress, are out of place, and must be quietly left by the way ; for they might endanger our popularity, offend, perhaps, the majority, and prevent us from securing the objects of our ambition.

We draw here no fancy sketch ; we are, unhappily, painting from the life. One sees the original everywhere. The evil has become great and menacing. We have lost our manliness ; we have sacrificed our independence ; we have become tame and servile, afraid to say that our souls are our own, till we have obtained permission of the public to say so, or at least till we have pretty well ascertained that it will not be *unpopular* to say so. The tameness and servility of American literature are almost universally admitted. It has no manliness, no reach, no depth, no aspiration. It seeks to win popular favor, not to correct public sentiment ; to echo public opinion, not to form it.

Now this, we contend, is a natural result of the principle of *responsibility to the people*, contended for by our politicians. If you repeat always to your statesmen, "Remember your accountability to the *people*," you must expect them to ask always, not, What is right ? but, What is popular ? And when you have led your statesmen to do so, made popular opinion their guide, you have made it so for all who aspire to place or power ; and then you have made it so for the great body of your whole community, and not in relation to politics only, but in relation to every department of life. Popularity will become the leading object of ambition, and popular opinion the standard of morality. The public will intervene everywhere. The minister of

religion will court the public, and the pulpit will soften or suppress the unpopular truth. All will be done with a view to immediate popular effect ; and what will not tend to secure immediate popularity will be looked upon as a blunder, or, at best, as a crime. In such a state as this, how can there be the virtue necessary to sustain wise, equitable, and efficient government ? In such a state as this we indisputably are ; and to such a state as this, if not our institutions themselves, at least the doctrines in regard to them, with which we commenced our political career, have a direct, if not an inevitable, tendency to reduce us. Here is the weak side of our political order, and here is what must always be the result of a political order, which rests for its support on Selfishness, on Interest, on universal Competition, and Responsibility to the popular will. Here is *the* danger to which we are peculiarly exposed, and against which, if we love our country, and desire the prevalence of justice, we must be always on our guard.

It is useless to undertake to deny what we have here stated, and useless to undertake to prove, that popular governments have not a direct tendency to create a multitude of demagogues, and to make what is popular the standard of what is right, or proper to be undertaken. Popular governments are favorable, by the freedom of competition they maintain, to commerce, to industry, to great material prosperity, *for a time*, so long as there remains a large body of the people as yet uncorrupted, — so long as the selfish principle they foster has not yet become universal. But, as soon as this principle, on which they are founded, reaches the heart of the community, and the scramble for wealth, for place, and for power, affects all classes, and becomes universal, all sorts of prosperity come to a stand still, and the state falls to pieces by its own internal vice and rottenness. What are called free states are always marked by a sudden and surprising activity, by a sudden and surprising prosperity, and by almost as sudden and surprising a decline and fall. And this lies in the nature of things, unless, independent of the government proper, there be in the community a counteracting and conservative principle. On

this point, if we will neglect the lessons of antiquity, (for our experiment is not so new as we sometimes boast,) we do not well to neglect the lessons of our own experience. No man can attentively study our political history, and analyze with some care our popular institutions, but must perceive, and admit, that our state contains the seeds of its own dissolution, and seeds, which have already begun to germinate. Unless the tendency, we have thus far obeyed, can be arrested, and a stronger and more effectual conservative principle be brought in to our relief, all hopes of a successful issue must be abandoned.

We feel how very unpalatable all this must be to our countrymen, and how ill it must be received. It will be easy to ascribe it to our own diseased imagination, or disappointed ambition ; it will be easy to ascribe it to a growing distrust of our institutions, to a hankering after other forms of government, or to a love of singularity, or of notoriety. All this it is easy to say, and all this unquestionably will be said, and be believed by not a few. There are a thousand voices interested in silencing the still small voice of truth ; and may do so. But, alas ! the truth remains the same, and the evil exists not the less, conceal we it never so effectually from the eyes of the spectator. The evil is there. The cancer eats into the very vitals, and death must, sooner or later, ensue. We may say what we will of the physician who warns us of our danger, who bids us seize time by the forelock, and apply the remedy before it has become irremediable ; we may dismiss him, and call in another, who will tell us smooth things, that there is no danger, that we may eat, drink, dance, sing, and be merry, as usual ; but this will avail us nothing. The cancer is there, and eats, eats, never the less.

But we have not closed the catalogue of our dangers. The root of all is in the attempt, with a mere negative quantity, to obtain a positive, out of selfishness to bring forth virtue. This attempt, as we have seen, makes selfishness the ruling principle of the whole community. The great object of action, then, so far

as government is concerned, is to make it the means of promoting, not the public good, but private interest. But to suppose, that it can promote equally the private interest of all, is absurd ; or even of a majority. It can, in the nature of things, promote the private interest of only the few. Then there must be some contrivance by which the few can control its operations, and secure to themselves its advantages, in the language of the day, "the spoils." This contrivance, we may express by the word PARTY. There may still be in the country some remains of virtue, some reminiscences of the doctrine, that we ought to seek the public good. They who share these reminiscences might, if free to act according to their own convictions and sense of duty, trouble us, and thwart our schemes. We must control them by means of party organization and party usages, and substitute devotion to party, for devotion to the public, and thus make even the virtues of the people subservient to our selfish purposes. Hence springs up a system of party tactics, from which this country has more to fear, than from any other one cause whatever.

This system, if we have rightly learned it, — and we have learned it from the intimate personal associates of the distinguished man who is at present its most brilliant representative, — is in substance this : In a republican government, every thing must be done by means of party. Our first effort, therefore, must be to get, and to keep, our party in the majority. We must never propose any measure likely to throw it, or to keep it, in the minority. If we keep our party in the majority, we can, from time to time, through it, propose and carry such measures as we may judge to be proper, or expedient. Mark this. The *first* object is, not, to find out and support what is for the public good, but, by organization and discipline, to get, and to keep, our party in the ascendancy. *After this*, if we can serve the public without falling into the minority, well and good ; if not, why just as well and good, provided we only hold on — *to the offices*. Nothing can be worse than this. Regular organized parties, in a republican

government, organized with a view to permanence, so as to make it the primary duty of the citizen to support them, are fraught with the greatest danger to liberty. They are contrivances to override the constitution, and to enable a minority to rule the majority. They are machines constructed for the express purpose of centralizing power, for the express benefit of the intriguing politicians, who, by getting hold of the crank, may work then as they please. The only parties really defensible in a free government, are such as naturally and spontaneously spring up, and group themselves around different views of governmental policy. These come when they should, last as long as the difference of policy lasts, and then dissolve of themselves. They come, accomplish their object, and disappear.

But having determined that all is to be done by and through party, and that our primary duty is to labor for the organization and ascendancy of our party, the next thing to be insisted on is, *Fidelity to the party, and strict adherence to its usages*, — the surrender of all individual opinions, convictions, and preferences, to the decision of the party, which decision, be it understood, is always to be effected by the aforesaid politicians who have hold of the crank. This throws the whole business into the hands of central committees, and deprives the great mass of the citizens of all free voice in the determination of measures, or in the selection of candidates. These committees, often self-constituted, or, if not, chosen by a feeble minority, arrange every thing, and leave to the citizens at large, or to the great mass of the party, nothing to do, but to accept their arrangements, and support their nominations, or to assume the responsibility of throwing the government into the hands of the opposing party.

To keep the ranks of the party full, to prevent members from breaking away and asserting their independence, appeals are now made to the lowest and most corrupting passions of the human heart. The individual, who shows himself a little uneasy, or disposed to kick at the party traces, must be denounced, thrown over, and declared to be an enemy, and no longer enti-

tled to the confidence of the party. Thus men must be kept in the party, and faithful to its usages, decisions, and nominations, not by attachment to its principles and measures, but through fear, that, if they assert their independence, they will lose their share of "the spoils."

Now, fasten this doctrine on the country, and let it become our settled mode of disposing of all political matters, and our liberties, and the whole action of the government, will be at the mercy of the sly, cunning, adroit, intriguing, selfish demagogues, whom our country, as we have seen, has a direct and strong tendency to multiply.

And here, we must be permitted to say, is a strong reason why the American people should pause and deliberate long, before restoring Mr. Van Buren to the high office from which, in 1840, they so indignantly ejected him. It cannot be denied, that Mr. Van Buren is the most conspicuous representative of this system of party management, in the country. The system itself has been perfected, and to no inconsiderable extent was founded, by him and his more immediate political associates. He is intimately connected with it; owes to it all the political elevation he has ever received, and relies on it alone for his restoration to the presidency. He has no hope but in its influence; his restoration would, therefore, be a direct sanction of the system by the American people, and go far towards fastening it upon the country beyond the reach of future redress. In this view of the case, the reëlection of Mr. Van Buren, whatever his personal worth, would be a dangerous precedent, and a most serious public calamity.

In 1840, such was the state of certain great public questions, and such Mr. Van Buren's position, that all those of us, who felt deeply the importance of completing the financial policy commenced under his administration, were obliged either to vote for him, or to vote against our principles. But there is no necessity of driving us again to this severe alternative. More-

over, his defeat was not an unmixed evil, for it was not wholly owing to the opposition of the American people to the leading measures, or rather *measure*, — for it had but one, — of his administration ; but, to no inconsiderable extent, to the obnoxious system of party management he represented. We are not sure but the determination to get rid of that system — the caucus system — had as much to do in effecting his defeat, as opposition to the Independent Treasury. Men had grown weary of party tyranny, and disgusted with its machinery. That this gave to the Opposition no little of their strength is pretty clearly evinced by the fact, that no sooner were Mr. Van Buren and his caucus system believed to be out of the way, than the Republican party was stronger than ever. State after State returned, and gave their votes for the principles and measures of government, they had persisted, under him and his tactics, in voting down. The whole party, throughout the Union, gave a sudden spring, as if freed from some superincumbent weight, which had hitherto pressed it to the earth, and prevented all free movement. It was a general jubilee ; and men seemed to say, “ Now republican principles can have a free development, and a certain triumph.”

Considerate men, who had stood by Mr. Van Buren, and made no inconsiderable sacrifices to sustain him, felt, after all, that his defeat had its good side, in that it might tend to break up the old party organization, demolish its machinery, and leave men a measure of freedom to labor for the public good. They felt that all was not lost ; nay, that the gain might possibly, in the long run, overbalance the loss. Mr. Van Buren, they felt, was out of the way ; and this, in itself, was no trifling gain. Hope sprang up afresh, and, in the buoyancy of their hearts, they were disposed to treat him with all tenderness, to tread lightly on his faults, to forget the injuries he had inflicted on the Republican cause, and to magnify, as much as possible, his virtues and public services. His defeat softened prejudice and disarmed hostility, and all were disposed to follow him

to private life with marked respect, if not with gratitude. They felt, that, since he was no longer in the field, the disasters of the campaign could be easily repaired ; and that the Republican forces, marshalled again, under new leaders, with fresh hopes, and the natural stimulus of recently recovered freedom, would be in no danger of a future defeat. There was reason and justice in all this. But the reappearance of Mr. Van Buren upon the stage changes the whole aspect of affairs. He comes not alone, but as the chief of a band, which the country had devoutly hoped was dispersed, never to be collected again. He comes as the representative of the same old corrupt and corrupting system of party tactics, followed by the same swarm of greedy spoilsmen, with their appetite for plunder sharpened by the few years' abstinence they have been forced, through the remains of the original virtue and patriotism of the country, to practise. Gratify his wishes, restore him to the place he is personally soliciting, and we lose all that was good in the defeat of the Republican party in 1840, and retain only the evil. We restore, what, with an almost unheard-of effort, the country had thrown off, and place the Republican party in the condition in which it must be defeated again, or the country be inevitably ruined.

These are, no doubt, hard things to be said of a man who has once filled the high office of president of these United States ; but, if Mr. Van Buren had been at all worthy of that high office, they never would have been said ; for he would, on his defeat, have retired, and remained thenceforth in private life. The fact, that he is now before the public, soliciting to be restored to that office from which the country ejected him with indignation and disgust, is a proof of his moral unfitness for the place to which he aspires, and of the justice and wisdom of the people in ejecting him. He loses all the sympathy his defeat excited, forfeits all the respect with which generous hearts always follow the fallen, and all the sacredness that ordinarily belongs to those who have filled high office. He stands before us,

simply as an aspirant for the highest honor in the gift of the American people, and not an aspirant relying on his own personal merits and eminent public services, but on a system of party tactics and caucus machinery, which cannot be countenanced for a moment, without the most serious detriment to liberty, and the grossest indignity to civic virtue. Under these circumstances, he must expect to have hard things said of him, at least hard things to be *thought* of him, by every man capable of distinguishing between the virtues of the citizen and the virtues of the partisan. He voluntarily provokes the severest censure from every enlightened friend of his country, and of her republican institutions. It is too much to ask us to restore the old caucus system, the old party machinery, and reinstate all the old drill sergeants, by whose means our liberties have been jeopardized, and our Republic brought to the very edge of the precipice. It is too much to expect us quietly, now after so much has been done, to clear the onward path of republicanism ; now after Providence has so signally intervened in our favor against those who had for so long a time provoked its indignation, to replace the old impediments swept away by the whirlwind of 1840, by rallying again around the very man, who, of all others in the Union, relies most on these very impediments for success, and who cannot be ignorant, that, if it were not for the party contrivances which stifle the free voice of the people, he would never be solicited to leave, even for a moment, the classic shades of Lindewold.

We have spoken of the peculiar dangers to which institutions like ours are exposed. These dangers are great and threatening ; they have already acquired an alarming force, and seem almost ready to break upon us with overwhelming fury ; but we do not look upon them as inevitable, or irremediable. We may guard against them, and shelter ourselves almost, if not wholly, against all ill consequences. But our protection against them is in the virtue of the people, in their

firmness to resist the tendency to selfishness, which our institutions themselves naturally generate ; and we must add, in their virtue, not merely as *subjects* of the government, but as *citizens*.

Here, where suffrage is so nearly universal, the great body of the adult male population sustain to the government a two-fold relation, — the relation of *subject*, and the relation of *citizen*. As subjects, they are held to allegiance ; their virtue is loyalty, and their duty obedience ; as citizens, they are constituent elements of the government itself, and share in the administration.

A faithful discharge of all their duties as subjects will not secure the ends of good government. Good government demands, not only strict obedience to the laws, but just laws, and wise administration. The justice of the laws, and the wisdom of the administration, depend on the virtue and intelligence of the people, not in their capacity of subjects, but in their capacity of citizens. The republican form of government will prove a total failure, unless the citizens, acting as constituent elements of the government, carry into its administration loyalty to Eternal Justice ; that stern integrity, and disinterested devotion to the public, which will force the government, in all its practical workings, to seek, always and everywhere, the greatest good of each individual subject, whether high or low, rich or poor.

The chief danger, to which our republican institutions are exposed, does not lie in the disloyalty of the people when acting as subjects, but in their venality and corruption when acting as citizens, — in their increasing want of devotion to the public good, and increasing efforts to convert the government into a machine for promoting their own purely private and selfish ends, — each regardless of the evils he may cause it to inflict on others.

This distinction has not, we apprehend, been always made, nor sufficiently insisted upon. The teachers of morality, whether from the pulpit or the press, when insisting on the necessity of popular virtue to sustain

popular government, have confined themselves mainly to the virtue of the subject, that is, obedience to the laws, and the faithful discharge of the several duties involved in the various private relations of man with man; and it is still this obedience, and these private virtues, that our clergy have chiefly in view, when they speak of the necessity of religion as the support of popular government. Here is one great reason why we have so many tolerable subjects, who are grossly corrupt citizens; and why, with no mean share of private morality, we have scarcely the semblance of civic virtue. There has been, with us, in a deeper sense than is commonly implied, a total separation of Church and State. Religion and morality, in a political point of view, afford us little or no protection, because they are seldom brought to bear upon the people in their capacity of citizens. They will be sufficient for our wants, only when we are made to feel by our moral and religious teachers, that we must carry with us, in our capacity of citizens, all the singleness of purpose, all the firmness to resist temptation, and all the self-denial, and disinterested devotion to the Supreme Law, that we are required to have in our capacity of subjects, or private individuals.

Doubtless, the cultivation and growth of our virtues as subjects will tend to strengthen and confirm our virtues as citizens; but, on the other hand, the neglect of our virtues as citizens will tend to corrupt and destroy our virtues as subjects. I carry my selfishness with me into the discharge of my duties as a citizen, and I seek to make laws, or to administer the government, for my own private benefit. But I make the laws. If they are against my interest, why should I obey them? If I obey selfishness in making the laws, I shall be very apt to obey it in keeping them; and if I am corrupt in what concerns the public, I shall not long remain pure in what concerns individuals. We would not underrate the virtues of the subject, but, in their effects, the virtues of the citizen, in a country like ours, are of far more vital importance. The former affect few, and those

only for a short period ; the latter affect millions, and it may be through a thousand generations. Our religious and moral teachers should, then, bring the whole force of religion and morality to bear upon our conduct as citizens. The citizen, as distinguished from the subject, is a public officer ; in voting, he acts in a public capacity ; exercises, not a private right, but a public trust ; and, therefore, is bound to vote, not according to his private interests or feelings, but according to his most solemn convictions of the public good. No citizen has a right to say, "My vote is my own, and I may give it for whom I please." The consequences of his vote do not concern himself alone. In voting, he acts for others, no less than for himself. It is not, then, what he is willing to submit to for himself, that should govern him, but what he has the right to fasten upon those with whom he is associated. The citizen, who deposits his vote, should, then, do it under a deep and solemn feeling of his accountability, both to his fellow-citizens, or subjects, and to the Great Moral Governor of the Universe. He, who trifles with his vote, trifles with a sacred trust ; he who trifles with his vote, or suffers it to be tampered with by others, is as guilty as would be the Christian who should trifle with the most solemn act of his religion. He who gives his vote for the party, or the man, he cannot in conscience approve, and thus aids in fastening, what he cannot but believe an injury, on his country, is worse than a thief and a robber. He is a traitor to his God, his country, and his race. Here, no more than elsewhere, can there be the least compromise with duty, without guilt. To the citizen, as to the man, God says, "My son, give me thy heart." We must be made, as citizens, to feel this, and to act accordingly, or all is lost. Wise and just government cannot long coexist with the utter profligacy of the great mass of our citizens, as citizens. The citizens will impress upon the government their own want of public spirit and integrity. Our great danger lies here, — in our want of high-toned, stern, uncompromising civic virtue.

It is not our design, in this Journal, which is devoted mainly to the discussion of first principles, to mingle in the party strife about special measures or particular men ; but there are times, when men and principles are so interlinked, that it is impossible to disjoin them, and treat them separately. Such is, in our view, the present. We have reached such a crisis in our political affairs, that almost every thing depends, not on the party which now succeeds, but on the *man* we elect president. The great labor should now be to elect a president of the country, not the mere chief of a party, — a man who will go into office, and reform the administration, and wield the whole force of the government against the spoilsmen, and do all that he can, constitutionally, to arrest the tendency to suffer the politics of the country to lie under the control of the demagogues, as they have been for the last fifteen years. We want a man of high moral integrity, of a high order of intellect, of great firmness, decision, and energy of character, who shall look more than four years ahead ; a man who is above all party trickery, and who disdains all appeal to party machinery as the means of his elevation ; a man, in one word, the very opposite, in all his moral qualities and party relations, of Mr. Van Buren. We want a man at the head of the government who *is* a man, feeling his accountability to his Maker, and his duty to sacrifice himself, if need be, for the good of his country, and the moral and social elevation of his countrymen.

Now, it strikes us, that it is time for the sound portion of the people, disregarding all old party lines, and laying aside, for the moment, even favorite party measures, to rally around some such man, whether he has heretofore been called a Democrat or a Whig. Greater questions are at stake, than Bank or No-bank, Tariff or Free Trade. The very existence of our Republic, the very existence of our government, as it existed in the minds and the hearts of our fathers, and as capable of being a guaranty of individual liberty and public prosperity, is at stake. If the right man, if a statesman,

instead of a partisan, be placed now in the presidential chair, the circumstances of the country are such, that he can give to the political action of the country a healthy direction, and aid in our restoration to civic virtue. He can dash the hopes of the spoilsmen, and rescue the government from those who would make it an instrument of plundering the many for the benefit of the few. We have carried our ultraism, on both sides, far enough, and, go we with the *extreme right*, or the *extreme left*, ruin alike awaits us.

We trust this appeal does not come too late. Sensible men, in all parts of the country, are beginning to feel, that the success of the partisans of Mr. Van Buren, or those of Mr. Clay, representing as they do the opposite extremes, would be fraught with the most serious injury. Corruption has spread far and wide; the two armies of demagogues are marshalled, their drill sergeants are at work day and night; but it is to be hoped, that there is yet a sufficient number not enrolled in either of these divisions, to save the Republic. Let these men, who want justice and free government, make themselves heard before it is too late; let them select their man; let them rally to his support; and they will succeed. If not, if they fail, they will have the imperishable glory of having failed in a noble effort for a righteous cause. But they will not fail. There is a moral majesty in the movements of honest men and firm patriots, before which the unprincipled and corrupt cannot stand a moment. They will succeed. The moral forces of the universe are all with those who contend for the right, and let it not be said, that already the chains of party are so firmly riveted on our limbs, and our lips so closely fastened with its padlocks, that we cannot move nor speak.

ART. V. — 1. *Life of John C. Calhoun, presenting a Condensed History of Political Events from 1811 to 1843.* New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1843. 8vo. pp. 76.

2. *Speeches of John C. Calhoun, delivered in the Congress of the United States, from 1811 to the Present Time.* New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1843. 8vo. pp. 554.

THE title of the second work here named is inexact, and was given inconsiderately by the publishers, or editor, before receiving from Mr. Calhoun the one originally intended. The appropriate title, and which the author intended, as nearly as we remember, — for we have not now before us his Letter to the Editors of the *National Intelligencer*, in which he gives it, — is, “A Selection from the Speeches and other Writings of John C. Calhoun, since 1825, together with his Speech in Congress on the Subject of the War, December 19, 1811.” The title of the first-named work is well chosen, and liable to no objection. The life of Mr. Calhoun is intimately connected with the political history of the country, and his biography is necessarily a history of all the political events which have transpired since his entrance into the Congress of the United States. Perhaps no one of our statesmen has more completely identified himself with the history of the country. He no sooner entered Congress than he took an active and leading part, which he has continued from that time to this. This fact his able and candid biographer has properly appreciated, and has, in giving us a biographical sketch of Mr. Calhoun, given us one of the best political histories of the country, for the last thirty years and more, to be found in our literature.

John C. Calhoun, of Irish descent, was born in Abbeville district, South Carolina, March 18th, 1782, and is now in the sixty-second year of his age. He received his earliest education at a school in Columbia

county, Georgia, kept by his brother-in-law, Mr. Wardell, a Presbyterian minister. Subsequently, he entered Yale College, where he graduated in 1804, with distinction. He then devoted three years to the study of the law, eighteen months of which were spent at the celebrated Law School at Litchfield, Connecticut, at that time kept by Judge Reeves and Mr. Gould; the residue was spent in the offices of Mr. De Saussure (afterwards chancellor), of Charleston, and of Mr. Bowie, of Abbeville. His preparatory studies completed, he commenced the practice of the law in his native district, and at once took his stand with the oldest and ablest lawyers on the circuit.

Mr. Calhoun was not suffered to remain long at the bar. He was soon elected to the legislature of his native State, where he served two sessions. In the fall of 1810, he was elected to the Congress of the United States, and has since been, in one capacity or another, connected with the Federal Government without any intermission, till his recent retirement from the Senate. He was a member of Congress six years; then Secretary of War somewhat over seven; Vice-President of the United States from March 4th, 1825, to his resignation in the winter of 1832-'3; and senator, from that time till his recent resignation.

This hasty sketch merely shows us the sphere in which Mr. Calhoun has been placed, and the important and honorable offices he has filled; it tells us little or nothing of the man, or of the statesman. To be able to form any tolerable estimate of the man and the statesman, we must look to the questions in which he has been called to take part by his position and office, and to the part he has actually taken. Our limits will permit us merely to glance at a few of the more prominent of these questions. The principal questions, which came up during the time Mr. Calhoun was in Congress, were, 1. The war with England; 2. The United States Bank; 3. The Tariff and Internal Improvements.

With regard to the first, Mr. Calhoun took an active

part, and his first speech in Congress was designed to urge immediate and ample preparation for war. He was a uniform supporter of the war, and no man in Congress did more to suggest, mature, and obtain the adoption of efficient measures for prosecuting it; and no one in the country did more to stimulate the courage and the patriotism of the people. If the war was a just, necessary, and patriotic measure, Mr. Calhoun's course in regard to it was wise, bold, efficient, and deserving the warm approbation of his countrymen.

He also took a prominent part in the Bank question. At this time the Bank was an administration measure, and therefore a measure of the Republican party, with which Mr. Calhoun generally acted. It was not then, as now, a measure of the Federal party; it was demanded by a Republican administration, at the head of which was James Madison, and was supported by the majority of the more prominent individuals among its friends. It should also be remembered, that the circumstances, under which the project of a bank was then put forward and supported, were very different from those under which the recharter of the late Bank of the United States was urged, and the end proposed to be accomplished by it was by no means the same. Nothing is more plain than that Congress does not possess the substantive power to create a bank; but it is equally clear, that it has the power to create one, whenever it becomes *necessary* to enable the Federal government to discharge its constitutional functions. It is a power possessed only as an incident to other powers.

How far the regulation of the currency, beyond that of coining money, or putting its stamp on gold and silver, is the duty of the Federal government, may possibly be made a question; but, for ourselves, we have always agreed with Mr. Webster, that the currency is placed exclusively under its control; and, therefore, if a paper currency is admitted at all, it must be subject to Federal regulation. Of course, then, if a United States Bank were necessary for this purpose, the right to create one would vest in Congress, as incident to the power to

regulate the currency. But, however this may be, when the government is placed in such a condition, that it cannot perform its express and unquestionably constitutional functions without a bank, Congress has a right to create one ; as the grant of a power, or the imposition of a duty, carries along with it, always, all the powers necessary to the exercise of that power, or the performance of that duty ; and also, because the Constitution expressly declares, that Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary for carrying into effect "all powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

Now, it was contended at the time, in the then existing state of the currency, that the government, in its financial department, could not go on without a bank. The currency was deranged, specie payments were suspended by the banks, and the government, in consequence of its connexion with them, was obliged to receive its dues in their irredeemable paper. This paper was of unequal value in different parts of the Union. Its depreciation was as great as twenty *per cent.* in the District of Columbia, compared with that of Boston. How was it possible, in this case, to collect the revenues in a medium of uniform value, so as to obey the Constitution in not giving to one port in the Union an advantage over another ? How, with this paper currency, varying in value as you passed from one State to another, and from one section of the Union to another, was it possible to equalize the imposts and taxes ? It was necessary to compel the resumption of specie payments. To do this was the right and the duty of the government. The only question was as to the means. If a bank was necessary, a bank would, of course, under this view of the case, be constitutional.

The administration believed a bank to be necessary, and essential to the financial operations of the government, as well as for the general regulation of the currency of the country in view of trade and commerce. The case of the banks, at this time, was very different

from what it was in 1837. In 1837, the banks suspended payment, because they had made over-issues to individuals, who were not in a condition to be coerced into payment; and the suspension was rather a measure of relief to the debtors of the banks, than to the banks themselves. A measure of the Federal government, at that moment, compelling the banks to resume *instantly*, would have fallen not only with great weight on the banks themselves, but with a crushing weight on the great mass of the business men of the country. The recharter of a United States Bank in 1837, then, would have been a measure of terrible severity, and would have added not a little to the embarrassments from which the whole industry of the country was already suffering. But at the former period the case was different. The banks had over-issued, but, as Mr. Calhoun has remarked, they had over-issued to the government, a solvent debtor, whose stock was at par. The banks held this stock, and might have gone into the market and sold it for specie, and with that redeemed the excess of their issues. But this they would not do. They chose rather to draw interest on the stock, by discounting on it as capital, and to profit by its continued rise in the market. It was necessary to compel them to surrender these advantages which they held. The case here had scarcely any analogy with that of 1837; and the reasons for a bank, in the former case, were of a very different force from what they were in the latter. The principal weight of the bank, in the former case, would fall, not on the debtors of the banks, but on the banks themselves, and be felt in compelling them to use the government stock for taking up their over-issues, instead of using it as the basis of speculations.

It must be borne in mind, that the government was so linked in with the banks, by the fact of its treating their issues as money, that, at that time, the total separation of the government from them, by its refusal to receive and pay away their notes, was out of the question. Moreover, public opinion in relation to banks and banking would not, even for a moment, have sus-

tained the government in so bold a measure, if it had attempted it. No practical statesman could, at that epoch, have proposed such a measure. The boldest measure practicable was the resolution introduced by Mr. Webster, in 1816, prohibiting Congress from receiving, or paying away, the notes of any non-specie paying banks, in the collection or disbursement of its revenues.

But two methods of relieving the embarrassments of the government, and of compelling the banks to resume specie payments, were then possible; one, a national bankrupt law, and the other, a national bank. Mr. Calhoun was, as now, opposed to the former, as harsh, and unconstitutional; for, evidently, if the States have the right to incorporate banks, the exercise of that right cannot be controlled by the action of the Federal government, as it would be, by including them within the operations of a bankrupt law. Nothing remained, then, but a national bank. Mr. Calhoun, then, finally, with the greatest reluctance, went with the Republican administration, and the leading Republicans of the time, in support of a national bank. But, even then, he was unfavorable to a bank, regarding the question as one of bank or no-bank.

"In supporting the bank of 1816," he says, in a speech in the Senate, in 1837, "I openly declared, that, as a question *de novo*, I would be decidedly against the bank, and would be the last to give it my support. I also stated, that, in supporting the bank then, I yielded to the necessity of the case, growing out of the then existing and long established connexion between the government and the banking system. I took the ground, even at that early period, that, so long as the connexion existed, — so long as the government received and paid away bank-notes as money, — it was bound to regulate their value, and had no alternative but the establishment of a national bank. I found the connexion existing before my time, and over which I could have no control. I yielded to the necessity, in order to correct the disordered state of the currency, which had fallen exclusively under the control of the States." — *Speeches*, p. 263.

Mr. Calhoun is eminently a practical statesman. Al-

though possessing uncommon powers of generalization, as well as of acute analysis, and disposed always to look to first principles, yet he is always ready to yield, when necessary, to the force of circumstances. Though never, properly speaking, a bank man, and opposed to a national bank in principle, as a measure of independent and permanent policy, yet, in the circumstances in which he found the government and the country, in 1816, he could support a bank; and we, certainly, as strongly opposed as we are to the whole banking system, see not how he could have done better; for we are decidedly of the opinion, that, if the Federal government will treat bank-notes as money, receive them and pay them away, it is bound to regulate them, and a national bank seems, and always has seemed to us, the only feasible method of doing it.

In the *third* question, relating to the Tariff and Internal Improvements, Mr. Calhoun had also occasion to take part. In regard to the Tariff, the question, in 1816, was not a question of laying a tariff of duties for protection, but that of adjusting the war tariff to the relations of peace. The war had been the occasion of calling into existence various manufacturing establishments, which, supported by the high war duties, had attained to a state of considerable prosperity. It was feared, that peace, and a reduction of duties, would, by allowing a large increase of foreign importations, crush these incipient establishments, to the ruin of their proprietors, and the serious injury of the country. The country had suffered much, in the early part of the war, from its inability to meet at once the demands for consumption, created by the sudden diminution of foreign importations. To guard against this evil, to save the establishments already in existence, and to continue the stimulus which had already been given to the manufacturing industry of the country, a discrimination was called for, in the new tariff, in favor of such articles as were, or might be, the growth and manufacture of our own country. It was not a question of laying new duties, but as to the degree of discrimination to be

exercised in reducing, or taking off, already existing duties. Mr. Calhoun supported, or rather assented to, the discriminations demanded by the manufacturers.

It is probable, and we feel fully assured, that, if the broad, naked question of protection had then come up, and Congress had been called upon, as it was in 1824 and 1828, to adjust its tariff expressly with a view to protection, Mr. Calhoun would, even then, have been opposed to the protective, or, more properly, restrictive, system. But he does not appear, at that period, to have fully investigated the subject, and we think that he yielded more than he should have done. Then was the time to have resisted the system; and the only practical error we have found in Mr. Calhoun's long career as a statesman is, that he did not resist it. To say, as some do, that he is the father of the system, and that he fastened it upon the country, is not true; and the moment the question came up, in regard to a tariff, not for revenue, but for protection, he was found, where he has continued, in opposition to the system. The tariff of 1816 was a tariff for revenue; revenue was its sole object; and it touched the question of protection only incidentally, only in not reducing the duties on certain articles so low as they possibly might and would have been, if, in adjusting them, no reference had been had to the demands of the manufacturers. But even this was too much.

We do not find, that Mr. Calhoun ever committed himself to the constitutionality of the vast system of Internal Improvements by the Federal government, which was commenced soon after the return of peace; but we have little doubt, that, for a moment, he shared in the strong tendencies of the times. The effect of the war had been to draw off attention from the States, and to concentrate it on the Federal government; at least, this was the fact, so far as the Republican party was concerned. During the war, the rights of the States were defended by the Federalists. War has always a centralizing tendency, and, of course, the party waging and sustaining the war will always feel this tendency the

most. Add to this, that the party in favor of the war meets resistance, not only from individuals, but from States acting as States, which was the case in the war with England; and it is easy to see, that it will be led to restrict, as much as possible, the sphere of State action, and to enlarge and consolidate the powers of the Federal government. Now this is precisely what actually occurred. The Republican party, originally inclining to the States' Rights doctrines, and distrustful of the centralization of power in the Federal government, was the party that declared and sustained the war. In doing this, it had been forced to sustain the Federal government against the Federal party, and the States in which that party was in the ascendancy. All its habits and feelings came thus to be on the side of the Federal government, and to carry it away by a strong tendency towards centralization. Its members were strongly impressed, not with the necessity of maintaining the reserved rights of the States, but with the value of the Union, and the necessity of a strong and efficient central government. The Hartford Convention, which was got up as a sort of safety valve, as a means of letting off the superfluous steam which a violent opposition to the government and the war had generated in New England, had made many fear for the stability of the Union, and turn their attention to the means of consolidating and strengthening it. A vast system of public works, carried on by the Federal government, extending through all parts of the Union, and connecting all the extremities with the centre, and affording facilities to internal trade and intercourse, would obviously tend to this end. Men's minds were dazzled, and they began to dream of a great, a splendid Republic, one and indivisible, under a government fostering all interests, literature and science, prepared for all the emergencies of war, and all the arts of peace.

That Mr. Calhoun, for a time, shared this tendency, then the tendency of the Republican party, we have no doubt, and that he was, for a time, disposed to countenance it, we think not unlikely; but, if so, he soon cor-

rected himself, and resumed the genuine States' Rights doctrine, — a doctrine which divides, with us, the *exercise* of the powers of government between two co-ordinate governments, the State government and the Federal, leaving to the State the exercise of all the functions of government, except those expressly committed by the States to the Federal government.

Mr. Calhoun's career, as Secretary of War, deserves a full and extended notice, but we are obliged to pass it over with a single remark. He found the Department in the utmost disorder and confusion, and in a very few months he wholly reorganized it, increasing its efficiency, while at the same time retrenching very considerably its expenses. He here showed, in his reorganization and administration of the War Department, during the seven years of his secretarship, those remarkable administrative powers, unequalled by any executive officer we have ever had, and never surpassed by any one in modern times, unless perhaps by Napoleon. As much as we admire Mr. Calhoun, as a clear, profound, and original thinker, as the able and manly parliamentary orator, as the philosophical politician, we are far more impressed by his consummate ability as an administrative officer. He has remarkable powers of combination ; sees, at once, precisely what is requisite to be done ; and is unerring in the selection of his means and agents. We have no other statesman that can challenge comparison with him. He knows how to accomplish his ends, to establish a rigid accountability in every department, and to render it all but impossible for his agents to prove unfaithful or dishonest. Not a single defalcation took place in his department during the time he was at its head, and of the millions of dollars that passed through the hands of his subordinates, not a cent was lost to the government. One is tempted to ask the "sage of Lindenwold," whether he can say as much of the four years that it was his good fortune to be at the head of the Federal administration ?

We have dwelt the longer on this period of Mr. Calhoun's career, because it was in this period that he

laid the foundation of his popularity, and established his claims to be considered one of the very first men in the country ; and because it is the period of his life which the younger aspirants now on the stage are least familiar with, and oftenest misapprehend. We cannot follow him minutely in his subsequent career, as Vice-President for nearly eight years, and as Senator since the winter of 1832 - 3. During the leisure and opportunity, which the light duties of his office of Vice-President afforded him, he seems to have matured his views on all the great leading questions of government, of the Constitution, political economy, and the general principles of legislation, in which he has since taken part. The most important of the questions on which he has given his views are, the Restrictive System, the nature, extent, and limitations of the Federal Government, and of the rights of the States ; the Currency, the United States Bank, and the Banking System ; Distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the Public Lands ; the Bankrupt Laws ; the *Enterprise* and *Creole* cases, involving questions of international law ; the Ashburton Treaty, &c.

Of the *restrictive system*, the protective system, or American system, Mr. Calhoun has been the steady, uniform, and uncompromising opponent from the first, — the not pressing opposition to it in the form it came up in, in 1816, excepted, and then, as we have seen, he gave it no positive support. The real father of the system is Mr. Clay, a brilliant orator, of great ability, but a short-sighted statesman, — a man of expedients, not given to “abstractions,” nor accustomed to look for first principles ; captivated always by what appears plausible and likely to produce an immediate partial good, — a great man in his way certainly, but perhaps the unsafest of all our public men to be intrusted with power, or the general administration of the government. Mr. Clay, we doubt not, was honest in bringing the system forward, and in supporting it ; and he, no doubt, believed, that it would prove highly advantageous to the country. But he never understood the operation

of the system. Mr. Clay, so far as he has, or ever has had, any definite theory of government, is a democrat, in the worse, and in the better, sense of the word. When he first moved this measure, we make no doubt, that his real motive was to benefit the industrial classes, and at that period the industrial classes were far from being as sharply divided as now, into *proprietors* and *proletaries*. Especially was this true in his own section of the Union. The industrial classes were, in one way or another, nearly all producers; and his object was, to secure them a market for their produce, or rather to enable them to exchange their industry for the various necessities and conveniences of life.

Now, he said, with foreign trade, this cannot be done; because foreigners exclude our produce. We must therefore build up factories of our own, which will take the raw material of us, and give us manufactured goods in return, and then we shall be independent; both producer and manufacturer will be benefited. What if the article manufactured at home costs more than the imported article? Let the imported article be ever so cheap, you cannot buy it, without you have wherewithal to pay for it; and as you cannot pay for it in produce, you must, if you buy it, pay for it in money. But you must first get the money; and how can you get the money, unless you sell your produce for money? But that is impossible, for there are none to purchase it and pay us money for it. But, if the article is manufactured at home, you have the means of purchasing it, because you can exchange your produce for it; and, though it may be nominally dearer, it will be actually cheaper, than the imported article, because the former is purchasable, and the latter is not. This, if we recollect aright, is the sum and substance of his famous speech in Committee of the Whole, in 1824, though we have not read the speech since the spring of that year.

Now, this at first glance is plausible, but it is exceedingly fallacious. If Mr. Clay's premises are true, his protective system is unnecessary. Did it never occur

to him, that it makes no practical difference, as to the effect on our manufactures, whether it is the foreigner who excludes our produce, or we who exclude his manufactures? Foreigners can sell to us only on condition that they take in return, directly or indirectly, what is the growth or manufacture of our own country; consequently, their refusal to do this excludes them as effectually from our markets, as would a law of our own, imposing absolutely prohibitory duties. If, then, it was true, that foreigners would not, as Mr. Clay alleged, take our produce, there was no occasion for restrictive duties; because this refusal of foreigners prevented them from coming into our markets to compete with our own manufacturers. If this was the state of things, as Mr. Clay assumed, the restrictive system was useless and absurd; if there was not this state of things, that is, if foreigners would buy of us our surplus agricultural produce, then, the interest represented by Mr. Clay did not demand the policy he supported, for the foreign market was better for it than any artificial home market that could be created.

Mr. Clay's policy was, evidently, to confine American industry to American markets,—a narrow, contracted, and barbarian policy, wholly unworthy of the liberal spirit of modern times, which seeks to mould the whole human family into one vast association, and to make of the boundary lines of nations little more than the lines which separate different provinces of the same empire. He sought to isolate us from all the rest of the world, and to make us a nation wholly apart, without taking any interest in the general affairs of mankind. We would raise our own raw materials, and work them up for ourselves; just as if Providence would suffer a nation, more than an individual, to subsist in complete isolation! Each nation, no doubt, revolves on its own axis, but only as the condition of revolving around another centre, and of performing its part in the general system of nations with which it is connected. America has a part to perform in the general rôle of nations, and from which it has no right to attempt to

withdraw itself. It must contribute to the weal of nations, as well as to its own weal. Nations have no more right than individuals to be governed by complete selfishness. They should be animated by generous ideas, and pursue, not a selfish, but a generous policy. Mr. Clay, who is a man of strong feelings and generous impulses, felt this, when he favored the emancipation of Spanish America, of the Greeks, the Poles, &c., and we are sorry that he did not, when it concerned the peculiar interests of his own section of the country.

But the policy was not only illiberal, anti-social, and repugnant to the general mission of America in the work of modern civilization, but it was necessarily impotent with regard to the end for which it was sought. The great interests of our country are the planting interest, the farming interest, the commercial, and the manufacturing interests. It was the farming interest, the agricultural interest, as distinguished from the planting interest, that Mr. Clay represented, and wished to promote. This was the interest of his more immediate constituents, the Western and Middle States ; and he sought to benefit them, by creating a home demand for their surplus produce. It was not the manufacturing interest, as such, that he cared for, and he sought to advance it only as the condition of fostering the farming interest. That this was so is evinced by the fact, that his policy was supported, built up, and fastened on the country, by the Middle and Western States, where this interest predominates, against the votes of both the North and the South, representing the commercial and planting interests. Now, the slightest glance at the wide extent of our farming country, and its vast agricultural resources, is sufficient to show us, that no home market, which it is possible to create, can by any means satisfy its wants. Obviously, our cotton factories, unless we should manufacture for the whole world, cannot work up all the raw cotton we can grow ; equally obvious is it, that no manufacturing population we can create can consume more than a small portion of the surplus beef, pork, corn, wheat, &c., we can produce, if

we at all develop our agricultural resources. Thus far, the home market has done, and does, little or nothing towards determining the price of the great agricultural staples of the country.

Mr. Clay's policy, say what we will of it, was either unnecessary, or inadequate, let alone its justice, its constitutionality, and its effect on the relative position of the two classes of industrials, namely, proprietors and proletaries, — of which last we shall seize an early occasion to speak at length. And this fact is now beginning to be very clearly seen and felt. The planting interest was always opposed to the restrictive system; the commercial never more than reluctantly acquiesced, and that only because the wants of the manufacturing interest required an importation of articles, not the growth of this country, nearly equal to the diminution they otherwise occasioned, and more especially because the banking system, strengthened by the public deposits, greatly enlarged by high duties, by expanding the currency, so raised the prices of all articles, that it could come in over the restrictive tariff, pay the high duties, and still make a handsome profit; and now the farming interest feels the inadequacy of the home market, and demands admission into the foreign. It feels, that Mr. Clay's policy, which it so eagerly embraced, and so cordially supported, is really insufficient and hostile; and that, by closing, to some extent, our markets to foreign manufactures, it closes foreign markets to our agricultural products. The system is, therefore, now rapidly arraying against itself the three great and leading interests of the country, the planting interests of the South, the commercial interests of the cities, and the farming interests of the Middle and Western States; and it must, necessarily, be soon abandoned. The true policy for the manufacturing interest, in this state of things, is to acquiesce, and make the best bargain it can. It is able now to take care of itself, and its further extension should be left to its own natural development. Its natural growth will be as rapid as the wants of the country demand, or its healthy state will

admit. It can no longer rely on the restrictive system. Too powerful interests are leagued against that system, to suffer it to remain as the permanent policy of the country. It may be adopted by this Congress, but it will be repealed, or essentially modified, by the next ; thus keeping the country in a state of constant agitation, and business uncertain and fluctuating. The manufacturers should, therefore, demand, at least, consent to, such policy, as, from the fact of its being just to all sections and interests, will stand a good chance of being permanent.

The government must rely principally on the customs for its revenues, and it will want, even under the most economical administration, every cent that it is possible to raise from them. We shall be obliged to lay as high duties as can be laid, without diminishing revenue itself. These, we take it, will average about twenty-five *per cent.* ; higher than this, they would, we are inclined to believe, tend to diminish instead of increasing revenue ; and less would not give us a revenue adequate to the wants of the government. A revenue tariff, — to which nobody objects, — averaging, say, twenty-five *per cent.* on *all* our imports, would afford the manufacturers all the incidental protection they would need, or should have the face to ask for.

Taking this view of the case, we confess, that the tariff question does not interest us so much as it once did, and we think the controversy respecting it is in a fair way of being soon brought to a satisfactory close. But this was not always the case. The system had another aspect, which made it exceedingly unjust and oppressive to the Southern section of the country. If the manufacturing districts at the North could have taken up the main portion of the staples of the South, perhaps there would have been in the system no great sectional unfairness. But the home market they created for the Southern staples, cotton, rice, tobacco, &c., was altogether so inadequate, that it had little or no effect in determining their price. The planters had, after the adoption of the system, the same need of for-

eign markets that they had before. But the tariff, by restricting foreign imports, had a double effect ; it lessened the foreign demand for the staples of the South, and raised the price to the planter of all manufactured articles he must purchase in return for his staples. It thus diminished his means, while it augmented the price of the articles he consumed. It bore with peculiar hardship, therefore, upon the South. The North, which manufactured, though paying the same price for the articles it consumed, did not feel it, because it was the manufacturer, and because it was further indemnified by the protective bounty. But there was no drawback in favor of the South.

Nor was this all. The revenues were raised from the customs, by a tax on importations. But the imports can have no other basis than the exports of the country. A tax, therefore, on imports is effectively a tax on exports. The tax enhances the price to the consumer ; and nothing is better established than that just in proportion as you enhance the price to the consumer do you diminish consumption. By diminishing the consumption, you diminish the ability of the foreigner to sell, and, of course, his ability to buy. Consequently, the exporter finds the ability of his foreign customer to buy of him diminished just in proportion as the tax on imports has diminished their consumption. He must, then, export less, or at a less profit ; in either case, his means are diminished in the same proportion that the means of his customer are diminished. He must abate of his exports enough to place his foreign customer in the same condition he would be in, if the tax on his customer's wares, when imported into the country, had not been laid ; which proves, that it is virtually the exports that pay the tax on the imports.

Now, the exports were principally from the South. Its great staples were the basis of our imports ; and, as the revenues of the government were derived from the customs, the South virtually paid all the taxes for the support of the government. The tariff was, therefore, evidently unconstitutional, because the Constitution

requires the taxes to be proportioned equally among the States, according to the Federal census; and it was peculiarly oppressive to the South, because it threw upon it all the burdens of the government, while it depressed its industry, and not only exempted the North from taxation, but gave it a bounty on *its* industry.*

Mr. Calhoun was one of the first to see the inevitable tendency of the system, and to expose it. But what could reason and expostulation do? Mr. Clay had made the great farming States — commanding, when the others are at all divided, a majority — believe it for their interest to support it, and, against New England and the South, it was adopted. The power of these great central States the sagacious General Jackson was not slow to discover; and, finding them wedded, for the moment, to the restrictive policy, he adopted it, against the interests of his own section, and against the best interests of the country, and gave it the support of his astute politics, and immense personal popularity; and, as if determined that it should be the permanent policy of the country, he was hardly seated in the Presidential chair, before he recommended the distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among the States, — a measure, which, in common charity, we presume was concocted in the Albany Laboratory. In this case, Mr. Clay, at the head of the opposition, supporting the unjust, unequal, and unconstitutional measure; General Jackson and his friends also supporting it in princi-

* While we very strenuously contend for freedom of commerce, as between nations, we by no means give in to the modern free-trade, or *laissez-faire*, policy, as advocated by the late lamented William Leggett, and others. It is on other principles we found our opposition to the restrictive system. We have no confidence in what is said about individuals being the best judges of their own interests, and that all that is necessary for the peace and prosperity of a people is to leave them the natural workings of *free competition*. The duty of government is not simply to let us alone, to leave us to ourselves, and content itself with merely maintaining an open field for the full play of our natural selfishness. This would be for government to abdicate itself. We hold it to be the duty of government, often, to take the initiative, and by a wise and sound policy to foster and direct the industry of the country.

ple, and consenting to modify it only in a few details, and these mostly in a sense unfavorable to the South, what could be done?

It was the gloomiest time the country has ever seen. The Constitution had become only so much waste paper; the principles of constitutional republicanism were lost sight of, by one party and the other; and opposition and administration both seemed to agree, that any measure, which the majority of the people were in favor of, could in all cases rightfully pass. It was a day of trial. The sage of Monticello had seen the tendency before his death, and raised his warning voice, but his countrymen paid no attention to it; the glory had departed from the Old Dominion; New England had been forced into the support of the obnoxious policy by the Middle and Western States, and, being the chief gainer by it, could not be expected to go against it; the great mass of the active politicians were more concerned about the "spoils," than they were about the wise and just administration of the government; and even the chief of the administration felt so little the responsibility of his situation, that he found ample leisure to interfere in the visiting and social relations of the families of his secretaries. What could be done to save the country? who was there to do it?

There was but one man in the country, who could, or who, being able, would, at this juncture, have dared to step forth to arrest the fatal tendency, and to save the Union, the country, and republican institutions. This man was John C. Calhoun. He had the sagacity to perceive, the courage to adopt, and the energy to force the adoption, of the only practicable measure left. Going into a profound analysis of our system of government, guided by the teachings of Jefferson, he recalled to his countrymen a fact, which, since the return of peace, they had overlooked and forgotten; namely, that the Federal government is a constitutional compact, entered into by sovereign States, and, therefore, that the sovereignty with us vests not in the Federal government, but in the States, parties to the com-

pact. In forming the compact, the States did not part with their sovereignty, but merely formed a mutual compact, by which they solemnly stipulated, that certain specified attributes of sovereignty should be exercised henceforth, not by each State separately, but by all in common, or conjointly. In this case, the allegiance, due from the subject to the sovereign, is not due to the Federal government, but to the State. The Federal government reaches me, a subject of Massachusetts, only through the government of Massachusetts, and I therefore owe only such obedience to the Federal government, as Massachusetts has enacted.

This view, of course, leaves the State free to exercise all the functions of government, except those which she has stipulated shall be exercised only conjointly with the other States of the Union. She has, then, by virtue of this reserved sovereignty, the right to set aside, in her own dominions, and so far as concerns her own subjects, any and every act of Congress, which is not authorized by the terms of the constitutional compact. The parties to the compact being equal, and there being no common umpire, each, as a matter of course, is its own judge of the infraction of the compact, and of the mode and measure of redress. The State, then, if she judged proper, had the sovereign right to set aside this obnoxious tariff enactment, in her own dominions, and prohibit her subjects, or citizens, from obeying it; and they, on their allegiance to the State, and not to the Union, would be bound to treat it as a nullity. The resistance, firm, decided, of a single State, would, of course, prove effectual; for the machinery of government would thus be stopped, as effectually as the Tribunitial veto arrested the act of the Roman Senate.

We here merely state the doctrine; but we intend hereafter to take it up at length, and to do our best to determine, if possible, once for all, its soundness, or unsoundness. All we would now say is, that we have no sympathy with those political friends of Mr. Calhoun, who seek to palliate his doctrine concerning

State interposition, and to forget, and to induce the country to forget, the part he took. We hold ourselves among the warmest, if not among the most politic, of Mr. Calhoun's friends, and we are willing and anxious to rest his claims to the admiration and gratitude of his country, on the part he took, by means of the interposition of State action, in arresting the obnoxious policy. It is here, more than anywhere else, that is revealed his disinterestedness as a man, his fidelity as a patriot, and his courage, force, and wisdom as a statesman. It was a proud moment for Mr. Calhoun, that when he rose in the Senate chamber, to pronounce his protest, and that of the chivalrous State he represented, against the coercive measures recommended by the administration; when, with the axe of the executioner suspended over his head, and the chief of the nation watching eagerly for an opportunity to command it to fall, with the whole force of the government arrayed against him on the one hand, and on the other the whole force of the opposition, scarcely inferior, — when he rose there and stood unmoved, and with his single force turned back each hostile army, and laid their respective chiefs at his feet, and dictated to them the terms on which he would grant them mercy. There is no instance in our history where a man has dared so much, nor where such daring has been crowned with so sudden and so signal a triumph. The moral attitude of the man, at that moment, was sublime, almost beyond a parallel in history. He set then to the statesman an example of civic virtue, of moral heroism, of patriotic devotion, and of consummate wisdom and skill, rarely, if ever, before, exhibited in so eminent a degree, and which none but statesmen of the very highest order can even appreciate, much less follow. Shall a friend of Mr. Calhoun blush at this sublime example, which every republican statesman should struggle, in case of need, to imitate? Shall we pass lightly over it, for fear we may kindle up anew some old prejudices, and perhaps endanger his success as a candidate for the Presidency? What is the Presidency

of these United States to such a man as Mr. Calhoun? Just as if an election to the Presidential chair were a new triumph for him, who alone had proved himself more than a match for the combined forces of both administration and opposition; and who had seen both Jackson and Clay at his feet! Just as if he had not already risen higher, and achieved honors far above all possible official rank and dignity! It may be a matter of some moment to the country, whether Mr. Calhoun shall or shall not be President of the Union; to himself it is none at all. The Presidential chair may receive new dignity and lustre from him; to him it can give none.

We have heard it said, that Mr. Calhoun is ambitious; and we believe he is ambitious; but his ambition is of that sort which is incomprehensible to the ignoble minds who aspire to place and power as the means of acquiring wealth or renown; it is of that sort which leads a Socrates to persist in teaching the youth of his country to love truth, and practise virtue, at the risk of being condemned to death; the Decii to devote themselves for the salvation of the Republic; and the saint to prefer burning at the stake, to the abandonment of principle, or the desertion of the cause of God and humanity. Ambition of this sort he has, and in a much larger abundance than falls to the lot of ordinary mortals; and we thank God, that, for the honor and safety of our common country, it is so. Little men, petty politicians, unconscious of aught great or generous in their own feelings or motives, may fancy, that, in his resistance to the tariff of 1828, he was governed by spite toward the chief of the administration, and that he was moved by disappointed ambition. Disappointed ambition! Why, he stood the second officer in the Republic, and with one foot, as it were, in the first, the most popular man in the nation, at least with a single exception, and able at will to rise to the highest official rank and dignity the country could give. Such a man's ambition disappointed? Preposterous. That he was disappointed in General Jackson, whom he had

generously supported for the Presidency, that he may even have spurned with contempt the petty intrigues, the narrow and selfish policy, introduced by politicians of the Albany school, whose loftiest maxim was, "to the victor belong the spoils," is very possible; but no man, holding the position he held before the country, could possibly have taken the course he did, risked so much, sacrificed so much, from any purely personal motive. Say, if you will, his doctrine was unsound, or that its application was uncalled for; but do not, we beseech you, so libel your own hearts, and your own knowledge of human nature, as even to pretend, that a man can do what he did at the command of any other voice than that of the deepest convictions of duty, the loftiest patriotism, and the most generous devotion to principle.

We confess, that we linger with uncommon pleasure, and hope, on this period of Mr. Calhoun's life. In these days of venality and corruption, of selfishness and plunder, when patriotism is scouted, and civic virtue scarcely once thought of, it is some consolation to find one, even in the ranks of the highest, who can be moved by more generous impulses than love of popularity, and follow the lead of a loftier ambition than the mere selfish possession of place and power. His example is full of moral grandeur, and with superb majesty rebukes the whole herd of selfish and intriguing aspirants. It proves that Providence has not wholly deserted us and given us over to a reprobate mind, and permits us to hope, even in these hours of darkness, that there is in the country the virtue that will redeem and save it. Yes, my countrymen, there is yet hope for us; the Providence that watched over us in the days of our childhood, that, from the little band of wanderers in the desert, has enabled us to become a great and mighty nation, and whom we have so often proved by our transgressions and hard-heartedness, is yet with us, and will deliver us.

We wish our limits would permit us to go through with an analysis of the remaining questions, and point

out the part Mr. Calhoun has taken ; but this we cannot do, for it would be to rediscuss all the great and leading questions which have agitated the country since 1834. In all these questions Mr. Calhoun has taken part, freely, boldly, independently, — sometimes on the side of the administration, sometimes on that of the opposition, sometimes against both ; but always in obedience to the same leading thought, the same elevated, generous, and patriotic policy. He never offers a factious opposition, nor yields an indiscriminate support. He always considers every question on its own grounds, and supports or opposes it for its own merits or demerits, never in reference to its bearings on this or that party ; thus acting always from his own independent convictions, — from party dictation, never. Here he is strikingly distinguished from the chief of the Albany school, below whom, in the virtues of the partisan, he falls as far, as he rises above him in the virtues of the citizen, and the accomplishments of the statesman. Mr. Van Buren has, in politics, no standard of right and wrong but the will of his party, on the surface of which he floats, ready to take any direction the selfish views of its managers may give him ; he is always pliable, manageable, with no obstinate convictions of his own in his or anybody's way. He is the *beau idéal* of a true party man, riding, as we said of him some years ago, on the storm, but *not* directing its course. We cannot say as much of Mr. Calhoun. His deficiencies in a party sense are notorious, and not to be concealed. He may use party, but he will not serve it ; he may give law to it, but absolutely refuses to take the law from it. He assumes to judge even party itself, to labor to set it right, where wrong ; and, if he cannot set it right, he keeps on his course without it, or even against it. Mr. Van Buren is loyal to party ; he will adhere to his party, when it is in the minority, as well as when it is in the majority ; for he relies for his own success not on his own personal merits as a man, or a statesman, but solely on the success of his party ; thus merging, without reluctance, his own individuality in his

party, and consenting to be nothing out, or independent of it ; yet, if his party is divided, he takes good care to maintain a prudent reserve, or to vote with the larger division. What enemy of his has ever been able to isolate him from his party ? Who has ever caught the weasel asleep ? Mr. Calhoun, on the contrary, is often found voting with the minority of his party, often completely isolated from it, and not unfrequently in decided opposition to it. Ascertain where his party is going, and you know where to find Mr. Van Buren ; to know where to find Mr. Calhoun, you must comprehend his principles of government, and his views of governmental policy, and perceive clearly where these lead, for there you may know beforehand he is sure to go, with, without, or against, party, as the case may be. To men, whose rule of action is to go with their party, and who have yet to learn that true consistency is in standing, not by one's party, but by one's principles, all this may seem very inconsistent, and to mark a man on whom no reliance can be placed ; to men, who, conscious of no individual merits or responsibilities of their own, seek to merge themselves in the irresponsibleness of party, all this may seem a very great imprudence, even a crying sin ; but we need not add, that it is the only course a high-minded and honorable man, conscious of his responsibility to his God and to his country, ever will, or ever can, take.

We intend returning to the subject of this article in our next, and to take up, at considerable length, Mr. Calhoun's senatorial career, subsequent to the passing of the Compromise Act. We will close our present remarks, by saying, that we have introduced Mr. Calhoun into our pages, without reference to the fact, that he is now before the American people as a prominent candidate for the Presidency. Whatever may be our personal feelings and wishes, we are, in point of fact, in no sense pledged to his support, and speak in no sense as the organ of him or his friends. In this Journal we are non-committal on the Presidential question, save so far

as opposition to the reëlection of Mr. Van Buren is concerned. To Mr. Van Buren we are decidedly opposed, and for reasons given in the preceding article. We are not opposed to him because we prefer Mr. Calhoun, or because we have a personal preference for some other candidate; but on principle; because we find in him no one qualification for the office to which he aspires, and because he represents, at present, a loose, political radicalism, which we believe it the duty of every citizen who loves his country, and wishes to preserve her institutions, firmly, boldly, and perseveringly to resist to the last. The people, in 1840, not without justice, demanded a change in the administration of the government, though we thought then, and still think, that that was not the most auspicious time for making it; but, as they demanded it, and effected it, we contend it would be worse than folly now to attempt to reverse their decision, and to restore the elder branch of the Bourbons. At the moment Mr. Benton made his move in favor of Mr. Van Buren, we, in our humble way, commenced a counter move; and, whichever may prove ultimately successful, we shall persevere in our opposition to the end.

We own, that we should rejoice to see Mr. Calhoun in the Presidential chair, not because he is a States' Rights man, not because he is an Anti-Tariff man, not because we adopt his views of most of the leading questions of the day, but because he is a pure and upright man, an honest, able, and high-minded statesman, and — no demagogue, or friend of demagogues. In the present crisis of the country, it is of much more importance to choose a man who will administer the government with a strong and honest hand, and rescue it from the control of the demagogues and spoilsmen, than it is to choose one of this or that political creed. The times require all who wish well to republican institutions to act from higher considerations than those of the success of this or that party. Any man, on whom the *sound* part of the people will unite, is our man. We go for the country, not for party, nor for *justice* to this or that individual. Mr.

Van Buren's friends may think he ought to be reëlected in order to save his reputation, and it may be so ; Mr. Calhoun, his friends feel, needs nothing for himself ; his reputation and fame are in no danger.

ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *A Discourse on the True Idea of the State as a Religious Institution, together with the Family and the Church, ordained of God.* By TAYLOR LEWIS, Esq., Professor of Greek in the University in the City of New-York. Andover, Mass. : Allen, Morrill, and Wardwell. 1843. 8vo. pp. 56.

THE great question of the State may be asked from two distinct points of view ; 1. As to the mode of its constitution ; whether it shall be so constituted as to intrust its administration to the one, to the few, or to the many ; 2. Be its constitution what it may, — what is the origin and foundation of the right of the State to command and enforce obedience ? — To the question under this last point of view, five answers may be returned ; 1. The right of the State vests in the soil, as in the early constitution of Rome, or in property in general ; 2. It vests in a certain family ; 3. In a certain number of families ; 4. In the people ; 5. It is founded in the will of God. The first three answers may be dismissed as exploded. The question now turns between the will of God, and the will of the people. Is the *right* of the State to command founded in the will of the people, or in the will of God ?

To founding the right in the will of the people, there are two objections ; first, the people are not a people, till organized into a state ; and, therefore, to found the State on the will of the people supposes the people to have a will before they exist ; and, secondly, as the people are to be the subjects of government, if we assume them to be the sovereign, we fall into the absurdity of contending for a sovereign without subjects. The right of the people, as the body politic, to govern is conceded ; the question is, as to what constitutes them the body politic. When a body politic, they are, no doubt, in a political sense, the sovereign ; but the real question goes back

of this, and asks, What is that which makes them a body politic? If it be said, that this is their own act, the question returns, Whence their right to organize themselves into a body politic? The Democrat answers, it is a right inherent in them by virtue of their human nature. This assumes the foundation of all legitimate authority to be in human nature. But human nature is equally in all men. The right of this, in any one man, to govern, is equal to its right in any other man. Consequently, the right of each and every man to govern is established. But, if the right of each and every man to govern is established, the duty of each and every man to obey is denied. But government, which nobody is bound in duty to obey, can have no *right* to command. A government that commands, without any right to command, is tyranny. Either, then, no government or tyranny? So this answer will not serve our purpose, if we are to have government at all, and legitimate government.

There remains, then, as the only possible foundation of the right of the State to command and enforce obedience, the will of God, — the only legitimate source of power. This is the answer adopted by Professor Lewis. He maintains, that the State is ordained of God, and governs rightly only by virtue of the Divine will, of which it is the embodiment. But he affirms this of every actually existing government; and, therefore, necessarily affirms, that all the tyrannies and oppressions, which are, or ever have been, experienced from civil governments, are only so many manifestations of the Divine will! All rulers, no matter how wicked, how corrupt, how exacting, how crushing to the people, rule by Divine appointment, are executing the will of God, and resistance to them is rebellion against God!

Professor Lewis is driven to this horrible conclusion, by his preferring heathen notions to the principles of Christianity. If he was as familiar with the literature of the Church as he is with the literature of pagan Greece and Rome, and had as much faith in the Fathers of the Church as he has in Aristotle and Cicero, he would easily escape this conclusion, even while contending, as he very properly does, for the foundation of government in the will of God. He makes the State in itself, by its own inherent virtue, a religious institution; of course, then, he can admit no authority which can have the right to resist it. Redress of grievances, or reform of abuses, can *never* be legitimate, but through the action of the civil government itself.

We ourselves are far from admitting the right of the *individual*, on his own individual responsibility, to resist the gov-

ernment; but we contend most earnestly for the right of resistance to tyranny and oppression everywhere, or anywhere; and we will not so blaspheme our Maker as to say, that tyranny and oppression are ever by his appointment, or by instruments of his adoption. The error of Professor Lewis comes from his assuming the Church and the State to be *co-ordinate* institutions. The Church, the State, the Family, according to him, are three *co-ordinate* Divine institutions. Is this the Christian idea? The Family is a religious institution, we admit; but only by virtue of the sacrament of marriage. It is religious, because the Church has blessed it and given it a holy sanction, rendering it indissoluble, save by the authority that sanctions it. So also is the State a religious institution, but only on the same ground, only because the Church commissions it, and commands the subject to obey it. But the Church is competent to declare when obedience ceases to be a duty, and to prescribe the mode and measure of resistance.

But this the Professor declaims against, as reëstablishing the supremacy of the Church. Be it so. Does not he himself contend, that the Church is Divine? Is he *more* afraid to trust the Church than the State? Is the Divinity of the former less than the Divinity of the latter? Nay, through what medium will he transmit the Divinity to the State and the Family, if not through the medium of the Church? Does he contend, that there is any other mediator between God and men, than the man Christ Jesus, who has founded the Church, and is its Life? If the Son of God is the *only* mediator, then it must needs be only through the Church, his body, that the divine virtue can be communicated to the State and the Family. To deny, then, the supremacy of the Church, and to represent the Church, the State, and the Family, as three *co-ordinate* institutions, each supreme, independent, in its own sphere, without reference to a common superior, is to fall into a gross absurdity, and to contradict the fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion.

But what guaranty have you that the Church will not abuse its power? Strange question for one who believes in the Divinity of the State and the Family! Just as if God needed to establish one Divine institution as a check on another? Why, the Professor has not mastered the very alphabet of his science. Ask, what guaranty we have that the Church will not abuse its trust? Why not ask, what guaranty we have that God himself will not tyrannize? Is not the Church a Divine institution? Does it not rest on the Rock of Ages, on the Foundation Stone, the precious Corner Stone, which the Lord himself hath laid? Is not God's own Son its Support, its Head, its Life, agreeably

to his promise, "Lo, I am with you always unto the end of the world"? If you believe this, that is, if you believe in the Church at all as the Church of God, this distrust is not only unreasonable, but blasphemous. Why, then, refuse to build on the Church? They were, if we recollect aright, the *foolish* builders, who rejected the Foundation Stone, which the Lord had laid in Zion. But the subject requires an ampler discussion than we can now give it. We will only say, in conclusion, that with much that Professor Lewis advances, we heartily concur; his Discourse is marked by rare ability, and great richness of thought; but it has quite too much heathenism, and too little Christianity, for our taste and faith.

2. — *A Critical Introduction to the Canonical Scriptures of the Old Testament.* From the German of DE WETTE. Translated and enlarged by THEODORE PARKER, Minister of the Second Church in Roxbury. Boston: Little and Brown. 1843. 2 vols. 8vo.

WE can only notice, at present, the fact of the publication of this book, and bear our unequivocal testimony to its high character for extensive and various erudition. The original work stands deservedly high; but we may almost say, that it constitutes the least valuable portion of the work before us. Mr. Parker's additions are often superior to De Wette's text. Taking the work as a whole, it perhaps may be said to contain all that needs to be said on the mere literature of the Old Testament, and we look upon it as highly creditable to Mr. Parker's scholarship. As to the opinions, critical or exegetical, theological or philosophical, scattered through these two huge but beautifully printed volumes, we have nothing to say. There are few points on which we and Mr. Parker are likely to entertain the same views. We esteem him for his personal worth; we respect him for his scholarship; we honor him for his independence; but we believe his doctrine concerning Religion, the Bible, the Church, Christianity, and Philosophy, radically false, and in no slight degree detrimental to the cause of truth and righteousness. Nevertheless, we have found less in these volumes to offend the sincere Christian, than we have in his other productions; and all denominations of believers may, perhaps, read them without injury and with profit to themselves.

3. — *Lectures on Modern History, from the Irruption of the Northern Nations to the Close of the American Revolution.* By WILLIAM SMYTH, Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge. From the Second London Edition, with a Preface, List of Books on American History, &c. By JARED SPARKS, LL. D., Professor of Ancient and Modern History in Harvard University. Cambridge: John Owen. 1841. 2 vols. 8vo.

WE neglected to notice these finely printed volumes, when sent to the Boston Quarterly Review, by the publisher. We hope they have been profitable to the printers and publisher, for we should be sorry to think that they had been profitable to no one.

4. — *Démocratie Pacifique, Journal des Intérêts des Gouvernements et des Peuples.* Paris: Rue de Tournon, No. 6.

THIS is the title of a new daily paper, into which, on the first of August last, was converted the *Phalange*, the leading French Fourierist Journal. We have received most of the numbers, and have read them with much interest and some profit. The Journal is conducted with rare ability, and appears to be exerting considerable influence on the French mind. Of its peculiar doctrines, we shall have much to say, when we get through the crabbed writings of the Master, Charles Fourier.

5. — *Conservatism and Reform. An Oration pronounced before the Peucinian Society, Bowdoin College, Sept. 5, 1843.* By FREDERIC H. HEDGE. Boston: Little and Brown. 1843. 8vo. pp. 39.

MR. HEDGE is a scholar of rare abilities and attainments, a chaste, eloquent, and vigorous writer; a free, bold, and profound thinker; an earnest, faithful, and acceptable minister of religion. The views he has put forth in this Oration are manly, bold without being rash, and such as require us to labor for progress, instead of destruction. We regret, however, that Mr. Hedge should have so far conformed to popular prejudice, as to assume for his starting-point, Conservatism and Reform, as two opposite phases of one and the same great fact. It is an error to regard them as *opposite* phases, and then to seek to

reconcile one with the other. This is too much like attempting to reconcile religion and philosophy, after having first given them as two distinct systems of truth, resting on different foundations. Conservatism and Reform should never be given as antagonist systems, nor as *two* systems substantially agreeing one with the other; but as one and the same thing. Or, rather, Conservatism should be given as the condition of Reform, and Reform as the condition of Conservatism. This is really the thought of the Oration before us, though not expressed so clearly as we could have wished.

We are sorry to discover, here and there, in this Oration, some traces of the miserable Transcendentalism which has of late obtained amongst us, and which spins Truth, Good, Beauty, even God himself, out of the human soul, as the spider spins its web out of its own bowels. We had flattered ourselves that Mr. Hedge had worked himself entirely clear of this false notion. The Church, and all really valuable institutions, by which society is elevated and carried forward, are given to man by his Maker, and not developed by, nor from, the human soul. God alone is able to create without preëxisting matter; man can create only by means of a matter foreign to himself.

* * We send out this number as a fair specimen of what the public may expect if the journal continues. The design of the work, it will be seen, is somewhat peculiar. It is to consist mainly of original essays from a single pen. This plan is adopted, because the views of its editor are so peculiar, that it is impossible to open the pages to various contributors without destroying the necessary unity; and also because those who take it at all will take it for the writings of the editor. We have adopted this plan, moreover, because we have no room for any body else. We publish the journal because we have something we wish to say, and which we believe important to be said. We publish it for a serious, solemn purpose; and, because such is our purpose, we dare ask the patronage of the friends of freedom and religion, truth and progress, throughout the country. We have never, on any former occasion, asked the public to sustain us. We do it now, for we need public support; and we shall do our best to merit it, and to give a full equivalent for all we receive.